Nova Law Review 34, 3 by ,
Nova Law Review
Volume 34, Issue 3 2010 Article 1
Nova Law Review 34, 3
Nova Law Review∗
∗
Copyright c©2010 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
1: Nova Law Review 34, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 34 SUMMER 2010 NUMBER 3
HEALTH LAW ISSUE
Dedication in Memory of Stephanie Feldman Aleong
Introduction: Remembering Stephanie Feldman Aleong .... Kathy L. Cerminara 565
A Letter to M ost Darling Steph ................................................... Madison Gray 571
Remembering Stephanie ............................................................ Susan Polsinelli 575
Stephanie F. Aleong: A Tribute to a Natural Leader .................... Carsten Evans 579
Memorial Dedication to Stephanie Feldman Aleong ......................... Ani B. Satz 583
Stephanie Aleong: A Friend, Colleague, and Inspiration ........ William E. Adams 585
Stephanie Aleong: A Brief Recollection and Tribute ..................... Joel A. Mintz 587
Stephanie Feldman-Aleong:
A Legacy of Love and Loyalty ............................................ Anthony Niedwiecki 589
Professor Stephanie Aleong: More than My
Professor and Mentor-My Friend ......................................... Anthony M. Stella 593
ARTICLES
The Impaired Physician: Medical, Legal, and
Ethical Analysis with a Policy Recommendation .......... Rebecca Sara Feinberg 595
Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry:
Lessons from Hatch-Waxman and an Early
Evaluation of the Biologics Price Competition
and Innovation Act of 2009 .................................................. Matthew . Seamon 629
The Need for an Equitable Revolution to
"Appropriately" Remedy Wrongfully Denied
Benefits Under ERISA ............................................................. Robert C. Sheres 679
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/1
Closing the Door: Mental Illness, the Criminal
Justice System, and the Need for a Uniform
M ental Health Policy ................................................................. Shane Levesque 711
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Florida's Fight Against Prescription Drug Abuse:
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program ......................................... Ashley Dutko 739
Every Woman Deserves Her Own Pair of Genes:
The Constitutionality of Patenting the BRCA
Genes in Association for Molecular Pathology v.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office ................................................... Morgan Geller 765
3
: Nova Law Review 34, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
In Memoriam
Professor Stephanie Feldman Aleong
1972-2008
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/1
INTRODUCTION: REMEMBERING STEPHANIE FELDMAN
ALEONG
KATHY L. CERMINARA
I wish I were not writing this Introduction. As wonderful an issue of
the Nova Law Review as this is-and it is indeed a tour de force-it com-
memorates the loss of my dear friend and colleague, Stephanie Feldman
Aleong. I would gladly trade this publication opportunity to have Stephanie
back. The tragedy of her unexpected death in 2008 at the age of thirty-six
shook Nova Southeastern University's Shepard Broad Law Center to its core,
and we still sorely miss her. I'm sure we always will.
Nevertheless, we play the cards we are dealt in life, as no one knew bet-
ter than Stephanie. A juvenile diabetic who coped with her disease and
overcame past tragic events with sheer force of will and a huge personality,
this tiny woman liked to credit her infinitely positive attitude to her father's
advice that "You have to fake it until you can make it." Everyone who knew
Stephanie knew how she incorporated this admonition into her life, consis-
tently putting a positive spin on bad news and counseling others to look on
the bright side of any situation. Stephanie faced bad news countless times as
she battled melanoma this last time, from the day she first learned the diag-
nosis, throughout her research of treatment options, with her decision to
enroll in a clinical trial, and while preparing for anticipated discomfort as she
began the trial. Yet, "faking it until she could make it," she found the silver
lining in each cloud. Not long before she began the trial, only thirteen days
before her death, she assured her friends, family, colleagues and students that
"I am a tough little bird so I will undergo this therapy with a cheery heart and
a smile . .."
The tributes at the beginning of this issue afford the reader some
glimpse into why Stephanie was special to those of us who had the opportu-
nity to know her.2 On personal notes, Stephanie's friends Madison Gray and
Susan Polsinelli offer snapshots of the roles that she played in their lives at
1. E-mail from Stephanie Feldman Aleong to Faculty at Nova Southeastern University
Shepard Broad Law Center (Oct. 8, 2008) (on file with author).
2. See also James B. Levy, In Memoriam: Stephanie Feldman Aleong, 15 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. xiii (2009) (eulogizing her); Jennifer S. Bard, What We in Law Can Learn
From Our Colleagues in Medicine About Teaching Students How to Practice Their Chosen
Profession, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 841, 848 (2008) (describing her as "a distinguished health
law scholar and law professor whose remarkable commitment to innovative teaching is a
model for us all"); Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination,
83 WASH. L. REV. 513, 513 n.al (2008) (dedicating article to her).
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Vanderbilt University and in the Office of the State Attorney in Miami-Dade
County, Florida. Assistant Dean Carsten Evans of Nova Southeastern Uni-
versity's College of Pharmacy explains the important role Stephanie played
in the lives of countless Floridians as she and a team of investigators van-
quished a major pharmaceutical counterfeiting operation when she was an
assistant statewide prosecutor.3 After serving the state attorney general's
office in that capacity, Stephanie moved into teaching, heading to Emory
Law School, where she was a colleague of Professor Ani Satz, whose tribute
reflects great respect and affection. Finally, Stephanie came to our law
school, where her colleagues and students found herjoie de vivre and talent
inspirational, as is evident from the tributes of Dean Bill Adams, Professors
Joel Mintz and Anthony Niedwiecki, and alumnus Anthony Stella, once one
of Stephanie's students.
In part because of her juvenile diabetes, Stephanie felt strongly about
using her academic scholarship to further combat drug counterfeiting. While
teaching her beloved Criminal Law and Lawyering Skills & Values students,
she influenced pharmacists and other health care professionals through her
directorship of our Master of Science in Health Law program. She also re-
searched and wrote about America's flawed pharmaceutical supply chain.4
When the editors of the Law Review and I planned this issue, however,
it did not seem appropriate to narrowly focus on pharmaceutical regulation
when remembering Stephanie. Far from one-dimensional, Stephanie could
intelligently discuss, debate, and offer valuable comments on every subject
ranging from bioethics to health care policy. Therefore, it seemed most fit-
ting to include in this issue articles on a similarly broad range of health law
topics. Thanks to hard work by the Law Review editors and staff, especially
Alyson Sincavage and David Stahl, these articles address a variety of impor-
tant topics. Stephanie would be proud.
Notably, although the following articles analyze a cross-section of legal
issues in the health care industry, they all address matters that are of tre-
mendous importance to patients. Stephanie would have liked that. Much as
cost, quality and access comprise a "three-legged stool" underpinning health
care policymaking, 5 patients' costs, the quality of care patients received, and
3. See KATHERINE EBAN, DANGEROUS DOSES: How COUNTERFEITERS ARE CONTAMINAT-
ING AMERICA'S DRUG SUPPLY (2005) (recounting and putting into context the effort, titled
"Operation Stone Cold").
4. Stephanie Feldman Aleong, Green Medicine: Using Lessons From Tort Law and
Environmental Law to Hold Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Authorized Distributors
Liable for Injuries Caused by Counterfeit Drugs, 69 U. PITr. L. REV. 245 (2007).
5. Thomas M. Mayo, Foreward: Nonfinancial Barriers to Health Care, 32 Hous. L.
REV. 1187, 1187 (1996).
[Vol. 34
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patients' struggles to access care concerned Stephanie. In this, she and I
were kindred spirits, so I am especially thankful that this selection of articles
reflects a patient-centric focus.
Professor Matthew Seamon, for example, attempted to choose a topic
that "Professor Aleong would acknowledge as important,"6 and he succeeded
admirably by choosing one affecting the costs patients might bear for drugs
in the future. While most patients would not know what "biologics" are,
such drugs are of tremendous importance to them. A "biologic" is a drug
"derived from a living organism or one of its products and.., manufactured"
through a genetic pathway.7 Such genetically tailored drugs could improve
the lives of hundreds of thousands of patients, and Professor Seamon urges
the development of an abbreviated path to their approval. As he himself
says, this topic would "impact [patients'] wallets."8
Stephanie also worried about the quality of care patients received. Her
method of ensuring quality care was to ensure that patients received the pre-
scription drugs they were supposed to receive, rather than counterfeits. Two
of the authors in this issue, Rebecca Feinberg and Shane Levesque, propose
health care system changes that would also improve the quality of care pa-
tients receive. Specifically, Ms. Feinberg addresses the problem of impaired
physicians 9 and suggests nationwide standardization of methods to prevent
impairment, identify afflicted physicians, treat them, and follow up thereaf-
ter. Mr. Levesque focuses on improving care for mentally ill prisoners upon
release from prison, in an attempt to break the cycle of recidivism. He pro-
poses diversion programs, comprehensive discharge planning before release
from prison, and pre-release enrollment in public benefits to help ensure con-
tinuity of care upon release. There can be no doubt that taking steps to en-
sure that physicians are functioning at peak levels and reforming the way the
correctional system treats the mentally ill would improve the quality of care
patients receive-patients of many different types in the first instance and a
tightly circumscribed category of patients in the latter instance.
Finally, Stephanie shared my concern about the impact on patients of
America's employer-based system of health care coverage. Within this area,
6. Matthew J. Seamon, Antitrust and the Biopharmaceutical Industry: Lessons from
Hatch- Waxman and an Early Evaluation of the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation
Act Of 2009, 34 NOVA L. REV. 629, 629 n.al (2010).
7. See id. at 649-650.
8. Id. at 629 n.al.
9. She defines an "impaired physician" as a "medical doctor who suffers from alcohol-
ism, drug addiction, or mental illness." Rebecca Sara Feinberg, The Impaired Physician:
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Robert Sheres takes on one of the more perplexing puzzles arising from liti-
gation on the part of such patients under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).' ° Although Congress enacted ERISA with
the stated goal of protecting employees in the wake of spectacular pension
plan failures, the statute's effect on employees who receive health care cov-
erage through their employers has been far from protective. The United
States Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the list of statutory remedies
available to patients alleging that their health insurers improperly denied
payment for treatments. The result, as Mr. Sheres concludes after reminding
the reader of the statute's pro-employee goal, "contravenes this goal by re-
fusing to allow participants and beneficiaries to be made whole by way of
consequential damages."" His proposal that the Supreme Court revisit the
issue is a sound one, while his suggestions to those representing such patients
in the meantime are ingenious. Perhaps his article can help patients gain
access to treatments by putting some weapons in the hands of attorneys
representing them.
I cannot conclude this introduction without mentioning the contribu-
tions of two student authors about health law topics, for Stephanie loved her
students. Here, Morgan Geller and Ashley Dutko join the four authors
whose works I just described in addressing issues that could greatly impact
patients in the future. Ms. Geller analyzes a case alleging that the United
States Patent and Trademark Office acted unconstitutionally in granting pa-
tents on human genes to researchers, and Ms. Dutko writes about an impor-
tant Florida statute intended to combat prescription drug abuse. Stephanie
would have been glad to see student work of such quality.
In short, just as Stephanie aimed at improving her surroundings in every
way possible during her short life, this issue of the Nova Law Review is
chock-full of scholarship aimed at improving the health care system in a va-
riety of areas important to patients. It memorializes a terrific person who
lives on in our minds and hearts. It also reminds us that Stephanie did noth-
ing halfway and could juggle many different balls while smiling and inspir-
ing others to be better and to achieve more than they ever thought they could.
It reflects the variety of ways in which Stephanie continues to inspire others
to improve the health care system through public service, 2 to use the law as
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
11. Robert C. Sheres, The Need for an Equitable Revolution to "Appropriately" Remedy
Wrongfully Denied Benefits Under ERISA, 34 NOVA L. REV. 679, 710 (2010).
12. In tribute to Stephanie, Nova Southeastern University's College of Pharmacy and the
Drug Safety Institute have created an award titled the "Stephanie F. Aleong, J.D., National
Patient Safety Award" to recognize "individuals whose unique efforts have significantly ad-
vanced patient safety." See News Release, Nova Se. Univ., Two Florida Drug Inspectors
[Vol. 34
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an instrument of change,1 3 or simply to do the best job possible under any
and all circumstances.14 It is something she would be glad to see in print.
But I still wish I had not written this Introduction.
Receive National Patient Safety Award from Nova Southeastern University (Dec. 4, 2008),
http://nsunews.nova.edu/two-florida-drug-inspectors-receive-national-patient-safety-award-
from-nova-southeastern-university/.
13. For example, when Stephanie and two of our colleagues teamed up to lead the
Goodwin Symposium at the law school, they chose to focus on "the impact women have had
on the law and legal profession and to outline what challenges lay ahead." Stephanie Feldman
Aleong, Olympia Duhart & linda f. harrison, Tilting the Scales: The Changing Roles of Wom-
en in the Law and Legal Practice, 31 NOVA L. REV. 217, 219 (2007).
14. See, e.g., Anthony M. Stella, The Un-Taxability of Computer Software as Tangible
Personal Property by Florida County Governments, 34 NOVA L. REV. 281, 281 n.al (thanking
her for "unwavering guidance and mentorship"); David Stahl, The Role of the Florida Courts
in Protecting the Uninsured From Being Overcharged for Emergency Medical Services, 33
NOVA L. REV. 269, 269 n.al (thanking her for "valuable suggestions and guidance"); Yeemee
Chan, Abolishing Capital Punishment: A Feminist Outlook and Comparative Analysis of the
Death Penalty Using Equal Protection and Gender Discrimination Law, 31 NOVA L. REV.
339, 339 n.al (thanking her for "wisdom and guidance"); Richard V. Blystone, School Speech
v. School Safety: In the Aftermath of Violence on School Campuses Throughout This Nation,
How Should School Officials Respond to Threatening Student Expression?, 2007 B.Y.U.
EDUC. & L.J. 199, 199 n.al (thanking her for "guidance and contributions to this project").
20101
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A LETTER TO MOST DARLING STEPH
MADISON GRAY
Dearest and Most Darling Steph:
You must be highly amused by my multiple efforts to draft a "Tribute to
Professor Aleong" for an issue of the Nova Law Review to be dedicated in
your honor.
Do the well-meaning editors realize that the friends you gathered close
tended to be rather ... eccentric? Do they realize that an eccentric will offer
thoughts completely out of proportion from those that a colleague might? I
suspect that my piece might be politely declined out of a discomfort for the
edge of grief underlying every word. I suspect that the editors of the law
review might be more comfortable if I could write safe sentences about find-
ing closure regarding your absence.
It has been 508 days since your death. But enough about you...
How does one write a tribute anyway? Tribute is defined as "a gift, testi-
monial, compliment, or the like, given as due or in acknowledgment of grati-
tude or esteem" with synonyms such as "recognition, commendation, eulo-
gy." 2
Do words exist that could express how loving and brilliant and sparkly and
filled with laughter you will always be to those lucky enough to be in your
inner circle?
Here's what I find unseemly about this tribute piece. It's so very ... post-
humous.
Not my authorship obviously, but your place as the individual worthy of
honor. I celebrated you on a daily basis for the sixteen years that you were
my friend. I fear that most of our readers missed out. Those who knew you
surely do not need my awkward attempts to articulate how fabulous you
were.
1. Should I let our readers in on the fact that "But enough about you. was one of
your standard lines?
2. Tribute, DIC'nONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/tribute (last visited
Sept. 9, 2010).
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The thing that I admired the most about you was your capacity to live with
an open heart. The focus of your attention was on finding the joy in life-a
pixie sprite sprinkling glitter and giggles as she danced by.
As a result, the quality of your life-and the lives of those around you-was
illuminated. Is there a higher testimonial to offer on behalf of someone?
This is my simple truth to offer up for posterity's sake about Professor
Aleong: She illuminated her little corner of the world.
You were buried on a Sunday, and I spent my flight back to Nashville that
night paralyzed with grief. While driving to work the next morning, the ra-
dio played Bob Marley's Three Little Birds!3 It had to be a message from
you, yes?
How many times did we sing that song? I remember your little jazz-hands
motion while you mouthed the lyrics to me behind the back of a tragically
dull fellow at a disastrously dull cocktail party during law school; we laugh-
ed ourselves into asthma attacks on the way home that night. I remember
holding hands in the backseat of the car and singing it to one another under
our breath on the way to your bridal shower; your mother and grandmother
were in the front seat.
I need to believe that the song the morning after your burial was a message
from you.
For the consideration of our readers, I offer its lyrics to close this piece. If
they choose to believe that the spirit of the song is a message from you then I
am happy to share your message with them.
With unyielding love, Your Sabu4
"Don't worry about a thing,
'Cause every little thing gonna be all right."
Singin': "Don't worry about a thing,
'Cause every little thing gonna be all right!"
Rise up this mornin',
Smiled with the risin' sun,
Three little birds
Pitch by my doorstep
Singin' sweet songs
3. BOB MARLEY & THE WAILERS, THREE LnrrLE BIRDS (Island Records 1977).
4. Also known as, Madison Gray. Steph called me Sabu. It was a thing.
[Vol. 34
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Of melodies pure and true,
Sayin', "This is my message to you-ou-ou:"
Singin': "Don't worry about a thing,
'Cause every little thing gonna be all right."
Singin': "Don't worry about a thing,
'Cause every little thing gonna be all right!" 5
5. BOB MARLEY & THE WAILERS, supra note 3.
2010]
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Professor Aleong was a teacher long before she graced the halls of
Emory Law School or Nova Southeastern. I know this because I was one of
her first pupils. It was 1998 and I was Susan Schnell, a shiny new Assistant
State Attorney for Miami-Dade County, Florida, fresh out of the University
of Virginia, one of those law schools "up north." She was Stephanie Feld-
man, one of the "Chiefs" of the DUI/Crimes Division, the training grounds
for all new Miami ASAs. And although she was younger than I was (and
shorter), that made her my boss.
As Steph would tell it, that fateful first day, she looked out into the
room of forty plus eager new prosecutors, and somehow picked me out of the
crowd. She said that in those first moments, although she should have been
thinking about a thousand other things more pertinent to the job ahead, she
was instead thinking to herself that she and I were going to be fast friends.
Stephanie was a woman of great faith, so I never doubted for a moment
that she had a premonition about me and about our future. Those of you who
knew her, or knew of her, would also know that she was also a woman of
great determination. And so, whether it was destiny, determination, or just
my good luck, I think I can fast forward in this story to tell you that we be-
came dear and enduring friends.
For three years, we shared our daily lives. We worked together, we
shopped (a bit too often given our salaries), we dined (lots of sushi), and
listened to goofy 90s pop songs like Ricky Martin's La Vida Loca (one of
Steph's favorites at the time). When I left Miami with my husband-to-be to
move to Manhattan, we continued our friendship from a distance.
I loved and adored Steph as a friend, but what was more unusual about
this friendship was how much inspiration I drew from her example. Even in
her twenties Stephanie got more accomplished in a day than many of us get
done in a week. She was energized from the tips of her toes to the top of her
blonde head. Those who knew and loved her understood that her seemingly
limitless energy was fueled by her passion-passion for her family, for her
friends, and for the causes that she believed in.
As an Assistant State Attorney, Stephanie was a young, inexperienced
lawyer who was in a position to exercise a great deal of discretion and have
tremendous impact on the lives of hundreds of crime victims and criminal
defendants. Stephanie approached her duties with unwavering professional-
ism, unyielding precision, and a flawless moral compass. Stephanie advo-
cated ferociously on behalf of the crime victims that she helped, and more
than any other lawyer I know, she became personally involved with the cause
13
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of improving lives and helping crime victims put shattered pieces back to-
gether.
The excellence of her work was rewarded at the State Attorney's Office
where she was offered (and gladly accepted) leadership positions that al-
lowed her to move up the ranks with lightning speed (and grace). When she
left the office in Miami to go to the Statewide Prosecutor's Office, she had
already amassed the skills, knowledge, and street-smarts to spearhead a task-
force that was so effective in protecting the integrity of pharmaceuticals that
her efforts were documented in the book Dangerous Doses.'
I will leave it to her other friends and colleagues to tell you their ac-
counts of her career as a law professor at Emory and Nova Southeastern. I
observed these events only from a distance. But what I will mention, and
what was most remarkable to me about her time as a law professor, was the
seemingly endless array of students that she took under her wing. I have
catalogued years of zany sitcom-like problems presented by her law students.
Invariably, Professor Aleong was there to steadily guide them through these
amusing (at least to me) events. I would note that she was also there for
them when their lives and their families were truly in crisis.
In all of those years of conversation, I wasn't at all surprised to hear
about her level of engagement with her students. Stripping aside her bril-
liance and her accomplishments, Stephanie at her core was a wonderful
friend and advocate, and I am sure that those qualities helped shape the di-
rection of many lives and careers.
Stephanie's professional accomplishments and impact are obvious when
you look at tributes like the "Stephanie F. Aleong, J.D., National Patient
Safety Award" that is given by the Nova Southeastern College of Pharmacy
in her memory each year, or the publication of this volume of the Nova Law
Review featuring articles on health law topics that were near and dear to Ste-
phanie, or even the hundreds of friends, loved-ones, and admirers who
packed her memorial service.
On a personal level, her memory is with me in the large and small mo-
ments of my life. At turning points, I find myself aspiring to her high-
impact, activist approach to life. In the small moments, when I am exhausted
and I don't want to finish a tedious project for my work, I think of her end-
less energy. I think of her when I feel too drained to sit down on the floor
with my boys to play a game or put together a puzzle. When a task seems
too difficult or too intimidating, I conjure up my memories of Stephanie and
1. KATHERINE EBAN, DANGEROUS DosEs: How COUNTERFEITERS ARE CONTAMINATING
AMERICA'S DRUG SUPPLY (2005).
[Vol. 34
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I think about how quickly and methodically she would attack the situation
and just get it done.
She is my siren in other ways too. Stephanie possessed boundless ener-
gy, enthusiasm, and a capacity to love that I have seldom run into in life. If
you had been at her memorial service, you couldn't have helped noticing
how many of her beloved stood up to talk about how fiercely loyal, giving,
and loving Stephanie was to all those who she took into her heart.
She was the woman who would drop everything to help a friend (and
later, a student). She was the kind of person would drive miles out of her
way without question if it meant that someone whom she cared about would
have an easier time of it. And Steph would never skip a birthday or a holiday
or any special occasion that would allow her to make a fuss and show her
friends and family how much she cared.
Stephanie was exceptional in that she committed her heart and soul to
her relationships. She never wavered for lack of time, energy, or focus. So,
I often summon up my memories of Stephanie and her warmth and generosi-
ty. She is my emotional barometer, and her memory reminds me to be more
selfless, more open, and more loving.
As she battled melanoma, Stephanie shared her extraordinary warmth
and compassion with a new "family." I met them when she invited me to
log-in to her melanoma support community. Once there, I found that she
didn't just join the online group, rather she became entwined in the fabric of
the community. I knew from speaking with her that Stephanie was drawing
strength and comfort from her interaction with the other patients and their
families, but when I read the community posts, I quickly realized that she
was also very busy helping many of her friends in the melanoma community
accomplish a wide variety of goals-finding ways to pay for travel and lodg-
ing for an endless succession of treatments and experimental studies, sharing
information and research, giving advice on how to put financial and personal
affairs in order.
And then there was the emotional support. She was so deeply con-
nected to so many other individuals and families battling cancer. Even on
days when I had spoken with her and knew her to be physically and emo-
tionally exhausted to the core, she supported her friends with online posts
that were brave and sincere and full of certainty and optimism.
When Stephanie wrote an e-mail or a post her closing was always
"Love and Light." So I will close with that: To you Stephanie, to your love
and your light, and all of the goodness that came into this world and into our
lives because of you. May you continue to inspire us to make an impact in
our professions, communities, and in our personal lives. May your example
help us to embrace our friends and families with your same warmth, passion,
and compassion. And may we grow to embody your courage and optimism.
2o010]
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My heart is with your beloved Neil, your family, and all those who were
lucky enough to share your friendship. You are missed terribly.
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STEPHANIE F. ALEONG: A TRIBUTE TO A NATURAL
LEADER
CARSTEN EVANS
It was April of 2005 when I entered the Barnes & Noble on South Uni-
versity Drive in Plantation. My eyes were immediately drawn towards the
red-orange covered book on the top level of the promotional display counter
for just-released books. The title screamed at me "Dangerous Doses!" Then
the subtitle catch phrase, "How Counterfeiters Are Contaminating America's
Drug Supply," squealed even. I opened it to find that it was not only about
America, but more specifically how South Florida was contaminating Amer-
ica's drug supply. The book would have a major influence over me regard-
ing my profession-pharmacy-more than any other that I have read before
or since. I even personally knew some of the good and bad characters in the
book.
My job title is Assistant Dean in the College of Pharmacy at Nova Sou-
theastern University in Ft. Lauderdale. One of my responsibilities includes
educating working pharmacists through providing live, continuing profes-
sional education (CE) programs throughout the year. These programs are
continuing education for mandatory license renewals. It is my incumbent
responsibility to know what is happening within the profession and to pro-
vide speakers/forums with the focused vision to address the pertinent issues
of current interest at scheduled CE offerings several times a year. To do this,
I research the best topics and speakers for the subjects. This includes bring-
ing speakers from Canada and from around the United States to our campus.
I found myself unable to come to a stopping point when I started read-
ing this book, Dangerous Doses by Katherine Eban.' How could I have
missed hearing about all of this vital information regarding the safety of me-
dications that were being dispensed all around my little world in South Flori-
da? I was so embarrassed for my lack of knowledge, and yet, at the same
time so thankful of learning about the knowledge so vital to all patients
around the United States who potentially were taking counterfeit medica-
tions. This book had given me the idea for the keynote speaker for my next
meeting-Katherine Eban, the book's author.
After going back and forth with her New York agent, they settled on a
$5,000 plus expenses fee for her one hour appearance (maybe not even a
1. KATHERINE EBAN, DANGEROUS DOSES: HOW COUNTERFEITERS ARE CONTAMINATING
AMERICA'S DRUG SUPPLY (2005).
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lecture). My budget could bear a $2,000 honorarium, but not the big bucks
of corporate America. I scanned my alternatives to Katherine. The likely
choice would be the "star" of the book-the person whose courage and
strength put the bad guys in jail-Stephanie Feldman.
According to the book, Stephanie Feldman was the five-foot nothing
live character who coordinated the investigations of drug counterfeiting
through her office, Florida Health Care Fraud. She was the statewide prose-
cutor and was described in the book as being a character like Dorothy in The
Wizard of Oz. From the book I determined that she was the one person who
felt the strong responsibility of making the medications in this country safe.
As I found out later, this was one of her primary passions in life that drove
her professionally every day. She took counterfeiting Americans with bad
expensive drugs personally and could not understand why everybody did not
fight or care about keeping medications from being laced with these conta-
minates. So Stephanie became my new "mark" for the keynote speaker for
the upcoming CE program. Now I had to find her. The book ended with her
leaving the Florida taskforce and moving to Atlanta to work at the Emory
Law School. I felt good about this information and knew that it was going to
be easy to locate her.
Two weeks after my first calls, I finally hit somewhat of a jackpot. I
found a lady who used to work with Stephanie in the same department. She
asked me to repeat my name and where I was calling from, while using a
huge question mark-like statement. I knew something unusual was about to
happen. When I repeated what she wanted to know, she laughed at me. She
told me she knew Stephanie well and then stated, "She works at Nova Sou-
theastern University-right where you are calling from." For the second
time since I found this book, I had this instant mixed emotion of being so
embarrassed for my lack of knowledge, and yet at the same time so thankful
of learning about the knowledge so vital to me. I thanked her and set out to
meet Professor Feldman.
My first call to extension 6230 was to verify that Stephanie Feldman
was there-now I learned that her name was Aleong-and to ask her if I
could come over immediately and meet her. She said yes and I did. As I
discussed who I was and what I wanted, I did not find a monster-like law
enforcer who fought crime with the intimation and power of the legal system.
Instead, I found an attractive young lady that had the largest heart and com-
passion for doing the right things in life. She articulated the need for pedi-
gree documentation for drug management in this country. She was providing
me with an instant learning curve and with a breath of professional fresh air.
She was a great example of why students come to class on time. It also was
apparent in this brief meeting why all the investigators that worked with her
in the past wanted to adopt her. She was a winner in what I would call the
[Vol. 34
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A TRIBUTE TO A NATURAL LEADER
"friend-for-life" club. People who are in this club are so good at what they
do and believe in life that they seem unreal. That was Stephanie Feldman
Aleong from the first time I met her.
Stephanie became a regular at our continuing education meetings in
South Florida and eventually was recognized around the country as a safety
expert through her articles and lectures at national safety meetings in various
other professional circles. She lectured on medication symbology (e.g. bar-
coding) methods that would enhance inventory control and safety. She
served on advisory boards and wrote articles focused on pedigree enforce-
ment. Stephanie visited with Florida Governor Jed Bush in Tallahassee on
the subject and spent her own money, despite his political opposition to it. It
was her passion in life to advance patient safety to the level where people
could get the medication that they thought they were getting. How simple
was that?
Regardless of the many unbelievable opposing factors, Stephanie had
many supporters in her convictions. Cesar Arias and Dr. Gene Odin were
two South Florida pharmacy inspectors who shared the exact same expecta-
tions of "doing the right things in life." There were many others as well,
especially those associated in "Operation Stone Cold." This was her team
and she was their hero. (Please read the book.) In her short lifetime, she
gained the respect of all of those who understood and valued the word "inte-
grity."
For all the great safety awareness offerings that Stephanie Feldman
Aleong brought to the healthcare profession, the College of Pharmacy
created a recognition award in her honor one month after she died. The
award honors those who reflect the attributes that Stephanie practiced in her
passion to do the right things. The award reads, "Recognizing individuals
whose unique efforts have significantly advanced patient safety," and is
housed in a showcase on the third floor of the College of Pharmacy. It is an
annual award that is presented at the year's largest gathering of pharmacists
in South Florida.
The first "Stephanie F. Aleong, J.D., National Patient Safety Award"
went to the two pharmacist inspectors who worked closely with her, Cesar
Arias and Gene Odin. They shared the highest respect for each other in the
most difficult of difficult times. The book outlines the many behavioral chal-
lenges they survived. The second award, this past November, was presented
to Stephanie Shubat, who is responsible for the approval of all U.S. nonpro-
prietary names through the United States Adopted Names Program (USAN).
Her efforts synthesize the expertise of the American Medical Association
(AMA), he United States Pharmacopeia Convention (USP), the American
Pharmacists Association (APHA), and he Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in order to ensure that drug information is communicated accurately
2010]
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and unambiguously in an assigned drug name. Ms. Shubat also helps coor-
dinate international nomenclature through close liaison with the World
Health Organization's INN Program. During her tenure as Director of the
USAN program, Ms. Shubat presided over modifications to the nomenclature
schemes for up-and-coming biologics including monoclonal antibodies and
cell therapies. Besides having the name Stephanie in common, many perso-
nality attributes (sense of urgency, doing the right thing) and mental
attributes (integrity, honesty) were shared.
We like to teach "leadership" in the College of Pharmacy to all of our
students. I am sure that goes on for all of the colleges within the Health Pro-
fessions Division and around the campus, as we need leaders to get things
done the right way. For a few people on earth "leadership" comes natural.
Stephanie was a natural leader. Through her special efforts, she protected
the people we love most in this world.
NOVAW~ iiV 'STY zDSI
Colege of Pharmacy
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MEMORIAL DEDICATION TO STEPHANIE FELDMAN
ALEONG
ANI B. SATZ
In October 2008, the legal academy lost Stephanie Feldman Aleong to
melanoma. Stephanie was 36 years old.
Stephanie was an Assistant Professor at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center, where she sagely directed the Masters in Health
Law Program and taught doctrinal and legal practice courses. Under her
leadership, the Masters Program attracted an increasingly impressive group
of health care professionals from around the country.
Stephanie arrived at Nova by way of Emory University, where we first
met. At Emory she was known as an extraordinary legal writing instructor
and contributor to our Trial Techniques Program.
Stephanie's scholarship and advocacy focused on the safety of the do-
mestic prescription drug supply chain. This interest was cultivated during
her six year tenure as a Florida state attorney specializing in the prosecution
and investigation of racketeering in pharmaceuticals. In that capacity, Ste-
phanie helped dissolve a federal crime ring and undoubtedly helped count-
less individuals avoid illness and death from counterfeit drugs. Her work is
detailed in a novel,' and a Hollywood director intended to create a film about
her personal and professional story. Stephanie was a frequent consultant for
the print and news media on drug safety and occasionally served as a consul-
tant for television dramas addressing drug crimes.
Stephanie was a talented and passionate teacher. She was tirelessly de-
voted to helping her students succeed in their courses, careers, and more
generally in life. Their successes were her successes. A well-written student
paper made her beam; a poorly written one encouraged her to work harder.
Stephanie was also a wonderful colleague. She was one of the first
people to welcome me to Emory. She was generous with her time and know-
ledge, worked to connect people with similar interests, and sought to advance
the careers of others.
While Stephanie's academic accomplishments are easy to describe, it is
much harder to capture her personality. Stephanie was one of my closest
friends, and part of the difficulty may be that I am still too close to the loss.
What I am able to articulate is that Stephanie was one of the most ge-
nerous, thoughtful, and passionate people I have ever known. A good day
I. KATHERINE EBAN, DANGEROUS DOSES: How COUNTERFEITERS ARE CONTAMINATING
AMERICA'S DRUG SUPPLY (2005).
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was measured by the happiness of those around her. A room in her house
was dedicated to storing gifts for her family and friends-items she had dis-
covered that reminded her of certain people. The impressive number of me-
ticulously wrapped boxes stacked against the wall demonstrated in one more
way that she always seemed to be thinking of others. Even while battling her
terminal illness, she would ask me about my family, my career, and even
whether I was being a "healthy" vegetarian.
She loved animals, and aside from her domestic pets of many years-
Bubba (cat, now deceased), Molly (dog), and Monster (dog)-took care of a
family of ducks that lived in a nearby lake (Larry, Curly, and Moe). She
once saved an entire litter of newborn possums from certain death by erect-
ing a tent over them to help keep them cool until a wildlife rescue arrived.
What made her enthusiasm for life and generous nature especially re-
markable was that her own life had been quite difficult. She almost never
spoke about these challenges. When Stephanie was a very small child, her
mother perished in a car accident in which Stephanie was the only other pas-
senger. Stephanie was a childhood diabetic who went misdiagnosed for
many years, which caused her significant illness and distress. Many people
did not know Stephanie had skin cancer until it reoccurred five years after
her initial operation. Even at that point, she rarely discussed her illness and
demonstrated an amazing resilience and optimism about the uncertainty of
life that I suspect most could not garner under similar circumstances.
Stephanie symbolizes, in my view, what the legal profession should be
about: passion for scholarship and teaching, determination to make an im-
pact and further legal change, and service to one's institution and other
communities. Legal academia is often an atomistic enterprise. We are re-
warded not for the lives we touch or the change we catalyze but for the quan-
tity of articles generated in isolation behind closed doors. This is only part of
our task. I believe that we all could learn from Stephanie's example of what
it means to be a scholar, a teacher, a colleague, and a friend.
[Vol. 34
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STEPHANIE ALEONG: A FRIEND, COLLEAGUE, AND
INSPIRATION
WILLIAM E. ADAMS
Professor Stephanie Aleong, like most of us, was a complex person with
many aspects to her personality. I have previously discussed some of these
facets in a eulogy I was privileged to present on behalf of the Law Center,
which appears in an earlier version of this law review. This tribute will focus
on Stephanie's role as a teacher and administrator in her role as Director of
NSU's Master in Health Law Program. I was her supervisor in this job as
Associate Dean for International, Online and Graduate Programs.
Stephanie assumed this position a few years after the creation of the
program. A degree offered by a law school to persons not seeking a JD was
still relatively unusual; therefore, there were few models upon which to draw
guidance. Further, the degree was offered primarily in a distance learning
format, something also quite rare at the time in law schools and still unfortu-
nately so. To add to the challenge, the program needed to undergo a review
of its learning outcome goals pursuant to the assessment regime required by
regional accreditors, something that some universities had begun to practice,
but almost unique to law schools. True to her personality, Stephanie was
undaunted at undertaking such tasks. On the contrary, she loved challenges
and tackled these with the energy and enthusiasm that she mustered for eve-
rything that she undertook.
The substance of the program was a natural for Stephanie. As a former
prosecutor, she had zealously pursued those who profited from selling coun-
terfeit drugs and, true to form, had developed a reputation of excellence, one
that attracted the attention of journalists investigating the issue. Her com-
mitment is a testament to Justice Holmes' musing that "an individual must
involve herself with the issues of her time or be "at peril of being judged not
to have lived." Her interest, expertise and passion for matters of health law
made her struggles with her own health issues even more poignant. She
fought the latter with the same courage, strength and indefatigable energy
that she approached everything.
As with any administrative job, this one involved many tasks that are, to
say the least, tedious. There were the inescapable reports and forms that
needed to be completed and filed, meetings to be attended and reminders to
be sent to supervisors, supervisees, faculty and students. Unlike some who
rise to managerial roles because of their creativity and intelligence, Stephanie
did not neglect the mundane and boring parts of her job nor push them onto
someone else over whom she had supervisory powers. In regard to the pre-
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viously-mentioned learning outcome assessment review and reports, she was
an invaluable partner in mastering the jargon, this of the educational variety,
that seems an inevitable part of any new administrative review mandate. She
patiently revised reports that seemed, when submitted, to completely comply
with prior instructions. She displayed the same fortitude in explaining to
experienced attorneys and teachers why they needed to document and quanti-
fy what they were doing in their classes and listened patiently to their com-
plaints about this interference from distant bureaucrats.
Although she dutifully fulfilled these mundane tasks, she truly excelled
as a teacher and as a creative and thoughtful administrator. As she was in the
live classroom, she inspired in the online classroom as well. Always one to
push students to dig deep and find what they were capable of achieving; she
nonetheless was beloved by those lucky enough to study with her. Similarly,
she was interested in assisting those teaching in her program, most of whom
were new to teaching in an online format. The program flourished under her
guidance and will miss her.
Those of us lucky enough to toil in the field of education often draw in-
spiration from past teachers and colleagues to inform what we do. There will
be many things that I will remember and miss about Stephanie as a friend
and colleague, and there will be many things that I will try to emulate as I go
forward in my career. However, most of all, I can only hope that I can cap-
ture some of the passion and energy that will live on in those students lucky
enough to have encountered her. Farewell again, Stephanie, I still miss you
and am still inspired.
[Vol. 34
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/1
STEPHANIE ALEONG: A BRIEF RECOLLECTION AND
TRIBUTE
JOEL A. MINTZ
I met Stephanie Feldman Aleong in the fall of 2003, when she inter-
viewed for a position as an assistant professor in our law school's Lawyering
Skills and Values Program. We were then looking for a candidate who was
bright, hardworking, and enjoyed contact with students. We hoped that indi-
vidual would be a good colleague, a positive role model for the students, and
a benevolent influence in the school. My initial sense was that Stephanie
would do well in all of those respects. I was wrong. Stephanie Aleong did
not merely do good work in those-and all other-facets of her work. She
was simply superb at them.
Stephanie was extraordinarily intelligent as a professor and lawyer. Her
intelligence was not limited to her academic and legal abilities, however.
She also possessed what is colloquially referred to as "people smarts:" an
uncanny ability to hear what other people are saying, to understand what
affects and motivates others, and to communicate directly (and helpfully)
with everyone fortunate enough to come in contact with her.
Stephanie Aleong had remarkable energy and a great enthusiasm for
working with her students. She cared, in sincere and inspiring ways, about
their development and welfare, and she devoted immense amounts of her
time to guiding them, both academically and (at times) personally, through
their difficulties and travails. Stephanie's door was always open to her stu-
dents. They knew they could always go to her for valuable academic guid-
ance, sound advice, and (where appropriate) a needed word of sympathy and
support or a firm push in the right direction. Many students took advantage
of her availability to them. All who did benefitted enormously.
In addition, Stephanie was a first rate classroom teacher. Although
slight in stature, during class meetings her liveliness, learning, and passion
for her subject matter always filled the room. She prepared doggedly for
those learning sessions and she expected her students to do the same-
consistently holding them to high standards, but never belittling those who
were slower to grasp the points she was conveying.
Stephanie was also a highly skilled lawyer. Before entering academia,
she had been a successful prosecutor who specialized in rape cases and mat-
ters involving counterfeit medications. In that role, she was notably tough
but fair. Stephanie's knowledge of the pharmaceutical business and the laws
it is subject to was encyclopedic, and she used that knowledge to good effect,
protecting many lives in the process. Indeed, Stephanie's work to protect the
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public from phony medicines was nationally known, and she was well res-
pected for it by her allies and adversaries alike. Stephanie's groundbreaking
efforts in this area continued even after she left full time legal practice. She
was a popular speaker and an influential writer on the topic throughout her
all too brief academic career.
Stephanie Aleong was a marvelous colleague as well. She participated
in both committee meetings and faculty gatherings thoughtfully and (some-
times) passionately. Although she was not diffident about sharing her views
on various faculty matters, she also listened carefully to the views of others;
and she was unfailingly respectful to those who disagreed with her perspec-
tive. It was always a delight to serve on faculty committees with Stephanie.
She was someone you could always depend on to make helpful suggestions
and to do at least her fair share of the work-and often far more than that.
No task was too great or too small for Stephanie. She had a zest for getting
the job done, and her cheerful willingness to stay on track, and see the work
through, was very frequently contagious.
Beyond all of this, Stephanie Aleong was a warm and caring human be-
ing. She was devoted to her husband Neil and the other members of her fam-
ily, who looked to her often for love and support. She loved her friends, her
pets, good music, and good food. Her untimely passing left many who knew
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STEPHANIE FELDMAN-ALEONG: A LEGACY OF LOVE AND
LOYALTY
ANTHONY NIEDWIECKI'
Stephanie Aleong was a teacher, scholar, lawyer, prosecutor, aunt, sis-
ter, wife, and daughter. But to so many of us, she was a friend. Stephanie
was not the usual friend or acquaintance. She was a person who was con-
stantly pulling for you, supporting you and fighting for you. Stephanie really
represented what we all want in a friend-someone who is compassionate,
loyal, and generous. Stephanie was all of these things to me, and she is sore-
ly missed everyday because of it.
To say that Stephanie was compassionate is an understatement, but I
can think of no other way to describe how she treated people. Stephanie was
most compassionate when dealing with her students at Nova. Whenever a
student had a crisis, regardless of whether the student had a real crisis such as
an illness or a typical law school crisis of making a mistake in class, every-
one knew they could go to Professor Aleong for advice, support, and help. I
cannot count the times that I have heard students say how many hours she
spent helping those who were in need. Many students saw her as a motherly
figure, which is surprising given that she was one of the youngest faculty
members at Nova! Her firm advice with that gentle touch was exactly what
each student needed and sought from her. They knew that when they needed
a shoulder to cry on or advice on how to deal with some problem at home,
they could count on Professor Aleong to deal with them compassionately and
without judgment.
Nowhere was Stephanie's compassion more evident than when she was
dealing with her own cancer. At a time when she should have focused on her
own health and well-being, she reached out to others who were suffering
from cancer. She was a regular on the cancer blogs and message boards,
offering support and love to complete strangers. Stephanie provided quiet
support to those in the Nova family that were also suffering from cancer. I
did not know how much friendship and love she provided to so many people
at Nova that were sick until after she passed away. To this day, I do not
know how she had the time to help so many people, be the great professor
and scholar she was, provide support for her family and friends, and still
sleep! What's more, she did it all with a smile. Stephanie believed that she
1. Anthony Niedwiecki, Associate Professor of Law, Director of the Lawyering Skills
and Values Program, Nova Southeastern University. In addition to being a colleague, Profes-
sor Niedwiecki was a close friend of Professor Aleong.
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was put on this earth to help others, and everything she did in her life was
geared toward fulfilling that goal. Her life may have been short, but she did
more to help people in those years than most people do in much longer lives.
Her compassion made her one of the most loyal people I know. I al-
ways knew that I would have Stephanie's support no matter how tough times
got. If Stephanie disagreed with me, she would do so in her own sweet, but
firm way without anyone else knowing. As soon as we were in public, she
stood by me forcefully and strongly. I always knew she had my back.
Again, her loyalty also extended to her students. I know of no stronger ad-
vocate for our students than Stephanie. She pushed them to do their best and
had faith that everyone could succeed. The more difficult the student, the
harder she pushed. She was truly a teacher and mentor to every student she
encountered. Her loyalty to the Moot Court Honor Society is still an exam-
ple of how any professor should help a student organization. She spent
countless hours working with students and doing whatever she could to make
the program the best it could be. Her imprint on the program will be felt for
so many years to come.
Her compassion and loyalty are only overshadowed by her generosity.
In fact, her compassion and loyalty were most likely developed by her gene-
rosity. I know of no other person in my life that has given more to so many
without asking for anything in return. Again, the amount of time she spent
with her students and colleagues went well beyond what anyone could possi-
bly expect. The love she showed to each of her family members and friends
was immeasurable. Each person who came into her life felt like he or she
was the most important person to Stephanie because that is how she made
each of us feel. When I was around Stephanie, I thought I was the only per-
son who mattered to her. Stephanie would also give me small gifts that
would capture a special or funny moment that we shared together. To this
day, I chuckle when I see the tissue box she gave me that says "judicial re-
lief," knowing that we shared many stories about students crying in our of-
fices around the middle of each semester.
I know of no story, however, that captures Stephanie's compassion,
loyalty and generosity more than when she helped me with a campaign event
one day. Stephanie was one of my biggest supporters when I decided to run
for office, but nothing compares to the day she walked with me in a parade
only a couple weeks after having surgery to remove some of her cancer. I
never asked her to come, but she heard me say how excited I was about my
first parade as a candidate. The morning of the parade, she called and said
that she was bringing her dogs to walk with me and my family at the parade.
Before I knew it, Stephanie was at the parade wearing her campaign shirt and
walking her dogs. We walked almost three miles in the sun and heat, with
Stephanie constantly smiling and handing out candy to the children. Never
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once did she complain, although I know that she was still very sore from her
surgery. We tried to get her to ride in the car, but she refused. She just said
that she wanted to support her friend. That is what captures this great wom-
an-a loyal, compassionate and generous friend to all. I know I speak for so
many people touched by Stephanie when I say: "Thank you Professor
Aleong. We truly miss you, but your example of compassion, loyalty and
generosity will always live on."
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PROFESSOR STEPHANIE ALEONG: MORE THAN MY
PROFESSOR AND MENTOR-MY FRIEND
ANTHONY M. STELLA
Professor Stephanie Feldman Aleong taught me legal writing during my
first year of law school. But, to me, and to most students she encountered,
she was more than a professor. She was a mentor and friend.
Professor Aleong had an inexplicable ability to challenge her students'
minds and touch their hearts. She inspired her students to work hard and
grow intellectually, while simultaneously encouraging them to chase their
passions and follow their dreams. She also molded her students into both
better attorneys and better people.
How did she do accomplish this unbelievable feat? By example.
As a professor, her relentless work ethic exemplified the inexorable
commitment to professional excellence she bestowed on her students. With-
out rue, she demanded her students study, study some more, and, if we had
any free time, study something we liked. She accepted no excuse for lazi-
ness. It was not tolerated. Period.
She also deeply cared for the integrity of her students. She was a pundit
of professionalism. To her, results mattered, but the means were as impor-
tant as the end. She cautioned her students against losing sight of their moral
compass and jeopardizing their ethical stature for the sake of individual acco-
lades. She reminded us to balance our morality with our accomplishments,
giving equal weight to both. She encouraged us to never lose sight of our
humanity and to remember that we are people who should not only respect
our fellow man, but ourselves.
In the end, it was Professor Aleong's compassionate disposition for the
personal well-being of her students that endeared her to so many. Please
don't misunderstand me. She was just as austere as the toughest professor
when it came to her students' grading and quality of work (my lowest grade
during my first year of law school was in legal writing). But, unlike some
professors, who are justifiably cautious when it comes to student relation-
ships, she expressed a warm, heartfelt empathy for the many anxiety ridden
law students whom she perpetually taught and advised. Her door was always
open. With a warm smile and a bowl full of candy, she actively listened to
student concerns, offering well-thought-out advice and feasible solutions.
No problem was too big. No concern too small. Everything that mattered to
you mattered to her. You mattered.
For me, Professor Aleong ("Professor A" as I came to call her) had a
special place in my heart before her unexpected passing. Through divine
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patience and perseverance, she helped mold me into the person and profes-
sional I am today. She never gave up on me, even when I disappointed her-
although she never told me that and always said how proud she was of me.
At my lowest moments, she was there to support and encourage me. I will
miss her, as she was more than my professor and mentor-she was my
friend.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A young woman came in to see her obstetrician for an ultrasound during
her prenatal treatment. This is her third child, so she knows what normal
pregnancy is like. She informed the obstetrician that she has had cramping
and some spotting, an abnormal occurrence during the first trimester of preg-
* Ms. Feinberg received her J.D. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School in
2004. She also has a Master of Bioehtics from the University of Pennsylvania Medical School
and a Master of Science from Johns Hopkins University. Ms. Feinberg's practice focuses on
healthcare law and policy with a primary focus in bioethics. Ms. Feinberg is also an Adjunct
Assistant Professor of healthcare law and ethics at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard
Broad Law Center. In addition, she teaches both Legal Perspectives on Health Care Ethics
and Regulatory Compliance.
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nancy. The doctor, who seemed harried and stressed, began the ultrasound
and quickly viewed the machine's monitor. The patient heard the fetal
heartbeat and was placated by the doctor's pronouncement that all seemed
well. The doctor left as quickly as she had come in, calling over her shoulder
that she would see the patient in three months. The patient dressed and went
home. A week later the cramping became worse. The fallopian pregnancy,
which the doctor had missed on her quick ultrasound and had been foresha-
dowed by the cramping, had progressed to a dangerous stage. The fallopian
tube began to rupture under the pressure of the ectopic pregnancy. The pa-
tient was rushed to the emergency room where she was quickly transferred to
emergency surgery. Because the fallopian pregnancy had not been diag-
nosed at an earlier stage and had not been treated in a timely fashion, an
emergency hysterectomy had to be performed. The patient underwent three
blood transfusions during her four-day hospital stay and returned home not
only having lost the pregnancy, but also having lost the future capacity to
have children.
A young man sat on the edge of an examining table in a hospital gown,
waiting to be examined for minor back pain which began when he carried his
child's camp trunk up the stairs. When the doctor came in to perform the
examination, he appeared disheveled and unkempt. After a brief disorga-
nized examination, the doctor wrote a prescription for pain medication and
moved on to the next patient. The pharmacist recognized the doctor's signa-
ture. The doctor was an orthopedist highly respected in the medical commu-
nity, and so the narcotic prescription was filled without question. The patient
took the bottle of pills home and self-administered the medication. The pills,
morphine, should have been one milligram each and the patient should have
taken no more than two a day. The prescription had been written for ten
milligram tablets and the doctor had simply instructed the patient to take
them when the pain is bad. The patient woke in the middle of the night from
the back pain. Following the doctor's orders to "take them when the pain is
bad," the patient took two pills and laid back down. The two pills, a lethal
dose of morphine, suppressed the patient's respiratory drive and the young
man never awakened.
A patient was wheeled into the operating room for coronary artery by-
pass surgery. The cardiac surgeon stuck his head in the operating room door
and checked that the anesthesiologist was beginning to sedate the patient and
gave him a ten-minute warning before the patient will be fully sedated. The
cardiac surgeon is a seasoned physician who has earned the universal respect
of his colleagues. He is tremendously popular with nurses and residents be-
cause he is a patient teacher, skilled surgeon, and has wonderful bedside
manner, a skill many surgeons lack. On this morning he looked a bit ragged
and seemed to be shaky. He excused himself to the doctor's lounge to finish
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his "breakfast." When he did not return to begin scrubbing for the operation,
a resident was sent to retrieve him. The resident entered the lounge to find
the doctor swigging from a silver flask before heading for the operating
room. The resident, a direct subordinate of the surgeon, looked at him in
shock. The surgeon responded to the resident's shock by flippantly replying
that he just needs a little swig to steady his hands before surgery and he has
done this for thirty years, there is no problem.
Each of the scenarios just described, and many more like them, are an
all too frequent occurrence in the field of medicine. Physician addiction is
taboo, but this silence injures both the physician and his patients.' Alcohol
and drug addiction interfere with multiple functions in daily life. There is no
doubt, when the addicted individuals are physicians, the interference affects
their ability to practice medicine, causing their patients to receive a lower
standard of care than they would otherwise receive! In a retrospective study
of impaired physicians performed by Murray, most impaired physicians ad-
mitted during the interviews that their impairment had negatively influenced
their patient care.3 The cited lapses in care ranged from missing calls or
rounds because they were intoxicated to negligently causing the death of a
patient.4 The true surprise is in the number of physicians who are impaired
by addiction.5 A research study performed by Birch and colleagues found
that roughly two-thirds of young physicians drink in excess of recommended
safe drinking limits. 6 Some experts estimate the rate of addicted physicians
to be between seven and twelve percent, similar to that found in the general
population.7 Other experts state that a physician has a thirty percent greater
risk of becoming addicted than a member of the general population.8 Irres-
pective of the frequency of addiction and relapse among physicians, the
1. See Robin M. Murray, Characteristics and Prognosis of Alcoholic Doctors, 2 BRIT.
MED. J. 1537,1537-38(1976).
2. Leclair Bissell & Robert W. Jones, The Alcoholic Physician: A Survey, 133 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1142, 1145 (1976).
3. Murray, supra note 1, at 1538.
4. Id.
5. See D. Birch et al., Alcohol, Drinking, Illicit Drug Use, and Stress in Junior House
Officers in North-East England, 352 LANCET 785, 785 (1998).
6. Id.; Michael Gossop et al., Health Care Professionals Referred for Treatment of
Alcohol and Drug Problems, 36 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 160, 161 (2001).
7. Heidi D. Nelson et al., Substance-Impaired Physicians: Probationary and Voluntary
Treatment Programs Compared, W. J. MED., July-Aug. 1996, at 31, 31; see Richard D. Blon-
dell, Impaired Physicians, in 20 PRIMARY CARE, CLINICS IN OFFICE PRACTICE: SUBSTANCE
ABUSE 209, 210 (Richard D. Blondell ed., 1993).
8. Steven L. Dubovsky et al., Do Data Obtained from Admissions Interviews and Resi-
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problem must be addressed with a universal policy. Even one impaired phy-
sician who is left practicing medicine is one too many.
Despite the prevalence of physician addiction and subsequent impair-
ment, there is no universal approach to prevention, identification, treatment,
or post-recovery follow-up. The purpose of this article is to address and ana-
lyze the issues of addiction that are distinct for physicians, culminating in a
policy recommendation to address these problems. This policy recommen-
dation addresses current flaws in the system that allow impairment to occur
and continue in the medical field. Prevention will be addressed with a tho-
rough education and continuing education requirement for all physicians.
Identification, partially remedied by the education obtained in the prevention
approach, must also include inducement for self-identification and greater
protection for the identifying individual. Essential in both the treatment and
follow-up stages of care is a universal approach. This must include confi-
dentiality, if not anonymity, for the individual being treated and individua-
lized care plans. These suggestions combine to create a policy recommenda-
tion believed to remedy the current problem of impaired physicians.
U. MEDICAL ANALYSIS
A. An Impaired Physician Is...
The impaired physician is a medical doctor who suffers from alcohol-
ism, drug addiction, or mental illness. Physicians, like other professionals
who are responsible for the life of another individual, bear an additional bur-
den in their impairment. The American Medical Association's Council on
Mental Health defines physician impairment as, "the inability to practice
medicine adequately by reason of physical or mental illness, including alco-
holism or drug dependency."9 The ramifications of physician impairment go
beyond the individual and his personal contacts, and place his patients at
greater risk. It is this risk to patients that makes physician impairment in-
compatible with the practice of medicine.' ° And it is this incompatibility that
leads the impaired physicians to further conceal their addiction and continue
to practice medicine while impaired." The nature of medicine as a profes-
sion emphasizes self-reliance and competence. 12 These traits, ingrained in
9. Id.
10. Griffith Edwards, The Alcoholic Doctor: A Case of Neglect, 306 LANCET 1297,
1297-98 (1975).
11. See Deborah Brooke, The Addicted Doctor: Caring Professionals?, 166 BRIT. J.
PSYCHIATRY 149, 150 (1995) [hereinafter Brooke, The Addicted Doctor].
12. See Gossop et al., supra note 6, at 162.
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the physician from training and practice, make it more difficult for the physi-
cian to recognize or admit his own impairment. 13 Impairment, particularly in
the form of alcoholism and depression, inhibits the impaired physician's in-
sight. 14 Additionally, the impaired physician often conceals his addiction
because the stigma attached to physician impairment makes seeking help
significantly more difficult than for the general population. 15 Potential puni-
tive responses may also play a role in incenting concealment. 16 Compound-
ing the problems of self-denial and concealment is the fact that physicians
have difficulty recognizing and addressing early signs of addiction in their
colleagues, though the diagnosis may have been obvious if the addicted indi-
vidual had been a non-physician patient.' 7
Physicians have both a higher prevalence of impairment and more diffi-
cultly obtaining treatment than non-physicians.' 8 The high rate of impair-
ment is generally attributed to two sources: the high stress inherent in medi-
cal practice and the access to chemical substances.' 9 It is clear that the prac-
tice of medicine has an intrinsic level of stress greater than that found in
most professions. This stress stems from bearing the responsibility for the
lives of patients and accountability to both the patients and peer organiza-
tions. This stress coupled with relatively easy access to a gamut of pharma-
cologic substances creates a dangerous temptation for those physicians who
feel overwhelmed by their obligations and responsibilities.20 Baird and Mor-
13. See Brooke, The Addicted Doctor, supra note 11, at 150.
14. See Nelson et al., supra note 7, at 31.
15. See id. at 31, 35; Gossop et al., supra note 6, at 162.
16. See Gossop et al., supra note 6, at 162-63.
17. Blondell, supra note 7, at 210.
18. Id. In addition to impairment, physicians are at a greater risk for both physical and
mental health problems, according to Higgs in his published work on the health of health care
workers. R. Higgs, Doctors in Crisis: Creating a Strategy for Mental Health in Health Care
Work, 28 J. ROYAL C. PHYSICIANS LONDON 538 (1994).
19. Blondell, supra note 7, at 210. Impairment as a result of occupational stress is a phe-
nomenon that extends beyond the practice of medicine. See Bissell & Jones, supra note 2, at
1142-43. In general, greater responsibility in a chosen field is attributable in part to the at-
tainment of higher education and there is correlation between the attainment of higher educa-
tion and alcoholism. Id.
20. See Deborah Brooke, Editorial, Why Do Some Doctors Become Addicted?, 91
ADDICTION 317, 317-18 (1996) [hereinafter Brooke, Doctors Become Addicted?]. Included in
the concept of "stress" is the understanding that physicians work uncommonly high number of
hours per work week. See W.L.M. Baird & M. Morgan, Editorial, Substance Misuse Amongst
Anaesthetists, 55 ANAESTHESIA 943, 943 (2000). Attempts to control excessive work hours
have been instituted during training in residency and fellowship programs by the Accredita-
tion Counsel for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME). Accreditation Council for Graduate
Medical Education, ACGME Highlights Its Standards on Resident Duty Hours-May 2001,
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/positionpapers/pp-oshaResponse.asp (last visited April 17,
20101
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gan describe an additional reason for the higher prevalence of impairment
among physicians. 2' They propose that physician substance abuse is not
merely a result of access to opiates and other potent psychoactive drugs, but
in part a result of the physician's understanding of the intricacies of pharma-
codynamics and pharmacokinetics.22
Impairment affects the physician's life both personally and professio-
nally.23 The physician's personal life is usually affected first, then his pro-
fessional interactions with colleagues, and the last area to be affected by im-
pairment is often the physician's patient care skills.24 Impaired physicians
who might recognize that their addiction is overtaking their personal life still
might deny the existence of the problem in their professional life because
they fear the stigma and disapproval of their peers, or loss of their ability to
practice medicine.2 ' Loss of respect or approval by a physician's peers may
threaten their livelihood.26 One of the greatest fears cited by impaired physi-
cians was the threat of loss of licensure.2 ' This is a realistic fear given the
fact that the most common reasons for a doctor to appear before his profes-
sional disciplinary organization are alcoholism and mental disorder.28 The
looming potential for formal discipline and stigmatization by peers leaves
many impaired physicians feeling that they cannot seek help or treatment.29
The result is that the majority of physician suicides are attributable to alco-
holism, drug dependence, and depression.30 In these and many other ways,
impairment harms not only the physician, but also the physician's family.
31
2010). The ACGME's limitations restrict residents and fellows to an eighty hour work week
(this includes patient care, administrative work, and academic time). Id. As of the writing of
this article, there were no limitations by any governing body on the number of hours house
staff and attending physicians can work. Thus the "stress" of medical practice results not
merely from the inherent responsibility of medical practice, but also from the sheer quantity of
time during which the physician must shoulder this responsibility. See Baird & Morgan,
supra note 20, at 943. In a retrospective study of forty-one alcoholic physicians, one of the
three primary catalysts for drinking was overwork. Murray, supra note 1, at 1537.
21. See Baird & Morgan, supra note 20, at 943-44.
22. Id. at 943.
23. See George M. Bohigian et al., Substance Abuse and Dependence in Physicians: The
Missouri Physicians' Health Program, 81 S. MED. J. 1078, 1078 (1996).
24. Blondell, supra note 7, at 211.
25. Gossop et al., supra note 6, at 162.
26. Id.
27. Bohigian et al., supra note 23, at 1079.
28. Murray, supra note 1, at 1537-39.
29. Bohigian et al., supra note 23, at 1079-80.
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B. Identification of the Impaired Physician
Identifying the impaired physician presents a tremendous challenge.
The impaired physician resists identification because addiction carries stigma
amongst his colleagues and, potentially, punitive action by the medical li-
censing body. Colleagues, too, will be reluctant to report an impaired physi-
cian because they are fully aware of the harsh ramifications of being labeled
impaired. An impaired physician can be identified if his addiction leads to
an interaction with law enforcement authorities. For physicians still in train-
ing, a supervisor may identify their impairment based on work performance.
In most cases, the first people to become aware of the physician's impair-
ment are family and close friends.32
Many physicians hesitate to approach or identify a colleague. A sus-
pecting colleague may question whether he is correct in assessing the im-
paired physician's status. And more subtly, a colleague of an impaired phy-
sician does not wish to gain a reputation for "tattling." In many cases, a col-
league may hesitate to identify an impaired physician because he identifies
with him, and can easily see himself in his colleague's shoes. The reluctance
to identify an impaired colleague is due in part to the attitude of the profes-
sion towards addiction. Only a short time ago in the history of medicine,
smoking was socially acceptable despite the knowledge that smoking was
unhealthy and even detrimental. Now, as smoking has fallen out of favor,
few physicians would hesitate to tell a colleague not to smoke. The progres-
sion of alcohol in the attitude of medical professionals is following the same
trend. It is progressively less acceptable to drink in excess, and it is not
looked on favorably by colleagues.33 But attitudes have not yet progressed to
the point where one colleague is likely to tell another that he should not have
another drink.34 Although colleagues may hesitate to become involved or to
meddle, the impaired physician often craves their assistance, fears asking for
it, and wishes it were volunteered. 35 A testimonial from one recovering phy-
sician states, "to help us the most ... you must get to know us better and
sooner."36 Yet in the majority of documented cases, colleagues acted only
32. See Edwards, supra note 10, at 1297. As the addiction progresses the impaired phy-
sician's symptoms will become more overt, to the extreme of endangering patients. See id.
Before this point, the impaired physician will provide a progressively lower standard of clini-
cal care. See id. This may manifest in forgetfulness, lack of effort, or apathy towards supervi-
sion of physicians in training. Id.
33. See Edwards, supra note 10, at 1297-98.
34. See Bissell & Jones, supra note 2, at 1145.
35. Paul G. Steinbicker, Letter to the Editor, Helping the Impaired Physician, 59 PHAROS
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when the physician's impairment posed great danger to patients. 37 Gossop
and his colleagues found that fifty-nine percent of the impaired physician's
colleagues knew of the addiction as a result of impairment at work.38
The ramifications of addiction are not restricted to the impaired physi-
cian's professional life.39 His addiction is likely to get him in trouble in all
areas of his life. A physician who is caught driving under the influence may
be arrested and convicted, but his trouble may not stop there.40 It is the prac-
tice of some court clerks to send a report to the medical licensing board for
that state when there is any criminal proceeding that involves a physician.41
In some jurisdictions, such as California, the law provides that a physician
who has been convicted of more than one alcohol offense is guilty of "unpro-
fessional conduct., 42 In a study of ninety-eight recovered physicians, they
"accumulated ... 219 arrests and 170 jailings. 43 Yet in this same sample of
ninety-eight recovered physicians, only fifty-eight had been admonished by a
colleague, twenty warned by a medical licensing agency, twenty had lost
hospital privileges, and nine had their medical license revoked or restricted.'
These statistics show that the people and their law enforcement representa-
tives are stricter in identifying impaired physicians than is the medical pro-
fession.4 5 Closing the gap in identification between law enforcement and
medical regulatory agencies could be one of many steps taken to assist in
early detection and treatment of impaired physicians.46
Physician impairment often begins, or is at least foreshadowed, in med-
ical school.47 Many coping mechanisms that are developed to handle the
stress of practicing medicine are developed as a student when the rigors of
medical practice are first imposed upon the individual. Most substance use
begins in medical school and serves as an ominous predictor of future
37. Murray, supra note 1, at 1538.
38. Michael Gossop et al., Health Care Professionals Referred for Treatment of Alcohol
and Drug Problems, 36 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 160, 161 (2001).
39. See Berkeley Rice, Putting Your License at Risk, 79 MED. ECON. 85, 85 (2002).
40. Id. In many of the impaired physician testimonials, particularly those in rural atmos-
pheres, the physicians recount being stopped for driving under the influence, but released
without question because they were considered a prominent member of the community. Bis-
sell & Jones, supra note 2, at 1145.
41. Rice, supra note 39, at 87.
42. Id.
43. Bissell & Jones, supra note 2, at 1142-43, 1145.
44. Id. at 1145.
45. Id.
46. A more complete discussion of the laws surrounding impaired physicians is to follow
in Part IV, and the discussion of potential solutions will be continued in Part V.
47. Blondell, supra note 7, at 210.
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abuse.4" Yet medical schools traditionally neglect to address substance
abuse.49 There is unifying consensus that early detection and intervention are
by far the best approach, yet medical school curriculum does not reflect this.
Only twenty-two percent of medical schools have a policy of teaching pre-
ventive measures for physician impairment.50 In one study of emergency
medicine residency programs, only thirty-six percent involved instruction on
recognition, progression, and treatment of physician impairment. 5' In the
same study, thirty percent of program directors had no formal education re-
garding physician impairment.52 It would be a vast improvement simply to
inform all program directors that every state medical society has a physician
impairment program. Program directors cannot bear the full burden of iden-
tifying impaired residents because their impressions are based on work per-
formance. A resident's work performance is largely dependent upon medical
knowledge and skill, making it easy to mistake an impaired resident for an
unprepared resident. Possible impairment could be attributed to lack of un-
derstanding for a specific disease etiology or insufficient training in a specif-
ic locus. The impaired student, resident, or fellow will exhibit symptoms in
his behavior and interaction with family and friends long before impairment
manifests into the work environment.
53
Identification of an impaired physician54 should be done using an objec-
tive standard. Most commonly used to identify alcohol abuse is a four
question assessment called "The CAGE questionnaire" 56 which reads as fol-
lows:
1. Have you ever felt that you should cut down on your drink-
ing?
2. Have people ever annoyed you by criticizing your drinking?
3. Have you ever felt bad or guilty about your drinking?
48. Nelson etal., supra note 7, at 31.
49. Blondell, supra note 7, at 218.
50. Id.
51. Robert M. McNamara & Jeffrey L. Margulies, Chemical Dependency in Emergency
Medicine Residency Programs: Perspective of the Program Directors, 23 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 1072 (1994).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1074.
54. When the term "impaired physician" or "physician" is used, it is intended to encom-
pass medical students, residents, and fellows.
55. McNamara & Margulies, supra note 51, at 1074.
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4. Have you ever had a drink first thing in the morning to steady
your nerves or to get rid of a hangover?
Answering yes to more than two questions is indicative of a serious al-
cohol problem. 57 Identification of chemical abuse or addiction is most com-
monly based upon multiple symptoms in the following chart.58
EARLY SIGNS LATE SIGNS
Alcoholic family members Family dysfunction
Regular use of alcohol Depression
Drinking while studying Drinking while "on call"
Drinking to relax or to sleep Auto accidents
Drinking alone Poor hygiene
Frequent intoxication Public intoxication
Blackouts Memory impairment
Cigarette smoking Needle marks
No religious affiliation Missed work
Likable personality Negativism
Good health Poor health
Good grades and patient care Poor patient care
57. In the McNamara and Margulies study, these were the four criterion presented to the
program directors. McNamara & Margulies, supra note 51, at 1074. The report states that a
"substantial number of program directors reported no or only slight knowledge of four key
areas regarding impaired physicians." Id.
58. Blondell, supra note 7, at 211 (organizing data from David C. Clark et al., Alcohol-
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In order to utilize these two tools, medical institutions-medical
schools, residency training programs, fellowship training programs, hospit-
als, and other medical institutions-must have policies and procedures in
place to handle the impaired physician. These policies must include educa-
tion on impairment, identification of the impaired individual, modes of inter-
vention, requirements for treatment, policy on reporting to licensing agen-
cies, and procedures for re-incorporating the recovering physician into the
medical profession. Failure to have such a plan leads to an inappropriate
response which ultimately results in an inferior outcome.59
C. Intervention and Treatment of the Impaired Physician
There is no single right way to intervene and treat an impaired physi-
cian, but there are consistent elements that must be present in the treatment
of every case. Each state has its own impaired physician program, all with
similarities and differences. Many are affiliated with Alcoholics Anonymous
or Caduceus, which aids continuity for the impaired physician when he com-
pletes the formal treatment program.6° First and foremost is the understand-
ing that identifying and treating the impaired physician earlier in the course
of their addiction is the action that has the most influence over the outcome.61
It is not adequate to wait until the impaired physician manifests the symp-
toms of full or severe addiction before intervening and treating.62 The pro-
fessionals who intervene and treat the impaired physician must exude hope
and potential for recovery or the impaired physician may view continued
substance abuse or suicide as better options.63 It is essential that within the
positive attitude there is no hint of condescension. 64 Confidentiality is
another key element to successful intervention and treatment. The impaired
physician is likely to fear exposure to colleagues and thus deny addiction or
refuse treatment.65 In general, the impaired physician does best when treated
59. See Blondell, supra note 7, at 211-212.
60. See id. at 215; see also Caduceus Group, http://www.carle-clinic.comRecovery-
center/pages/caduceusgroup.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
61. Nelson et al., supra note 7, at 34.
62. Blondell, supra note 7, at 217.
63. Id. at 215.
64. Steinbicker, supra note 35.
65. See K. Rawnsley, Helping the Sick Doctor: A New Service, 291 BRIT. MED. J. 922,
922 (1985). It is commonly more effective to offer the impaired physician treatment outside
of the medical community in which he works. Id. This option removes the possibility of
colleagues developing a protective collusion that hinders recovery. Id. Additionally, the
impaired physician may be more comfortable attending a facility in which none of his col-
leagues treat him. See id.
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in an in-patient unit,'6 particularly if the unit is dedicated specifically to the
treatment of medical professionals so that the impaired physician is not being
treated alongside non-medical professionals.67 The standard progression of
treatment following the in-patient stay is a halfway house program that se-
gues into an outpatient follow-up program.68
There is universal consensus that early identification and intervention
result in the best outcome. The first statewide diversion program officiated
by the medical board began in 1989 in Oregon, and now serves as the model
for other state medical boards to emulate. 69 The Oregon diversion program
"starts with a focus on early identification and active intervention. '70 British
journals cite the American practice of early intervention to stress the urgency
of halting addiction before it escalates to a chronic level. 71 The early stages
of impairment tend to correlate with the early stages of a physician's career.72
It is during these early stages that physicians commonly adopt the habit of
drinking in excess73 or using other chemicals as a means of escape. These
students can be preliminarily identified by anxiety and stress during train-
ing.74 In the training period for a physician, which includes medical school,
residency, and fellowship, the student is supervised and evaluated regularly.
75
This observation by a senior physician provides a window of opportunity to
identify and treat the impaired physician. If addiction is missed during train-
ing, the physician may progress through several years of medical practice
and worsening addiction before the impairment is recognized by a col-
league.76 Additionally, program directors are more likely to refer a physi-
cian-in-training to a treatment program than colleagues would be to refer
another physician because the physician-in-training is not threatened with
license sanctions or negative implications on their career.77 The hierarchy of
medicine places an attending physician in a pedagogic position of authority,
with little to no personal risk from reporting a subordinate as there would be
66. Gregory B. Collins, Drug and Alcohol Use and Addiction Among Physicians, in
COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL ADDICTION 947 (Norman S. Miller, ed.,
1991).
67. Gossop et al., supra note 6, at 163.
68. Steinbicker, supra note 39.
69. Nelson et al., supra note 7, at 31-32.
70. John J. Ulwelling, The Evolution of the Oregon Program for Impaired Physicians, 76
BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS 18, 18-21 (1991).
71. See Gossop et al., supra note 6, at 160, 163.
72. Id. at 160.
73. Id.
74. Brooke, Doctors Become Addicted?, supra note 20, at 317.
75. Blondell, supra note 7, at 210-1I.
76. Id.
77. Nelson et al., supra note 7, at 34.
[Vol. 34
43
: Nova Law Review 34, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
THE IMPAIRED PHYSICIAN
if reporting a colleague. Despite these facts, the number of impaired resi-
dents being identified does not correlate to the number of residents who are
impaired. 78 McNamara and Margulies found that residency program direc-
tors identified one percent of their residents as impaired and intervened.79
The CAGE results for the same group of residents revealed that over twelve
percent were either addicted or severely abusing chemical substances.80
Thomas, Santora, and Shaffer demonstrated the ability to identify potential
impaired physicians during training by their stress level. 81 Their retrospec-
tive study demonstrated that those physicians who were mid-life drinkers
exhibited significantly more stress and anxiety than physicians who in mid-
life are non-drinkers.82
An important, yet generally lacking, element of early detection is educa-
tion. Physicians must be taught how to identify the signs and symptoms of
addiction both in themselves and their colleagues. In addition they must be
taught how to help the impaired colleague, or how to help themselves. This
training should begin in medical school, be reinforced in residency and fel-
lowship, and be continually discussed during continuing medical education.
In addition, medical institutions should form an "Impaired Physician Com-
mittee" that would be charged with educating all members of the staff about
identification, available resources and access to resources.8 3
The initial hurdle in treating an impaired physician is actually getting
him to commit to a treatment program.' There are two ways an impaired
physician enters a treatment program: voluntarily or by referral. Impaired
physicians who choose to enter a program voluntarily are rewarded with
anonymity. This allows them to arrest the progression of their addiction and
recover without public exposure, disciplinary action, restriction of privileges,
or loss of license. 5 Voluntary entrance into a treatment program does not
usually occur until a relatively late stage of addiction. This is in part because
the impaired physician is often not able to recognize the progression of their
chemical dependency, and also in part because denial is a classic companion
78. McNamara & Margulies, supra note 51.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. C.B. Thomas et al., Health of Physicians in Midlife in Relation to Use of Alcohol: A
Prospective Study of a Cohort of Former Medical Students, 146 JOHNS HOPKINS MED. J. 1
(1980).
82. Id.; Brooke, Doctors Become Addicted?, supra note 20, at 317.
83. Blondell, supra note 7, at 211-12.
84. In a study published in the British Medical Journal, a retrospective examination of
impaired physicians in the follow-up stage of recovery demonstrated that the degree of coop-
eration in treatment did not affect the outcome. Murray, supra note 1, at 1537-39.
85. Bohigian et al., supra note 23, at 1078.
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to addiction. 86 Thus, without external aid, the impaired physician is not like-
ly to seek assistance "until late in the course of [his] illness. 87
In cases of referral, knowledgeable physician colleagues are the pre-
ferred method of entering a treatment program.88 Often the referral of an
impaired physician to a treatment program is either by a superior in his med-
ical institution or by an accreditation or licensing board resulting from an
investigation after a problem in the work environment. Approximately forty
percent of referrals stem from poor work performance, and another thirty
percent of referrals are catalyzed by some form of "disciplinary action or the
threat of disciplinary action. '"89 A referral, irrespective of the source or
cause, must be kept confidential. Most medical association treatment pro-
grams have a strict policy to keep impaired physician's information confi-
dential. Some go so far as to not retain records and to identify impaired phy-
sicians by a given number and not by name.90 The British Medical Associa-
tion, quoting success in American programs, reported that health care profes-
sionals in treatment are entitled to the highest standard of confidentiality. 91
The burden of treatment for impaired physicians falls not only on the
impaired physician's shoulders, but on the shoulders of the greater medical
community. Impaired physicians must be treated individually. Their treat-
ment and recovery program must contain certain universal necessities, but
those involved in providing treatment must tailor the program to the individ-
ual patient.92 Society in general has an expectation that medical profession-
als will not abuse chemical substances. This stems from the understanding
that physicians guide and lead their patients by example as well as by treat-
ment. Physicians are expected to set a healthy example by not smoking, ex-
ercising regularly, and seeking regular medical check-ups. This example
cannot be imposed as moral judgment and may not be presented in a fashion
of moral superiority.93 Such a negative approach will not aid the impaired
physician in treatment or recovery, and may inhibit other impaired physi-
cians from seeking treatment. The illness of one health care professional
affects and reflects on the greater health care community. Colleagues who
86. Blondell, supra note 7, at 213.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 209.
89. Gossop et al., supra note 6, at 161.
90. Baird & Morgan, supra note 20, at 943.
91. See Douglas G. Fowlie, Commentary, The Misuse of Alcohol and Other Drugs by
Doctors: A UK Report and One Region's Response, 34 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 666, 667
(1999).
92. Blondell, supra note 7, at 215-16.
93. Edwards, supra note 10, at 1297.
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are supportive and compassionate without being judgmental are all integral
parts of a positive outcome for the impaired physician.94
D. Prevention of Recovered Impaired Physician Relapse
Physical recovery from addiction is a quick and relatively small part of
the impaired physician's recovery; it is the mental recovery that lasts a life-
time.95 Addiction is a progressive and chronic disease in which the impaired
person uses and abuses chemical substances, despite personal knowledge of
the negative ramifications. The chemical substance progressively controls
the addicted, both physically and mentally. Cessation of use, depending on
the chemical, may cause physical withdrawal. The nature of addiction leaves
the impaired subject vulnerable to relapse during any stage of recovery.96
Thus a significant portion of treatment effort must be funneled to ensuring
that the impaired physician does not succumb to relapse.
Relapse is a significant concern, particularly when the impaired physi-
cian returns to patient care. Monitoring and follow-up care, like initial ad-
diction treatment, does not have a specific recipe; rather, this stage must also
be tailored to the individual in question. Shore studied the probationary pe-
riods of recovered impaired physicians and found that probation ranged in
length from one month to one hundred and twenty months.97 In a focus
group of his study, eighteen of the thirty-four physicians experienced a total
of forty relapses. 98 The Rand study, a study focusing on addicts with "se-
rious dependency profiles," reports a fifty-six percent relapse rate.99 Baird,
who focuses on impaired anesthesiologists, cites a forty percent relapse rate
during the first two years of recovery.' ° He goes on to state that eighty per-
cent of recovered impaired anesthesiologists successfully return to clinical
practice.'' Ulwelling found that forty-nine percent of impaired physicians
relapsed at an average of twenty-two months.'0 2 The prognosis is not as dour
94. Baird & Morgan, supra note 20, at 944.
95. Gareth Lloyd, !Am an Alcoholic, 285 BRIT. MED. J. 785, 786 (1982).
96. Blondell refers to relapse as a "common" occurrence. Blondell, supra note 7, at 209.
97. James H. Shore, The Impaired Physician: Four Years After Probation, 248 JAMA
3127 (1982).
98. Id.
99. J. MICHAEL POLICH ET AL., THE COURSE OF ALCOHOLISM: FOUR YEARS AFTER
TREATMENT 147 (1980).
100. Baird & Morgan, supra note 20, at 944.
101. Id.; accord Richard T. Paris & David I. Canavan, Physician Substance Abuse Im-
pairment: Anesthesiologists vs. Other Specialties, 18 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 1, 4 (1999).
102. Ulwelling, supra note 70.
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as it may seem; impaired physicians typically have more favorable outcomes
than the general public. 0 3
Multiple factors contribute to the successful recovery of the impaired
physician. Many impaired physician treatment programs cater directly to
these needs, acknowledging that the ultimate goal is to reincorporate the im-
paired physician as a practitioner in the medical community. To attain and
sustain this goal the impaired physician requires a combination of factors
including, but not limited to, support of colleagues, support groups angled
towards impaired physicians, outpatient follow-up care, and monitoring and
advocacy during any probationary period of return to work.
The process of recovery is dynamic; the recovering impaired physician
requires different resources as their recovery evolves.'04 In the beginning,
most impaired physicians require the guidance and support of professional
health care providers.'0 5 Ultimately, many recovered impaired physicians
model their own practice of medicine to help and treat other addicts.'0 6 In
testimonials provided by recovered alcoholic physicians, Doctors' and Dent-
ists' Group of Alcoholics Anonymous and general Alcoholics Anonymous
groups were pivotal and invaluable components of their recovery.'0 7 Alco-
holics Anonymous provides continuity for the recovered impaired physician
as they progress through the stages of recovery. 0 8 This is particularly impor-
tant for physicians who traveled to treatment facilities in another geographi-
cal location for treatment, for whom continued care is often a stumbling
block. Additionally, Alcoholics Anonymous endorses camaraderie amongst
the participants, creating an environment that can be warm and accepting.1°9
The comfort found in this environment is strikingly different from the more
sterile and detached atmosphere found in most psychiatric facilities."0 Re-
search demonstrates that a cohesive support system, such as that found in
Alcoholics Anonymous, serves to reinforce good behavior."'
Toxicology testing is another common element of follow-up care. One
approach is to use Alcoholics Anonymous in conjunction with random toxi-
103. Blondell, supra note 7, at 216.
104. Robert Erwin Jones, A Study of 100 Physician Psychiatric Inpatients, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1119, 1122 (1977).
105. Id.
106. See Mark Galanter et al., Combined Alcoholics Anonymous and Professional Care for
Addicted Physicians, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 64,66,68 (1990).
107. Id. at 66; Treatment for GPs with a Drink Problem, 8 PRACTITIONER 1059 (1989).
108. See Galanter et al., supra note 106, at 67.
109. Id.
110. See Jones, supra note 104, at 1122; Galanter et al., supra note 106, at 67-68.
111. V. K. Gallegos, The Pilot Impaired Physicians Epidemiologic Surveillance System,
36 MD. MED. J. 264 (1987); see Galanter et al., supra note 106, at 64-68.
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cology screening. 12 Ulwelling found that random urine monitoring had a
positive correlation with successful treatment outcome. 13  He went on to
show that if a recovered impaired physician does not relapse in the first four
years, they are not likely to relapse." 4 If the impaired physician arrived at
treatment by referral, they will be followed upon release by the applicable
medical board.' Recovered impaired physicians who are followed closely
in this manner have a high success rate." 6 If a relapse occurs, close monitor-
ing often allows detection before a positive drug screen demonstrates that
relapse has occurred."
17
If the recovered impaired physician is returning to clinical treatment,
medical facilities may institute additional requirements before granting prac-
tice privileges. Some examples are restrictions on access to controlled sub-
stances, 18 and medications to be taken for any ailment must be done under
the supervision of a physician who is aware of the individual's recovery sta-
tus.' '9 Some institutions may limit the scope of practice or the recovered
impaired physician's prescribing capacity. 120  The arrangements between
privilege granting facilities and the recovered impaired physician are similar
to all the previous stages of treatment and recovery in that it must be indivi-
dualized to each specific case.
I. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Impaired Physician Legislation
Every state in the union has an established treatment program for im-
paired physicians. 121 In the early 1970s, the American Medical Association
112. Ulwelling, supra note 70, at 21. Many treatment programs, upon admittance to the
facility, require the impaired physician to sign a contract of sorts which includes committing




116. Ulwelling, supra note 70, at 21.
117. Bohigian et al., supra note 23, at 1079.
118. See Blondell, supra note 7, at 217.
119. Bohigian et al., supra note 23, at 1078.
120. This is of particular importance when the prescriptions in question are narcotics. A
common practice is to use a prescription pad that is sequentially numbered and creates a dup-
licate with each prescription.
121. Lynn Hankes & LeClair Bissell, Health Professionals, in SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A
COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK 897, 900 (Joyce H. Lowinson et al. eds., 2d ed. 1992); Gossop et
al., supra note 6, at 160.
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began to focus attention on the issue of impaired physicians.122 This began
the national transformation that culminated in an impaired physician treat-
ment program in each state.123  The first state medical board to establish a
statewide impaired physician program was Oregon. 124 The Oregon Senate, in
1989, passed Senate Bill 1032 which established funding and structure for
the Diversion Program Supervisory Council and its medical director. 25 In
addition, the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education man-
dates that program directors in certain medical fields, "identify impaired
physicians and intervene appropriately."' 126 The effects of this obligation are
evident in the most recent surveys which indicate that eighty-two percent of
programs have a policy regarding impaired physicians.
27
The impaired physician's addiction has ramifications beyond their med-
ical practice. The impaired physician, like any other substance abuser, is
likely to come into contact with law enforcement. 128 It is the practice in
some states, and is the law in others, that when a physician is convicted of a
criminal offense, the medical board is notified. 29 In the year 2001, the Fed-
eration of State Medical Boards gave 335 disciplinary actions for non-
medical related offenses. 30 In the majority of jurisdictions, a conviction for
driving under the influence will lead to a state board investigation to deter-
mine if the incident was isolated or evidence of impairment.' 31 Despite this
practice, the public response to impaired individuals 32 is harsher and more
122. Ulwelling, supra note 70, at 21.
123. See Federation of State Physician Health Programs, History, http://www.fsphp.org/
History.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010); Gossop et al., supra note 6, at 160.
124. John J. Ulwelling & John F. Christensen, Northwest Center for Physician Well-Being,
174 W. J. MED. 70,71 (2001).
125. Id. The funding for the Diversion Program Supervisory Council and the medical
director is funded by medical licensees' fees, which at time of publication were twenty five
dollars each year. Ulwelling, supra note 70, at 21. Cumulatively, these fees raised roughly
one hundred and sixty thousand dollars per year. Id.
126. Dubovksy et al., supra note 8, at 447.
127. McNamara & Margulies, supra note 51, at 1072. The Accreditation Council for
Graduate Medical Education initially required this of emergency medicine residencies. Id.
128. Bissell & Jones, supra note 2, at 1145. Contact with law enforcement refers to inci-
dents such as driving under the influence and disorderly conduct.
129. See Rice, supra note 39, at 88. Some states go so far as to notify the medical board if
a physician is arrested. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Public response refers to arrests, jailing, revocation or suspension of driver's license.
Bissell & Jones, supra note 2, at 1145. Medical society's response most often consists of
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frequent than the medical societies' responses. 33 In a study of 100 impaired
physicians, only three had their license revoked, fifteen had their license sus-
pended, and nineteen had restrictions placed on their practice. 34 This means
that more than half of the impaired physicians in this study received no re-
primand from the medical society. Blondell, in his article on impaired phy-
sicians, concludes that physicians must address the lack of response to im-
pairment by medical societies or the legislature will do it for them. 35
B. Legal Aspects of Reporting the Impaired Physician
Many impaired physician treatment programs offer anonymity as an in-
centive to enroll voluntarily. 36 Impaired physicians who do so and success-
fully complete the program may never come into contact with the licensing
agency or medical board.1 37 Although the promise of anonymity acts as in-
centive to enroll in the treatment program with the ultimate goal of physician
recovery, there is a little-discussed negative. An impaired physician who
completes the treatment program and returns to clinical practice may do so
without anyone else's knowledge. Specifically, it is possible for an impaired
physician to voluntarily receive treatment and have none of his colleagues or
superiors become aware that a problem existed. Given the high incident of
relapse, 38 significant risk to patients still exists. As noted in the discussion
of treatment programs, follow up care and close monitoring are essential
parts of a treatment and recovery program for an impaired physician. 3 9 The
impaired physician who maintains complete anonymity will not be followed
or additionally supervised once he completes the treatment program.
Impaired physicians who self-refer to treatment programs may be re-
quired to expose themselves as impaired on license applications and renew-
als.140 Physicians must renew their license on an annual basis. One step in
the license renewal process is answering a series of questions including ques-
133. Id.
134. Galanter et al., supra note 106, at 64-65.
135. Blondell, supra note 7, at 217-18. It is inherent in his writing that Dr. Blondell be-
lieves legislation, rather than response within the medical community, would not be a positive
solution. Id.
136. Nelson et al., supra note 7, at 32.
137. Herbert S. Peyser, Self-Incrimination on Medical Board and Licensing Applications,
44 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 517, 517 (1993).
138. As detailed in the previous section, multiple studies report the relapse rate for recov-
ered impaired physicians is between forty and fifty-five percent in the first two to four years.
139. See discussion supra, Part II.C.
140. Peyser, supra note 137, at 517.
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tions about substance abuse and treatment.' 4' The phrasing of the question
and what information must be reported by mandate varies by state. 142 Cur-
rently, many state psychiatric associations are lobbying to have the impair-
ment and substance abuse questions reflect current impairment and not past
history of impairment. 143 This would allow the physician to move from state
to state, receive license reciprocity in the new state, and then relapse. If the
impaired physician continually enrolls in the treatment program voluntarily,
it may be possible for him to transfer from state to state each time he re-
lapses. This loophole has the potential to put patient populations at grave
risk." The Federation of State Medical Boards has made a progression to-
wards closing this loophole by creating the practice of information sharing
between state medical boards. 45 This progression, while a strong attempt to
move in the right direction, does not address the full problem. 46 State medi-
cal boards share information about disciplinary action taken against a physi-
cian, but as we have seen in the statistics, less than half the impaired physi-
cians ever received formal discipline from their medical board. 147 In addi-
tion, the extent of action taken may vary between states as well as the deter-
mination of what discipline is significant enough to report. 48 Finally, most
medical "boards do not report licensure denials.' 49
The American Medical Association's Council on Mental Health in its
report on physician impairment states, "[It is the physician's ethical respon-
sibility to take cognizance of a colleague's inability to practice medicine
adequately by reason of physical or mental illness including alcoholism and
drug dependence."' 50 Despite this ethical obligation, many physicians hesi-
tate to report a colleague for two primary reasons. First is the general per-
ception among physicians that the counseling programs for impaired physi-











149. Kusserow et al., supra note 144, at 823.
150. Am. Med. Ass'n Council on Mental Health, The Sick Physician: Impairment by
Psychiatric Disorders, Including Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, 223 JAMA 684 (1973).
151. See Irving Lutsky et al., Use of Psychoactive Substances in Three Medical Special-
ties: Anesthesia, Medicine, and Surgery, 41 CANADIAN J. ANESTHESIOLOGY 561, 565 (1994).
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The fear of liability for third parties'53 can influence the decision to re-
port an impaired physician in either direction."5 Fear of liability for slander
may prevent a person from reporting a physician's alleged impairment. To
date, there is no record of a successful slander suit against a reporter whose
report can be justified with evidence even if the alleged impairment is ulti-
mately unfounded. This can be interpreted as the court system protecting the
honest reporter or it could simply be a function of out of court settlements
driven by social pressures on the parties involved. Opposing the fear of lia-
bility for slander is the fear of liability for negligence. 55 The impaired phy-
sician's employer can be held liable for negligence if a patient injury results
from the impaired physician's practice of medicine. 156 Thus, there is incen-
tive for colleagues and employers to refer an impaired physician to a treat-
ment program.'57
Impaired physicians who are referred to treatment programs may have a
greater potential for successful recovery.5 8  When the impaired physician
enters a treatment program by referral, the appropriate medical board is noti-
fied. 159 As detailed in the medical analysis section of this paper, impaired
physicians fear losing their license to practice medicine."6 If the impaired
physician is known to the medical board, the incentive to participate and
succeed in the treatment program increases. 16' Additionally, when the im-
paired physician completes the inpatient and halfway house portions of their
treatment and begins to reintegrate into the clinical environment, the medical
board participates in the follow up care to help ensure patient safety.162
In addition to self-reporting and colleague/employer reporting, a patient
who believes that his physician is impaired may take action. 163 The patient
152. See Third-Party Liability, LSU Law Center's Medical and Public Health Law Site
(1993), available at http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/books/ibb/x617.htm [hereinafter Third-Party
Liability].
153. Id. Third parties refers to the impaired physician's colleagues, employer, and institu-
tion. Id.
154. See id.
155. Third-Party Liability, supra note 152.
156. Id.
157. Edwards, supra note 10, at 1297. Additional incentives for referral are discussed in
the ethics portion of this paper.
158. Patrick G. O'Connor & Anderson Spickard Jr., Physician Impairment by Substance
Abuse, 81 MED. CLINICS OF N. AM. 1037, 1038, 1048 (1997).
159. See id. at 1048.
160. See supra Part ll.A.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1047-48.
163. GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS 254 (2d ed. 1992).
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has two venues in which he can file his complaint."M One option is for the
patient to sue the physician for malpractice. 165 In a malpractice suit the pa-
tient will have the burden to prove four elements: duty, breach, damage, and
causation. 166 Another option is for the patient to file a complaint with the
licensing board, in which case the patient need only prove duty and breach
for the board to take action. 67 There are significant distinctions between a
malpractice suit and a complaint filed with the licensing agency. To begin,
the patient does not need to have suffered injury at the hands of the allegedly
impaired physician to file a complaint with the licensing agency. 68 This
narrower scope of investigation makes a complaint to the licensing board
significantly easier to verify than a malpractice suit. 69 In the case of a suc-
cessful malpractice suit, the patient will likely receive monetary compensa-
tion for their injury. 170 To the contrary, a complaint to the licensing agency
that is found to be meritorious does not provide any tangible compensation to
the complaining patient.' 7' Instead the patient acts altruistically because the
tangible benefit of the complaint is to protect future patients from harm. 72 A
complaint filed with the licensing board is arguably the most effective means
of prevention because it is the licensing board's primary goal to protect pa-
tients from unqualified physicians.
17 3
C. Impairment in the Context of the Americans with Disabilities Act
Individuals who are deemed disabled under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act (ADA) are afforded protection from discrimination based upon their
disability. 74 The general rule, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12112 states, "No
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
164. See id.
165. In order to file a suit alleging malpractice, the patient must have the ability to claim
some form of damage that resulted from the physician. See id. at 252.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 252, 254.
168. See ANNAS, supra note 163, at 254.
169. Id. at 252.
170. See id. at 254. A physician does not necessarily lose their license to practice medi-
cine as a result of a successful malpractice suit. See id. at 253.
171. Id. at254.
172. ANNAS, supra note 163, at 254.
173. See id.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (West 2009).
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terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."'' 75  To establish a prima
facie case of discrimination that violates the ADA, the McDonnell Douglas
framework is used. 76 The plaintiff must establish: (1) he is disabled or
regarded as disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is qualified to
perform the essential functions of the job; and (3) he was subjected to an
adverse employment action solely on account of his disability. 177
In accordance with the McDonnell Douglas framework, the foundation-
al question is whether or not alcohol or substance abuse/addiction qualifies
as a disability under the ADA. 78 The court in Burch v. Coca-Cola Co.1
79
determined that alcoholism is not a per se disability as defined by the
ADA. 80 Irrespective of a disability's status under the ADA, the courts have
held that if the employer treats the individual as though they are impaired,
the disability automatically becomes considered a disability under the
ADA. 18' From this we must conclude that if an impaired physician is ap-
proached and offered the opportunity to self-refer or is referred to a physi-
cian wellness program, the impaired physician will necessarily be considered
impaired under the ADA. Therefore the impaired physician would be pro-
tected from discrimination-in the form of termination, restricted privileges,
etc.-based solely on his impairment.
175. Id.
176. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
177. Id. at 802; see, e.g., Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1525 (11 th Cir.
1997) (where a police officer injured in an accident claimed he was discriminated against as a
result of his disability and the district court granted the city's motion for summary judgment
because the officer was no longer able to perform the essential functions of the job but the city
had maintained his job title, wages, and benefits); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-Am., Inc., 85
F.3d 1311, 1320 (8th Cir. 1996) (where the court granted summary judgment to employer
because plaintiff failed to establish that he was disabled within the meaning of the ADA);
Bacon v. Great Plains Mfg., Inc., 958 F. Supp. 523, 531 (D. Kan. 1997) (where a former em-
ployer was not held liable under the ADA because plaintiff did not show former employer
knew of her disability, nor did she show that she had a disability that qualified under the
ADA).
178. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
179. 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997).
180. Id. at316.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(l)(C) (2006); see, e.g., Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d
362, 363 (9th Cir. 1996). Holihan acted in an abusive, hostile and threatening manner towards
several employees. Id. at 364. Holihan's supervisors inquired if he had any problems that
they could help him with, which Holihan denied. Id. Holihan was transferred to a different
store where he had multiple outbursts. Id. Holihan's supervisors offered him the choice of
suspension pending investigation or a leave of absence if he contacted the company's em-
ployee assistance program. Id. The judge held that, "a reasonable jury could infer that Lucky
regarded Holihan as suffering from a disabling mental condition that substantially limited his
ability to work." Holihan, 87 F.3d at 366.
2010]
54
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
The prohibition against employment discrimination based on disability
in the ADA sets precedent for changing the questions asked in the licensing
and credentialing process.'82 The ADA prohibits questions about an individ-
ual's past history of disability in the employment context because it is intru-
sive and would require an unnecessary disclosure of private information.
18 3
The ADA does not apply directly to the licensing and credentialing process,
but the rationale used when drafting the legislation lays the groundwork for
changing the licensing and credentialing process to be held to the same stan-
dard as other employment activities.184
D. Informed Consent and Disclosure of Prior Impairment to Patients
The doctrine of informed consent is the principle that "[e]very human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body."' 185 This doctrine guides the physician-patient rela-
tionship. The physician must disclose a standardized amount of information
before receiving consent to perform a procedure. 86 The physician must dis-
close the diagnosis, including further tests and evaluations and their nature
and purpose.'87 The physician may emphasize which treatment modality he
would recommend based on his expertise, but he must also disclose all thepossible options188 The physician must also disclose the risks associated
with each treatment option. 89 Informed consent is necessary prior to treat-
ment.' 90 If informed consent is not obtained, the treatment may be technical-
ly considered battery, and the physician could be held liable.' 9'
The remaining question is whether an impaired physician has the obli-
gation to disclose his addiction to a patient prior to performing a treatment.
Some states have adopted a patient-centered standard for disclosure, requir-
ing the physician to disclose any information that could be material to the
182. Peyser, supra note 137, at 517.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. Schloendorffv. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93 (N.Y. 1914).
186. Robert J. Boyle, The Process of Informed Consent, in INTRODUC'ION TO CLINICAL
ETHICS 81, 84 (John C. Fletcher et al. eds., 1995).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 83. Included in the treatment options must be the option to refuse care. See
Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906 (Cal. 1980).
189. Boyle, supra note 186, at 84. The threshold for relevant risks is expressed in Canter-
bury v. Spence. 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
190. See, e.g., Cooper v. Roberts, 286 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971).
191. Id. (applying the rule in Gray v. Grunnagle, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (Pa. 1966)).
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patient's decision. 192 Spielman states that "the test for determining whether a
particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision:
all risk potentially affecting the decision must be unmasked."'193 This stan-
dard is troublesome to many physicians who do not tend to share information
on their own competence when discussing informed consent. Rather, physi-
cians are accustomed to controlling the quantity and content of information
flow between themselves and their patients.194 Physicians do not expect, nor
do they want, the patient expanding the topics of discussion during informed
consent.' 95 The closest analogy is physicians informing a patient of a mis-
take they have made that caused the patient injury. 96
In Kaskie v. Wright,97 an alcoholic physician performed emergency
surgery on an injured child without informing the child's parents of his im-
pairment. 198 Although the statute of limitations had run before the case was
filed, the court addressed the issue in their decision.1 99 The court, referencing
Boyer v. Smith, ° stated that there must have been a "touching," but that neg-
ligence is not necessary for recovery.2°' It described consent to treatment as
a contractual arrangement by which any "contact with the patient's body
must be agreed to."'202 The court followed the precedent set out in Boyer and
refused to expand the doctrine of informed consent "to include matters not
specifically germane to surgical or operative treatment. "203
In Ornelas v. Fry,2' a kidney transplant from one sibling to another
failed.205 During the surgery, the kidney-receiving sibling "bucked," an ac-
192. Bethany Spielman, Expanding the Boundaries of Informed Consent: Disclosing
Alcoholism and HIV Status to Patients, 93 AM. J. MED. 216-18 (1992). Two states specified
in this study are Louisiana and New Jersey. Id.
193. Id.
194. SUE FISHER, IN THE PATIENT'S BEST INTEREST: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF
MEDICAL DECISIONS 58-59 (1986); Spielman, supra note 192, at 216-18.
195. See Roger W. Shuy, Three Types of Interference to an Effective Exchange of Infor-
mation in the Medical Interview, in THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF DOCTOR-PATIENT
COMMUNICATION 17, 24 (Sue Fisher & Alexandra Todd eds., 2d ed. 1993); Spielman, supra
note 192, at 216-18.
196. The issue of disclosing addiction is akin to the issue of a physician disclosing his HIV
status. Few, if any, physicians disclose to a patient if they themselves are HIV positive.
Spielman, supra note 192, at 216-18.
197. 589 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
198. Id. at 214.
199. Id. at214-15.
200. 497 A.2d 646 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
201. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 216.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 217.
204. 727 P.2d 819 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
205. See id. at 820.
20101
56
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
tion akin to coughing. 2°6 The motion tore stitches from the recently attached
kidney, and emergency suturing had to be done. °7 The kidney was removed
a few days later; ultimately the transplant recipient died.208 The family al-
leged that the "bucking" was a result of negligent anesthesia.209  They
brought suit against the anesthesiologist alleging that he did not disclose his
status as an alcoholic, which they believed to have been the proximate cause
of their son's death.2 0 The court held that the anesthesiologist's status as an
alcoholic did not in itself prove the claim of negligence.21' The court went
on to say that negligence could only be proven if his alcoholism translated to
a lower standard of care.212 The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not
demonstrated evidence that the anesthesiologist's alcoholism played a rele-
vant factor in the poor outcome of the surgery.1 3
In Hidding v. Williams,214 the court found differently than the above
cases. 21 5 Mr. Hidding was operated on by an alcoholic physician.2 16 The
physician neglected to disclose the risk of loss of control over bowel func-
tion.21 7 He also neglected to disclose his status as a chronic alcoholic.2 1 8 The
court concluded that this doctor's failure to disclose his impairment vitiated
the patient's consent to surgery.219 The court justified this decision by stating
that had the patient known this piece of information, it is likely he would
have elected to have the surgery performed by a different physician.20
Different forms of physician impairment should be compared in the
analysis of what information should be disclosed to a patient about the pro-
vider. A common comparison is made between an alcoholic physician and
an H1V-positive physician. If a provider has the obligation to reveal his
HIV-positive status to a patient because there is risk of transmission, does the
same obligation exist for an alcoholic physician to reveal his addiction be-
cause there is an increased risk of error and/or complication? In Estate of
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 820-21.
209. Ornelas, 727 P.2d at 821.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 823.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
215. See id. at 1198.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1196.
218. Id.
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Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton,2  the Superior Court of New Jer-
sey held that the Medical Center could suspend Dr. Behringer's surgical pri-
vileges based on his positive diagnosis of AIDS.22 2 The court went further to
say that the Medical Center properly conditioned the return of Dr. Behring-
er's surgical privileges on the mandate that he obtain informed consent, "as a
physician with a positive diagnosis of AIDS" from every surgical patient.
223
There is no clear consensus in the courts or in the medical literature
about physician disclosure and the informed consent process. These oppos-
ing interests, the patient's interest in information and the physician's interest
in privacy, are not calculable to an exact science.224 Just as each patient is
treated individually, each physician and each informed consent process must
be taken individually.
2 2 5
E. Policy for Impairment in Professions Outside the Medical Arena
Impairment from alcohol or drug addiction is a significant concern in
any profession in which one individual is responsible for another human be-
ing. Physician impairment can be compared to pilot impairment and fire-
fighter impairment, to name only a few. All professions which entail public
safety share the same universal public policy initiative, to protect the public
which the profession is there to serve. This shared goal creates a dichotomy
of two competing interests-the interest of the public and the interest of the
professional. In the case of impairment, these competing interests are mul-
tiplied.
In the case of a pilot, physician, or firefighter who is impaired, the pub-
lic that each profession serves is placed in a precarious situation. The pas-
sengers on a plane, the patient in pre-operative preparation, and the innocent
victim in a burning building or car accident do not know or have control over
the abilities of the professional who is there to assist them. Yet, the outcome
is less likely to be positive because an impaired professional is providing
substandard services. From the perspective of the service consumer, it seems
logical to ban impaired professionals. On the other hand, the impaired pro-
fessional is also a person with inherent self-worth who is suffering from an
illness beyond his control. Removing him from the profession or even pub-
licly acknowledging his impairment, even for the sake of treatment, may
cause great harm. The impaired physician may be the sole provider for his
221. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
222. Id. at 1283-84.
223. Id. at 1255 (emphasis omitted), 1279.
224. See id. at 1254.
225. See id. at 1258.
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family and removing him from work may adversely affect all the members of
his family.226 In addition to the potential economic hardship, the impaired
physician may suffer as a result of the stigma his illness carries.
Although many levels of assistance are available to the impaired profes-
sional, society ultimately places the public's interests above the profession-
al's personal interests. We see this decision expressed in our legislative sys-
tem with regulation of narcotics and opiates as well as age restrictions and
activity restrictions on alcohol. In addition, a number of court cases have
reiterated this point in decisions concerning impaired professionals. 27 Each
of these cases abided by the public policy notion that the safety of the gener-
al public outweighed the interests of the impaired professional.
IV. ETHICAL ANALYSIS
The ideal foundation for healthcare policy stems from the express val-
ues of society. In the field of bioethics, the predominant approach to the
application of these values is through the theory of Principalism. 228 Princi-
226. The economic hindrance may be short term or long term. In the short term, the fami-
ly will have no source of income; in the long term, the professional may be shunned and lose
his or her cliental or the endorsement of his peers, both of which may lead to his or her ulti-
mate economic demise.
227. See, e.g., D'Amico v. City of New York, 955 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Monte-
gue v. City of New Orleans, No. CIV. A. 95-2420, 1997 WL 327113 (E.D. La. June 12,
1997); Judice v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 919 F. Supp. 978 (E.D. La. 1996); Altman v. N.Y.
City Health & Hosps. Corp., 100 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1996). In D'Amico v. City of New York, a
firefighter was terminated after multiple attempts and failures at treatment for his cocaine
addiction. 955 F. Supp. at 297, 299. The court justified this termination based on the unique
safety demands placed on a firefighter that could easily be compromised by cocaine use. Id.
at 299. In Judice v. Hospital Service District No. 1, an impaired physician applied for reins-
tatement of his hospital privileges after recovering from an alcoholic relapse. 919 F. Supp. at
980. The hospital insisted on a second opinion from a specialist, which the physician refused
to submit to claiming it violated his rights under the ADA. Id. The court ruled in favor of the
hospital, saying it is reasonable to obtain a second opinion from a specialist prior to granting
hospital privileges. Id. at 984. In Montegue v. City of New Orleans, a firefighter sought rehire
after being terminated for cocaine and marijuana use. 1997 WL 327113, at *1. The court
found for the department stating that it was not obligated to rehire him. Id. at *4. In Altman v.
New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., the chief of internal medicine sought reinstatement
as chief after treatment for alcoholism. 100 F.3d at 1055. The court found that the physi-
cian's history of treatment and relapse posed a sufficiently high public safety risk and that he
was not qualified for the job. Id. at 1060-61.
228. See generally NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, BELMONT
REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
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palism provides a framework with which all bioethics dilemmas can be ana-
lyzed based upon four principles: autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence,
and justice.229 Medical society has held this ethos since the origin of the pro-
fession, a fact demonstrated by the persistent use of the Hippocratic Oath for
nearly two and half millennia.23 ° Society has since reinforced the ethos of
the four prima facie principles in a codification of the Belmont Report.23'
Thus, Principalism is the de facto standard for moral foundation in medicine.
Within the philosophical framework of Principalism, society values
benefit to the patient over benefit to the physician.232 This hierarchical rank-
ing is demonstrated by the policies limiting the physician's autonomy in
areas such as human research, refusal to treat, and treatment protocols. 2 33 An
impaired physician policy must be syntonic with these established policies.
It must maximize the good for the patient within the framework of society's
chosen value system. Once the desired outcome is defined and the method
of obtaining that outcome is determined, policy can be designed to ensure the
desired outcome is reached. Thus it is essential to perform an ethical analy-
sis of the potential responses to physician impairment prior to making a poli-
cy recommendation.
A. Autonomy
Autonomy, also referred to as "Respect for Autonomy," is the principle
of self-governance, the concept that an individual is free of controlling influ-
ence or limitations imposed by others on the individual's decision making
process.2 3 In the framework of physician impairment, the patient's autono-
my and the physician's autonomy come into conflict. It must be clear in the
policy that patient autonomy takes priority over physician autonomy. The
physician may have the autonomy to self-destruct, namely to leave addiction
untreated, but this right cannot be extended to be a right to damage a patient.
229. Id. at Part B.
230. See id. at Part B2. The Hippocratic Oath, written in 400 B.C.E. by Hippocrates, the
Father of Medicine, is an oath taken by all physicians in which the physician pledges to ensure
that the rights of all patients are respected. MedicineNet.com, Definition of Hippocrates,
http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=20908 (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
231. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 228, at Part A-D. The Belmont Report, issued by
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1979, is a codification of the "basic ethi-
cal principles" with which all human beings must be treated in medical research. Id. at Part B.
These principles have since been extrapolated and applied to the practice of medicine. Id. at
Introduction.
232. See id. at Part B2.
233. See id. at Part A-C.
234. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 228, at Part B.
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Patient autonomy infers that the patient be fully informed because there
is no opportunity for autonomy without knowledge. This analysis does not
favor protection of the physician, but rather implies that the patient must be
informed that the physician suffers from addiction. The problem raised by
this analysis is that it creates incentive for the physician to hide his addiction.
Policy on physician addiction must recognize the potential for this behavior
and the additional risk of patient harm created by this potential. Practical
policy must therefore create incentive for the addicted physician to self-
identify and seek treatment. If the incentives include the opportunity for full
rehabilitation and return to practice upon remission of the addiction, then the
physician is more likely to self-report, obtain treatment, and return to medi-
cal practice unimpaired. Incentive, even in a non-punitive form, does not
allow autonomy for the physician, but does create greater benefit to both the
physician and his patients. 35
B. Nonmaleficence
Nonmaleficence is the principle obligation to not inflict harm.236 This
principle is a foundational concept universal to all ethical theories in medi-
cine.237 It is summarized in the maxim, primum non nocere, first do no
harm.238 In the circumstance of physician impairment, the principle of non-
maleficence is simple: protect the patient from the impaired physician who
would likely do harm. Any policy addressing physician impairment must
address the need to prevent an impaired physician from injuring a patient.
C. Beneficence
Beneficence, the natural extension of nonmaleficence, is the obligation
to do good.239 Within Principalism, a physician has four obligations: "1.
[o]ne ought not to inflict evil or harm ... ; 2. [o]ne ought to prevent evil or
harm; 3. one ought to remove evil or harm; [and] 4. [o]ne ought to do or
promote good." 40 The first obligation is nonmaleficence and the remaining
three obligations are beneficence.24' Thus, beneficence builds off of nonma-
235. See id. at Part B2.
236. See id.; see also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 114 (5th ed. 2001 ).
237. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 228, at Part B2.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 236, at 114.
241. Id. at 115.
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leficence, taking the theory of first do no harm and extending it to preventing
others from doing harm, removing the potential for harm, and ultimately
doing good. 42
The potential for beneficence in physician impairment is maximized by
offering the impaired physician non-punitive treatment options.243 If physi-
cian impairment is approached in a punitive fashion, the risk increases that
an impaired physician will obscure and hide his addiction, ultimately creat-
ing risk of harm to the impaired physician's patients.2"
Within the principle of beneficence the patient's and physician's inter-
ests are not in conflict. Incentivizing treatment for physician impairment
fulfills a universal good. Beneficence is accomplished for the patient by
removing risk of harm and replacing it with treatment by a non-impaired
physician-i.e., doing good. Beneficence is accomplished for the physician,
who in this case is also a patient, by obtaining treatment for the impairment.
D. Justice
The principle of justice is attributed to Aristotle who summarized it as,
"Equals must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated unequally."
245
In the context of physician impairment, the comparison is best drawn as the
rights of the individual-i.e., the physician-versus the rights of society-
every member of society is a potential patient.246 As expanded upon before,
the communal ethos in society is to place greater value on the rights of the
members of society. 47 Thus, society and the individual are not equals and
are therefore not treated as equals. The needs of potential patients' safety
trumps the impaired physician's needs, resulting in regulation of medical
practice while impaired. Policy resulting from the principle of justice would
emphasize its primary focus on removal of the impaired physician from prac-
tice, and secondarily address the treatment programs.
In the context of medicine, justice is often analyzed in the context of
distributive justice.248 Distributive justice focuses on disparate levels of
healthcare and health services for different groups within society. 24 In the
instance of physician impairment, there is no evidence that any one subset of
242. See id.
243. See id. at 116.
244. See id.
245. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 236, at 227.
246. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 228, at Part B3; see also BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 236, at 226.
247. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 228, at Part B3.
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society is at greater risk for treatment by an impaired physician. Theories of
disparate impact can be made for different socioeconomic classes, but again
there is no proof that either of these theories is accurate. The first theory is
that the poor population is disparately affected by physician impairment be-
cause this population generally receives care in large institutions in which an
impaired practitioner could more easily slip through the cracks. In addition,
members of lower socioeconomic classes do not necessarily have knowledge
of or access to patient advocates to assist them. The second theory is that the
rich population is disparately affected by physician impairment because
members of upper socioeconomic classes tend to receive care in elite institu-
tions where a physician with status may be able to avoid being reported for
impairment by use of clout and influence. In addition, many physicians who
choose not to practice in this elite environment, but rather choose to serve the
underprivileged communities, may have a communal ethos of altruism and
idealism. These practitioners are less likely to tolerate an impaired colleague
who puts their patients at risk.
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite the prevalence of physician addiction and subsequent impair-
ment, there is no universal approach to prevention, identification, treatment,
or post-recovery follow-up. Each of these four elements must be standar-
dized for all physicians practicing in the United States. For all physicians in
the United States, their careers began in a standardized format. Every stu-
dent took specific pre-med requirements, the MCATs, standard medical cur-
ricula, core rotations, medical board examinations, and the same accredita-
tion exam for their specialty. This ecumenical approach to medical educa-
tion and training produces a consistent caliber of physicians. Yet once a
physician's official training years are complete, the national standard ends.
Physicians are regulated by their state licensing agency. Each state sets its
own requirements for continuing medical education and license renewal, and
national continuity is lost. It is this loss of continuity in the system that al-
lows impairment to occur and continue in the medical field. Creating a na-
tional standard for impaired physician programs and policies would return to
the proven methodology of universal physician regulation.
This policy recommendation rests on a base of continuity. Each of the
four elements of an impaired physician policy-prevention, identification,
treatment, and post-recovery follow-up-must be standardized.
Prevention of physician impairment is the ideal approach to reducing
the impaired physician problem. As the studies discussed in prior sections
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have demonstrated, the majority of physician impairment starts during medi-
cal school.250 For this reason, it is essential that physician impairment be
addressed during the first year of medical school. A standard curriculum
should be taught in every medical school, the same way that anatomy and
physiology are standardized in all medical schools. The curriculum must
include key information such as how to recognize impairment in oneself and
in others, what resources are available for an impaired physician, and what
protection is afforded the impaired physician. After a detailed curriculum is
taught in the first year of medical school, a truncated version of the course
should be revisited at the end of second year, just before students begin to
rotate on the wards. In addition to education during medical school, residen-
cy programs should incorporate at least one impaired physician lecture per
year in the regular, mandatory conferences. Finally, all physicians must par-
ticipate in a certain amount-varying by state-of continuing medical educa-
tion to maintain their credentials and licensure. It should be mandatory that a
portion of this education address physician impairment. This plan ensures
that every physician is well versed in recognizing and addressing physician
impairment and is knowledgeable about the resources available.
All the literature and studies are in agreement that the key to a success-
ful recovery is the early identification of an impaired physician.25 The edu-
cation discussed above will help physicians to recognize impairment in their
peers. In addition, the continuing conversation about physician impairment
throughout a physician's career will help to remove the stigma attached to
physician impairment. The combination of lowered stigma and knowledge
of resources will help to raise the portion of physicians who self-report or
who report a peer.
Universality is most important during the treatment stage. Rather than
having an impaired physician program in every state, there should be a num-
ber of nationally run and regulated physician wellness programs. Having a
national impaired physician treatment center would help to vitiate a number
of the current treatment deterrents. National treatment centers would help
the impaired physician to seek treatment outside of their professional circles.
This is particularly important in small medical communities where anonymi-
ty may be far more difficult to maintain. Additionally, this would ensure that
physicians are treated in physician-only settings, which are proven to be
more successful for recovery than programs that mix physicians and non-
physicians. Additionally, the healthcare providers at these national treatment
centers would be specialists in physician impairment, and thus more apt in
250. See Blondell, supra note 7, at 210.
251. See supra Part II.C.
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approaching the treatment hurdles that are unique to physicians. A national
impaired physician treatment center would encourage self-reporting by pro-
viding anonymity in combination with the optimal treatment environment.
The post-recovery follow-up must also be standardized. Every recover-
ing physician should be followed in the same manner, for the same length of
time, and by the same physicians as the treating physicians. This continuity
helps provide stability for the recovered physicians as they re-enter the work
environment. Additionally, a standardized follow-up program allows the
recovered physicians to know what to expect and to not feel singled out for
additional attention.
These suggestions combine to create a policy recommendation believed
to better diminish the current problem of physician impairment. Continuity
in each of these four stages will provide the backbone of support necessary to
minimize physician impairment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the movie Training Day, veteran police detective Alonzo Harris,
played by Denzel Washington, tells rookie police officer Jake Hoyt, played
by Ethan Hawke, "This shit's chess not checkers."' Although Detective Har-
ris was not talking about the biopharmaceutical industry, he might as well
have been. Over the last couple of decades, the U.S. pharmaceutical market-
place has become a sophisticated gaming industry spawned by the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly
known as Hatch-Waxman. 2 Financial success is predicated on anticipation,
responsiveness, business shrewdness, legal adeptness, and industry acumen.
Although complicity and collusion may be unlawful, the pharmaceutical
industry has pushed the outer boundaries of behavior for profit and penetra-
tion. Consider the incentive-the average cost to develop a new biotechnol-
ogy product is $1.2 billion and only one-third of drugs approved recoup re-
search and development costs. 3 The risk is high. However, the upside is
substantial. Blockbuster drugs generate billions in sales annually with cer-
tain drugs earning in excess of ten billion dollars annually.4
1. TRAINING DAY (Warner Bros. 2001).
2. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
3. Average Cost to Develop a New Biotechnology Product Is $1.2 Billion, MED. NEWS
TODAY, Nov. 11, 2006, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/printerfriendlynews.php?newsid
=56377.
4. Stephanie Saul, For Jarvik Heart Pioneer, Drug Ads Raise Profile and Questions,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at Al (Lipitor, marketed by Pfizer, reportedly achieved sales of
$12.7 billion in 2007).
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Biologics represent the evolving future of prescription drug therapy.5
They have already revolutionized the treatment of cancer, diabetes, hemophi-
lia, and rheumatoid arthritis, among other diseases. As the human genome is
mapped to completion, research and development is now identifying impor-
tant genetic predispositions and novel targets for therapy that will further
restructure medicine. We are truly at the threshold of a paradigm shift in
drug therapy. Herceptin, a monoclonal antibody drug used to treat a deadly
form of breast cancer, has been shown to reduce the risk of death by 33%.6
Nevertheless, the costs of biologics are immense A single biologic can cost
upwards of $200,000 annually. 8 In 2007 Americans spent over forty billion
dollars for biological drugs and they now account for approximately 20% of
global drug sales.9 It is estimated that 50% of the pharmaceutical market is
represented by biologics."l
To confound the situation, there is a newly legislated, but not yet im-
plemented approval pathway for generic biologics in the United States autho-
rized under the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009
(BPCIA). I' Prior to this act, for a generic biologic to become available, the
sponsor had to conduct lengthy and costly research; essentially the same re-
quirements as an innovator drug. 12 Thus, the research and development costs
remained significant and the cost to the patient would be only marginally
decreased. Additionally, as approval would only be considered a follow-up
without significant cost-savings, many would be reluctant to "switch," and
sponsors were disinclined to develop these products. 13 Accordingly, brand
biologics had a functional patent life in perpetuity and the incentive to com-
pete was trivial. For example, recombinant human insulin by Lilly was ap-
5. Alfred B. Engelberg et al., Balancing Innovation, Access, and Profits-Market Exclu-
sivityfor Biologics, 361 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1917, 1917 (2009).
6. Edward H. Romond et al., Trastuzumab Plus Adjuvant Chemotherapy for Operable
HER2-Positive Breast Cancer, 353 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1673, 1673 (2005).
7. Engelberg et al., supra note 5, at 1917.
8. id.
9. Doug Trapp, Biologics Don't Need Long Market Exclusivity, FTC Says,
AMEDNEWS.COM, June 29, 2009, http:llwww.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/06/29/gvscO629.
htm; NiLs BEHNKE ET AL., BAIN & Co., BIOSIMILARS: A MARATHON, NOT A SPRINT 1 (2009),
available at http://www.bain.com/bainweb/PDFs/cms/Public/2009 BBBiosimilars.pdf.
10. Linda Hull Felcone, The Long and Winding Road to Biologic Follow-Ons,
BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE, May 2004, at 20.
11. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-03, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
12. Engleberg et al., supra note 5, at 1918.
13. See id.
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
proved in 1982, and there remains no generic for this billion dollar drug.
14
However, on March 23, 2010, President Obama signed into law the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, a health reform bill, which, in part pro-
vided statutory authority for biosimilar products, like Hatch-Waxman estab-
lished for traditional drugs.'5
Although Hatch-Waxman is often viewed as a wide success, it has a
number of important flaws that should serve instructional in the evaluation of
the new regulatory framework for generic biologics. 6 Additionally, Europe
has a pathway in place to provide further insight and experience, and a Ca-
nadian system is approaching final implementation. 17 There are important
lessons to be learned and a properly structured approval pathway for generic
biologics will prove to be advantageous.
Part II of this paper presents antitrust concerns in the current biophar-
maceutical marketplace. It looks at the current system of patents and exclu-
sivity and evaluates the economic framework that makes biopharmaceuticals
so unique and susceptible to peculiar business practices. Part III of this pa-
per presents the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) regulatory role in
prescription drug regulation and then underscores the current business prac-
tices of the biopharmaceutical industry. It establishes that the future of med-
icine is biologically based and the need for a properly structured pathway for
generic biologics. Part IV of this paper reviews the regulatory framework
involving prescription drugs, including biologics. Part V deconstructs the
Hatch-Waxman provisions to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1983
(FDCA) and surmises limitations to the amendment, serving as foundation
for the evaluation of the BPCIA. Part VI of the paper reviews the current
state of generic biologics and evaluates the new legislation in the U.S. using
the E.U. legislation as a benchmark. Part VII assesses the future of follow-
14. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (30th ed. 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf [hereinafter DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS] (listing all drugs approved since 1984 exclusive
biologics licensed under the PHSA, and commonly referred to as the Orange Book based on
the color); see also Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year




16. See Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by Pharma-
ceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171, 188,
198, 200(2008).
17. See Behnke et al., supra note 9, at 2.
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up biologics in the U.S. in light of the evolving framework and provides con-
cluding remarks on the topic.
II. REGULATORY AND ECONOMIC OVERVIEW
In order to appreciate the gamesmanship involving biologics and drugs
one must need to understand the regulatory interplay between antitrust law
and patents and the economic framework surrounding prescription drugs.
A. Antitrust Considerations
Antitrust involves the balance between government granted monopoly
in the form of patents and other intellectual property rights, and the abuse of
monopoly power to hinder competition. 18 It serves to protect the integrity of
the competitive process and enable consumers wide access to the best possi-
ble products at the lowest possible prices. It serves to try and level the play-
ing field for all players in a market.
Antitrust legislation originated in the late 1800s while certain business-
es, called trusts, controlled entire industries, most notably steel and oil. 9 As
expected, prices soared while quality and services diminished.20 In response
to growing concern, President Theodore Roosevelt and Congress led the bust
of these trusts, through pioneering antitrust legislation. 21 Antitrust legislation
has shown to lower prices, improve service and spawn vigorous competi-
22tion. Amazingly, it is some of the most direct and succinct law on the
books. It is elegant in its simplicity. Consider Section 1 of the Sherman Act
is ninety-six words and outlaws "[e]very contract, combination ... or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade., 23 Section 2 is eighty-two words and finds
"[elvery person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize ... guilty
of a felony. ' 24 The impact of these 178 words has evolved an encyclopedia
18. See FTC Fact Sheet: Antitrust Laws: A Brief History, 1, http://www.ftc.govfbcp/edu
/microsites/youarehere/pages/pdf/FTC-Competition_Antitrust-Laws.pdf [hereinafter FlrC Fact
Sheet].
19. Id. John D. Rockefeller, founder of Standard Oil Company, reportedly amassed a net
worth of over a billion dollars making him the world's first billionaire. John D. Rockefeller,
http://www.johndrockefeller.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
20. FTC Fact Sheet, supra note 18, at 1; see also Rudolph J.R. Peritz, The Sherman Anti-
Trust Act of 1890, in HISTORIANS ON AMERICA, DECISIONS THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE 31, 33
(2007), available at http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/books/historians-on-america.pdf#pop
up.
21. Peritz, supra note 20, at 35.
22. Id. at 35-36.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
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of case law, has allowed U.S. businesses to develop new industries, and has
provided U.S. consumers remarkable services and products at reasonable
prices. Today, antitrust legislation remains a vital aspect to competition and
affects such diverse industries as cable television, telephone service, internet
search engines, and computer operating systems.
Antitrust legislation encompasses federal antitrust laws, enforced by the
Department of Justice and state antitrust laws, enforced by state attorneys
general. Antitrust cases involving drugs are primarily within the purview
of the FTC Bureau of Competition, Health Care Services, and Products Divi-
sion, which generally regulates the pharmaceutical industry. 26 Antitrust leg-
islation provides for suits by the injured party27 including State Attorneys
General, 28 and the award of injunctive relief.29 Antitrust law involving drugs
is based primarily in Section 1 of the Sherman Act-trusts; ° Section 2 of the
Sherman Act-monopolies;3' Section 2 of the Clayton Act, commonly re-
ferred to as the Robinson-Patman Act-prohibiting price discrimination;
3 2
Section 3 of the Clayton Act--dealing with exclusionary practices, such as
tying arrangements and predatory pricing;33 Section 7 of the Clayton Act-
affecting mergers and acquisitions; 34 Hart-Scott-Rodino--involving pre-
merger notification; 35 and Section 5 of the FTC Act-preventing unfair and
deceptive business practices.36
B. Patents and Exclusivity
Patent law involves "the right to exclude others from making, using, of-
fering for sale, or selling [an] invention throughout the United States or im-
porting [an] invention into the United States., 37 Patents are granted to prod-
ucts based on utility, novelty, 38 and non-obviousness. 39 Patent law is consti-
25. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF FTC ANTITRUST ACTIONS IN
PHARMACEUTICAL SERVICES AND PRODUCTS 1, 6, 8 (2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/
0608rxupdate.pdf [hereinafter FTC 2008 REPORT].
26. Id. at 1.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 15(c).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 26.
30. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (commonly referred to as the Anti-Chain Store Act).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 14.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 18(a).
36. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
37. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
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tutionally based and within the federal purview.4° Article 1, Section 8 of the
U.S. Constitution reads "Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries.' Patent law serves to foster innovation by protecting the interest
of the innovator and to prevent copycats that simply pilfer the reward.42 The
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the federal agency
responsible for granting patents and is an Agency in the U.S. Department of
Commerce.43
There are three types of patents available for prosecution. 44 Drug pa-
tents primarily incorporate utility patents and typically involve the drug
product, formulation, manufacturing process, and method of use.45 Theoreti-
cally, all patented drugs are subject to replication, including complex biolog-
icals." A properly filed patent, must
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.
47
When talking about drugs and biologics another important aspect to
consider is exclusivity. 48 Exclusivity refers to "exclusive marketing rights
granted by the FDA upon approval of a drug. 49 Patents are granted by the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office based on statutory requirements, whereby
39. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
40. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8; 35 U.S.C. § 1.
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
42. See U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Who We Are, http://www.uspto.gov/about/
index.jsp (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
43. 35 U.S.C. § 1.
44. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Process, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/
process/index.jsp#heading-2 (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Design patents are issued for orna-
mental designs; plant patents are issued for distinct and new varieties of plants; utility patents
are issued for any "process, machine, article of manufacture, [or] composition of matter," or
any new and useful improvement thereof. Id.
45. Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues Dur-
ing the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FooD & DRUG L.J. 245, 246 (1999).
46. See Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, § 101(a)(2) 110th Cong. (2008).
47. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
48. See FDA, Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, http://www.fda.
gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031 .htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
49. Id.
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exclusivity is granted by the FDA upon a drug's proof of safety and effica-
cy. 50 Patents are granted for twenty years.51 Exclusivity depends on the type
of patent issued and is typically five years.52 Although an innovator drug
may have no patent protection remaining, once it is approved by the FDA it
gains a period of exclusivity, whereby the FDA cannot approve a generic
competitor.53
The interplay between patent law and antitrust law strikes an important
and delicate balance between competing interests.54 Patents are government
granted monopolies, while antitrust is government's bust of monopolies.
The two are in complete philosophical opposition.56 Interestingly, however,
both seek to accomplish the same end: increase innovation.57 Patents seek
this by directly rewarding innovation and making public information on ex-
isting products to help promote further research and development, thus pay-
ing it forward. 8 Antitrust seeks to promote innovation through a leveling of
the competitive process, thus allowing new innovators to research and re-
ward.59
Trade secrets are another intellectual property right, like patents, but
with critical differences. 60 Trade secrets refer to "any information that can be
used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others.'
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or com-
pilation of information which is used in one's business, and which
gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a chemical
compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving ma-
50. See 35 U.S.C. § 1; 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (2009).
51. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
52. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2).
53. See id.
54. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innova-
tion Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1260 (2009).
55. Id. at 1259.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 1260.
58. See id. at 1261.
59. See Leslie, supra note 54, at 1263-64.
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c (1995).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEITION § 39.
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terials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of custom-
ers.
6 2
Generally speaking, to be protected, a trade secret must be kept secretive, be
of value, and provide a competitive business advantage. 63 Trade secrets dif-
fer from patents in three important regards.6' First, a trade secret can survive
indefinitely, unlike a patent which expires after twenty years.65 Secondly, a
trade secret does not involve disclosure of any information and in fact re-
quires the holder to conceal the practice.66 Thirdly, trade secrets offer no real
protection against reverse engineering and copy.67 The classic example of a
trade secret is the recipe for Coca-Cola. If Coca-Cola sought patent protec-
tion, they would have to disclose the recipe and then receive protection for
only the statutory time.68 Not a great business practice for the Atlanta based
company using a recipe from Pharmacist John Pemberton, developed over
one hundred years ago. 69 However, if at any point a competitor can legally
determine the recipe, Coca-Cola is at a complete loss for compensation or
harm.
70
The pharmaceutical marketplace does not typically rely on trade secrets
to protect innovation.71 Although the protection afforded is expansive, the
risk is too great.72 Pharmaceutical companies notoriously employ a number
of competitive intelligence systems, and the technology used to reverse engi-
neer drugs is rather simple for those in the business.73 Instead, the major
pharmaceutical companies rely on patent protection and urbane marketing
62. RESTATEMENT (FIRST)OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
63. FLA. STAT. § 812.081(1)(c) (2009).
64. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c.
65. See id.; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c, f.
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. c.
68. See 35 U.S.C. § 112; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
69. John Stith Pemberton: Who Invented Coca-Cola?, The Chronicles of Coca-Cola,
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.con/heritage/chronicle-birth-refreshing-idea.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2010).
70. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 cmt. b; 18 U.S.C. § 1832
(2006) (misappropriation of a trade secret for economic harm is unlawful).
71. See PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE OF
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION: THE NEED TO MAINTAIN STRONG AND PREDICTABLE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (2002) [hereinafter PHRMA, DELIVERING ON THE
PROMISE].
72. See id.
73. See Phoebe M. Roberts & William S. Hayes, Information Needs and the Role of Text
Mining in Drug Development, 13 PAC. SYMP. ON BIOCOMPUTING 592, 596 (2008), available at
http://psb.stanford.edu/psb-online/proceedings/psb08/roberts.pdf.
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campaigns to maximize profits, as accountability to shareholders is an impor-
tant obligation.74
C. Economic Framework
The pharmaceutical industry has a very unique economic framework
based on the styles of competition, manufacturing issues, research and de-
velopment costs, barriers to entry, and elasticity of demand.
Life saving therapies, and drugs in general, are said to have inelastic
demand.75 Practically speaking this means as the price increases, the demand
stays the same regardless of supply. In classic economic theory, a product's
price is viewed as the equilibrium point between supply and demand in a
perfectly competitive marketplace.76 However, in a situation like Type I
diabetes where you need insulin to survive, the relationship between supply
and demand is irrelevant to establish a price point. A diabetic will pay what-
ever price possible, independent of the supply.
Another important economic consideration involving drugs is pricing.
77
There is no price regulation in the United States, although every other Wes-
ternized country has some regulation. 78 For example, there are direct price
regulations in Canada, France and Italy.79 Indirect regulations exist in Japan
-insurance reimbursements-and the United Kingdom-profits.8 ° Pricing
is extremely complex in the United States as insurance, managed care, and
government payers confound the situation, and the inelasticity of demand
supports high pricing. 81 Drugs are further unique in that they involve impor-
tant economies of scale.82 An established pharmaceutical manufacturing
74. See id. at 592-93.
75. See Economics A-Z: Elasticity, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/
research/economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=E (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
76. See Supply and Demand, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/
supply and demand (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Alfred Marshall was a British economist who
is credited with identifying supply and demand in his text, Principles of Economics, published
in 1890. See generally ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (Prometheus Books
1997) (8th ed. 1920).
77. See Neeraj Sood et al., The Effect of Regulation on Pharmaceutical Revenues: Expe-




81. See, e.g., Allison K. Young & Meredyth Smith Andrus, Pharmaceutical Pricing and
Hatch-Waxman Reform: The Right Prescription, 1 J. GENERIC MEDS. 228, 229 (2004).
82. See Patricia M. Danzon, Economics of the Pharmaceutical Industry, NAT'L BUREAU
OF ECON. RESEARCH, Research Summary 2006, www.nber.org/reporter/fall06/danzon.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
[Vol. 34
75
: Nova Law Review 34, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
2010] ANTITRUST AND THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 639
facility can manufacturer drugs at a nominal cost. This does not hold as true
for biologics, which may have a considerable cost associated with manufac-
ture, but economies of scale still ring true as with all large scale productions
and industries.83 Once the facility is established, the cost to produce is rather
low.
The pharmaceutical industry is inimitable in that it encompasses three
types of competition, each with unique economic considerations.' First,
there is brand/brand competition.85 This typically involves drugs in the same
class and drugs used for similar indications.86 An example of this is Viagra
and Cialis. The second type of competition is brand/generic. 87 This occurs
when a drug loses its exclusivity and patent protection and a generic drug
becomes available.88 An example of this is Prozac and fluoxetine, manufac-
tured by a generic company. The third type of competition among drugs is
generic/generic..89 As drugs lose their patents, generics become available.90
An example of this might include fluoxteine-by Mylan Pharmaceuticals-
and fluoxetine-by Teva Pharmaceuticals.
Barriers to entry are another essential concept in understanding the in-
terplay between patent and antitrust with drugs. Drug development is consi-
dered to have a slow speed of entry and new players are at a considerable
disadvantage. 91 It takes approximately eight years to develop a drug from
initial research to market approval.9" And this is for skilled players. A new
company seeking to research and develop a drug would face a number of
challenges, including necessary supplier agreements, specialized industry
regulation and intellectual property right considerations, sunken costs, and
susceptibility to predatory pricing.
83. See id.
84. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY xi (1998), available
at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS].
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at xii-xiii.
88. See id.
89. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS,
supra note 84, at xiii.
90. See id.
91. See Red Orbit News, New Drugs Are Taking Longer to Bring to Market in the U.S.,
According to Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, http://www.redorbit.com/
news/health/291272/new drugs-are taking-ionger__tobring-to-marketjin/ (last visited Apr.
17, 2010).
92. See Average Cost to Develop a New Biotechnology Product Is $1.2 Billion, supra
note 3.
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As a result of these factors, the pharmaceutical marketplace has evolved
into a true oligopoly. As such, there is a great incentive for price fixing, con-
scious parallelism, tacit collusion and collusive pricing tendencies, along
with heavy reliance on game theory.93 Not surprisingly, the industry has
faced accusations of monopolization, agreements not to compete, agreements
on price or price-related terms, predatory pricing, unlawful horizontal mer-
gers between competitors, vertical mergers involving PBMs, potential com-
petition mergers, illegal tying, and other arrangements.
94
HI. INDUSTRY OVERVIEW AND REGULATION
The pharmaceutical industry is a competitive and potentially very lucra-
tive marketplace. Profits are measured in billions of dollars in annual sales
and unexpected, sudden market collapses are not uncommon. One day
Vioxx was a jackpot with sales of $2.5 billion annually; the next it was a
liability estimated at $50 billion to Merck.95 Black-box warnings, other labe-
ling revisions, and competing drug approvals incessantly threaten a drugs
survival and profitability.96 One in five drugs will see a black-box warning
or require market withdrawal in a twenty-five year life-span. 97 Loss of pa-
tents protection is another critical issue. Within two months of losing patent
protection, Prozac lost 70% of its multibillion dollar market share.
98
A. FDA Oversight
The FDA is one of eleven agencies of the Health and Human Services
(HHS) which is the department responsible for "protecting the health of all
Americans."" The statutory functions of the FDA are formally delegated to
93. See Julia Rosenthal, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse? Collusive Settlements Between
Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 319-20 (2002).
94. See FTC 2008 REPORT, supra note 25.
95. See Aaron Smith, Jury: Merck Negligent, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 22, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com2005/08/19/news/fortune5O0/vioxx/index.htm; Matthew Herper, Merck
Vioxx Liability Could Near $50 Billion, FORBES.COM, Aug. 22, 2005, http://www.forbes.com/
2005/08/22/merck-vioxx-liability-0822markets0 .html.
96. See Karen E. Lasser et al., Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for
Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 2215 (2002).
97. Id. at 2216.
98. Richard G. Frank, Regulation of Follow-on Biologics, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 841,
842 (2007).
99. Department of Health & Human Services, About HHS, http://www.hhs.gov/about/
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
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the Secretary of the HHS,' ° who is appointed by the President and is a mem-
ber of the President's cabinet. °1 The FDA ensures safe and effective drugs
to U.S. consumers, in addition to a myriad of other roles.'0 2 The FDA also
oversees food, veterinary medicines, dietary supplements, medical devices,
radiation emitting devices, and cosmetics. 0 3 The FDA has six product cen-
ters, one research center, and two offices within the agency that regulate its
various responsibilities.' 4  The Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER) is the largest center in the FDA and is charged with prescription and
non-prescription drugs.'0 5 The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research
(CBER) is responsible for biologics including some drugs. 06
Like all administrative agencies, the FDA has three essential functions:
rulemaking authority, investigative/enforcement authority, and adjudicatory
100. FDA, FDA Staff Manual Guides, Volume II, Delegations of Authority: Regulatory
Delegations of Authority to the Commissioner Food and Drugs, http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/StaffManualGuides/ucm080711.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2010).
101. See McDERMOTt, NEWS, (McDermott Will & Emery), President Obama Announces
FDA Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner Appointments (Mar. 16, 2009),
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nidetail/object - id/d878770f-69b9-
455f-a879-250d5caf9c6d.cfm. The Current FDA Commissioner is Dr. Margaret Hamburg.
FDA, Commissioner's Page, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CommissionersPage/default.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010). The Current HHS Secretary is Kathleen Sebelius. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Kathleen Sebelius Confirmed as Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, http://www.hhs.gov/secretary/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
102. FDA, What the Food and Drug Administration Regulates, http://fda.org/index.php?
article=what-the-food-and-drug-administration-regulates (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Admin-
istrative agencies are a product of the legislation to oversee complex matters of Government.
The FDA implements the rules and regulations while Congress paints with broad brush
strokes on food and drug issues.
103. Id.
104. FDA, Organization Chart, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Centers
Offices/OrganizationCharts/UCM198460.pdf. The newest center in the FDA is the Center for
Tobacco Products established upon passage of Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act on June 22, 2009. News Release, FDA, FDA Launches New Center for Tobacco
Products, (Aug. 19, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/
ucm179410.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010); Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Con-
trol Act, Pub. L. No. § 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776, 1776 (2009). This act gave the FDA new
authorities over tobacco including a ban on certain flavored cigarettes, requiring companies to
fully disclose ingredients and additives, prohibiting the terms "light" and "mild," and stopping
youth-focused marketing. See id. at 1784, 1799, 1831.
105. FDA, How Drugs Are Developed and Approved, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/default.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2010).
106. FDA, About the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CBER/default.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
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power. 10 7 Nevertheless, administrative agencies are often referred to as a
headless, fourth branch of government as their rulemaking authority is
granted by the legislature, their investigative and enforcement authority is
accountable to the Executive branch, and their adjudicatory authority is sub-
ordinate to the court system. These inherent limitations have often inhibited
the FDA and account for many of the claims made by its detractors.
The FDA regulates approximately $1 trillion worth of goods, 08 with an
annual budget of $3.2 billion.' °9 Approximately $828 million of this budget
originates from user fees."' These user fees were first established in 1992 in
response to growing concern about the efficiency of the FDA's review
process when Congress enacted the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA
I)."' PDUFA reauthorizes every five years. 12 PDUFA affords the FDA the
opportunity to hire reviewers and expedites the drug approval process." 3
The most recent enactment, PDUFA IV, was included in Title I of the Food
and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA). 14 Under
PDUFA, the FDA collects three types of user fees from the industry: appli-
cation fees, establishment fees, and product fees." 5 PDUFA has been heavi-
ly criticized as the regulators-the FDA-have now become very tight bed-
fellows with the industry, and the agency now relies on this funding for sur-
107. See JOHN P. SWANN, FDA's ORIGIN, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/
History/Origin/ucm124403.htm (adapted from A HISTORICAL GUIDE TO THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT (George Kurian, ed. 1998)).
108. FDA, FAQs by Topic, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDAIWhatWeDo/FAQs/default.htm
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
109. FDA, Summary of the FDA's FY 2010 Budget, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
ReportsManualsFormsfReports/BudgetReports/ucml 53154.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
The budget for 2010 specifically includes a section on generic biologics-referred to as "Fol-
low-on Biologics." Id.
110. Id.
111. See 21 U.S.C. § 379g-h (2006).
112. See FDA, White Paper Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA): Adding Resources
and Improving Performance in FDA Review of New Drug Applications, http://www.fda.gov/
Forlndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm 119253.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010)
[hereinafter FDA, White Paper].
113. Id.
114. See FDA, PDUFA Legislation and Background: PDUFA IV, http://www.fda.gov/
Forlndustry/UserFees/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm 14441 l.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
115. FDA, White Paper, supra note 112; see also FDA, Small Business Assistance: Fre-
quently Asked Questions on Prescription Drug User Fees (PDUFA), http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm069943.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2010); Prescription Drug User Fee Rates for Fiscal Year 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,451,
38,451 (Aug. 3, 2009).
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vival, a very alarming proposition." 16 User fees account for approximately
fifty percent of drug review costs.
117
In determining which products are assessed user fees, the FDA widely
utilizes a reference entitled Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations."8 This reference includes all drug
products approved by the FDA since 1984 including therapeutic equivalents,
so called generic drugs."1 9 Drugs listed in the Orange Book are assumed to
be marketed and thus qualify for user fees. 120 The Orange Book also serves
as the official compilation of patent and exclusivity listings of drugs recog-
nized by the FDA.'
2 1
B. Research and Development
The drug approval process is a costly, complex, and cumbersome one.
In the screening and development phase, a myriad of laboratory compounds
are thoroughly screened for activity. 122 So called "hits" are then further
tested for "leads" in a process coined hits-to-leads.12 3 Medicinal chemists
work to identify and then (re)engineer the most active and stable compounds
to focus further development, all in the hopes of finding the next blockbus-
ter.124 Compounds, most active in vitro, are administered to rodents and then
primates to assess plausibility in humans. 25 Products appearing promising
can then be administered to humans in a complex and closely monitored sys-
tem of escalating doses and monitoring. 26 Products are further tested for
carcinogenicity, mutagenecity, and teratogenecity.1
27
116. See FDA, White Paper, supra note 112.
117. Id.
118. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the Hatch- Waxman Scheme on
Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 169 (2005).
119. See id. at 167, 169.
120. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, supra note 14,
at ix.
121. Id. ati.
122. FDA, Investigational New Drug (IND) Application, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Approva]Applications/
InvestigationalNewDruglNDApplication/default.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) [hereinafter
FDA, IND].
123. Konrad H. Bleicher et al., Hit and Lead Generation: Beyond High-Throughput
Screening, 2 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 369, 371 (2003).
124. Id. at 377.
125. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(2) (2009).
126. See 21 C.F.R.§ 312.21.
127. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(c)(B).
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Before administering a so called investigational drug to humans, the
sponsor must seek an Investigational New Drug Application (IND). 28 Tech-
nically, this serves as legal permission to move an unapproved, investiga-
tional drug into the stream of interstate commerce. 129 The application has
three focus areas: 1) animal pharmacology and toxicology; 2) chemistry and
manufacturing; and 3) clinical protocols and investigator information.' 30 The
FDA reviews this application with an eye on safety and future development,
all the while understanding that drug development is inherently dangerous,
but necessary. 13' The FDA has a thirty day window to issue a "clinical hold"
on an IND, or else the application is deemed approved and the drug can then
be administered to human subjects in the first of a series of research proto-
cols. 13
2
Phase I studies are the first studies involving humans. 3 3 The drug is
typically administered to a small number of healthy male volunteers, usually
between ages twenty and eighty. 34 The drug is evaluated for the preferred
route of administration, a tolerable dosage range, safety and side effects, and
reviewed for its pharmacokinetic characteristics. 135 Next, Phase 1I studies are
conducted whereby the drug is administered to a population of interest,
usually about 200 patients inflicted with the disease, but otherwise healthy.
36
These studies establish preliminary efficacy data, identify the preferred dos-
ing regimen and target dose, and further assess safety. 137 Phase III studies
are typically large scale randomized, controlled and uncontrolled trials in-
volving thousands of patients to substantiate efficacy, expand safety data,
and confirm the optimal dose.1
38
128. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2006); see also 21 C.F.R. § 312. IND is also referred to as
"Notice of Claimed Investigational Exemption for a New Drug." 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b).
129. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a); 21 C.F.R. § 312.
130. FDA, IND, supra note 122.
131. See id.
132. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, MANUAL OF
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6030.1 2 (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/UCM082022.pdf [hereinafter
CDER, 1998 POLICIES AND PROCEDURES].
133. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a)(1).
134. Id.; see also FDA, Inside Clinical Trials: Testing Medical Products in People, http://
www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/Consumers/ucm143531.htm (last visited Apr. 17,
2010).
135. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a). Pharmacokinetic characteristics refer to the body's action on
a drug. See 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(5). That is, absorption, distribution, metabolism, and eli-
mination/excretion. 21 C.F.R. § 312.23(a)(8)(i).
136. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(b).
137. See id.
138. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(c).
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Overall, the research and development process is a risky endeavor. The
top ten pharmaceutical companies bring an average of only 0.6 drugs to mar-
ket per year. 39 Only five out of five thousand compounds make it to human
testing, of which only one is ultimately approved for human use.' 40 Then
remarkably, only one-third of drugs approved generate sufficient earnings to
recoup average research and development costs.141
C. Marketing Strategies Employed
In response to the highly risky, yet lucrative business of pharmaceuti-
cals, the industry has developed a complex multi-faceted approach to in-
creasing sales, promoting widespread, and some would say indiscriminate
use, and discerning themselves from the competition. 42 Drug companies
hire celebrity spokespersons and cheerleaders as sale associates.143 They
utilize a sophisticated system of data mining to identify changes in market
share and physician identifiable prescribing habits.'" The industry has even
been accused of creating diseases and selling sickness. 145 They have an in-
famous reputation for providing lavish incentives to physicians for the mere
opportunity to detail them on the benefits of their product. 46 They regularly
masquerade marketing as "educational symposia and seminars."' 147 Compa-
nies seed the market through the use of "free" drug samples and low cost in-
hospital contracts. 148 They use prominent physician names, along with ghost
writers in medical publications and have even gone so far as to establish
journals. 49 Although these tactics may be facially legal, the ethical consid-
139. Big Pharma-Biotech Partnering Holds Promise for Improving R&D Productivity,
MED. NEWS TODAY, Mar. 26, 2007, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/66151.php.
140. Tufts Ctr. for the Study of Drug Dev., Backgrounder: How New Drugs Move
Through the Development and Approval Process (2001), available at http://csdd.tufts.edu/
files/uploads/how new-drugs-move.pdf.
141. Ten Percent of New Prescription Drugs Generate Half of the Industry's Net Returns,
BUSINESS WIRE (New York), Dec. 13, 2002, at 1.
142. See RAY MOYNIHAN & ALAN CASSELS, SELLING SICKNESS: HOW THE WORLD'S
BIGGEST PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES ARE TURNING Us ALL INTO PATIENTS x-xviii (2005).
143. Id. at 41; Stephanie Saul, Gimme an Rx! Cheerleaders Pep Up Drug Sales, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at Al.
144. See Michael Heesters, Comment, An Assault on the Business of Pharmaceutical Data
Mining, I 1 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 789, 789 (2009).
145. See MOYNIHAN & CASSELS, supra note 142, at xi-xii.
146. Id. at 23.
147. See id. at 26.
148. See id. at 23-24.
149. Id. at 25; Posting of Bob Grant, Merck Published Fake Journal, to http://www.the-
scientist.com/blog/display/55671 (Apr. 30, 2009); see also Joseph S. Ross et al., Guest Au-
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erations are notable. Direct-to-consumer advertising (DTCA) of drugs has
become a great windfall for the industry since 1997 when the FDA issued a
draft guidance that effectively enabled the use of broadcast ads for DTCA. 50
Currently, only the United States and New Zealand allow DTCA of pharma-
ceutical products.
151
In addition to FDA regulation, the industry highly self-regulates.
PhRMA, the pharmaceutical trade association, publishes a Code on Interac-
tions with Healthcare Professionals, which provides ethical guidance on in-
dustry practice. 152 The updated code took effect in January 2009 and in-
cludes a number of changes targeting some of the above mentioned practic-
es. 153 The other major regulatory guidance is published by the Office of the
Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services and is
called the Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufactur-
ers. 154 It calls for drug companies to establish voluntary compliance pro-
grams within the company.'55 Specifically, the program targets three risk
areas: "(1) Integrity of data used. . . to establish payment; (2) kickbacks and
other illegal remuneration; and (3) compliance with laws regulating drug
samples.' 56 The document is intended for drug companies to gain insight
and foster adherence to relevant laws, especially involving federal health
care programs.1
57
Another important business tactic widely impacting healthcare delivery
involves off-label drug use. 158 Off-label use refers to the delivery of a phar-
maceutical distinct from its approved labeling. 5 9 This can range from an
thorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related to Rofecoxib, 299 JAMA 1800, 1802
(2008) (describing Merck's use of ghostwriters with Vioxx).
150. FDA, Prescription Drug Promotion, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/testimony/
ucm1 15206.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
151. Barbara Mintzes, Should Canada Allow Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescrip-
tion Drugs?, 55 CAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 131, 131 (2009).
152. PHRMA, CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS 2 (2008), avail-
able at http://www.phrma.org/files/attachments/PhRMA Marketing Code 2008.pdf.
153. See Press Release, PhRMA, PhRMA Revised Marketing Code Reinforces Commit-
ment to Responsible Interactions with Healthcare Professionals (July 10, 2008),
http://www.phrma.org/news-room/press-releases/phrma-code-reinforces-commitment-to-re
sponsible-interactions_withhealthcare-professionals.
154. See generally OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,
68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,731 (May 5, 2003).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 23,733.
157. Id. at23,731.
158. See Randall S. Stafford, Regulating Off-Label Drug Use-Rethinking the Role of the





: Nova Law Review 34, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
2010] ANTITRUST AND THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 647
increased dose to a shortened duration of treatment to a novel use.160 Once a
drug is approved by the FDA, the actual use becomes part of the practice of
medicine, and thus beyond the purview of the FDA. 161 Off-label drug use
accounts for approximately twenty percent, with certain drug classes ap-
proaching seventy-five percent. 62  This use is considerable and has even
landed a prominent physician in jail for unlawful promotion. 163
IV. STATUTORY REGULATION OF DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS
Drugs, including biologics, are regulated primarily under federal legis-
lation via the interstate commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
Traditionally, health, safety, and welfare, the so called police powers, are
reserved to the states. However, as drugs "substantially affect interstate
commerce," their regulation is deemed a federal matter subject to federal
purview.'"
A. Drug Regulation under the FDCA
Federal drug regulation occurs primarily through the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).165 This Act was first legislated in 1938 in
response to the tragic sulfanilamide incident and has since undergone a num-




163. Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern Dist. N.Y., Psychiatrist Charged with
Conspiracy to Illegally Market the Prescription Medication Xyrem, Also Known as "GHB,"
for Unapproved Medical Uses on Behalf of its Manufacturer (Apr. 5, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2006/2006aprO5.html; see also Alex Berenson, Indictment
of Doctor Tests Drug Marketing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2006, at Al. Pfizer recently
settled to pay $2.3 billion for fraudulent marketing which is "the largest health care fraud
settlement" in history. News Release, U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., Justice Depart-
ment Announces Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in Its History (Sept. 2, 2009),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/09/20090902a.html. The settlement included a
felony plea to the FDCA and a billion dollar settlement under the civil False Claims Act. Id.
164. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
165. See generally Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, § 1, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
(2006).
166. For a nice history and overview on the regulation of drugs see Matthew J. Seamon,
Plan Bfor the FDA: A Need for a Third Class of Drug Regulation in the United States Involv-
ing a "Pharmacist-Only" Class of Drugs, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 521, 537-47
(2006).
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state commerce of a new drug without an approved application. 67 Approval
can arise from a New Drug Application (NDA), "paper NDA," abbreviated
NDA, or Over-the-County (OTC) Monograph.
68
Under the FDCA, a drug is defined as an article "intended for use in the
diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease."' 169 This
means the intended use, via the labeling of a product, dictates its status. The
FDCA further regulates drugs through its misbranding and adulteration pro-
visions. 70 Adulteration refers, in part, to a drug product that is "filthy, putr-
id, or decomposed."'' Misbranding involves a drug's label. 72 Any false or
misleading labeling statements render the drug misbranded. 73 Drugs found
to be adulterated or misbranded are subject to seizure by the FDA and other
enforcement mechanisms. 7 4 The FDCA also authorizes the IND, which
allows an unapproved drug to be researched. 75 Historically, a number of
biologics have been approved solely under the FDCA, including insulin and
human growth hormone.
76
1. New Drug Application (NDA)
Under the FDCA, drugs require premarket clearance before they can be
sold in the United States. 77 Drugs that appear to have a positive risk to ben-
efit ratio are then sought for marketing approval. 78 This typically occurs
through a New Drug Application (NDA), authorized under section 505(b)(1)
of the FDCA. 179  The NDA is the comprehensive collection of data and
knowledge on a drug product. 80 The goal of an NDA is to demonstrate to
the FDA that a drug is safe and effective, the labeling is appropriate, and that
167. 21 U.S.C. §355(a) (2006).
168. See FDA, Small Business Assistance, supra note 115.
169. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B).
170. 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 352.
171. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(3).
172. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a).
173. Id.
174. 21 U.S.C. § 334. Although the FDA maintains enforcement authority for civil, crim-
inal, and administrative actions, they maintain a cooperative working relationship with the
U.S. Department of Justice involving many criminal matters. See 21 U.S.C. § 335. In fact,
section 335 authorizes the FDA to report criminal violations to said department. Id.
175. 21 U.S.C. § 355(i); 21 C.F.R. 312.23 (2009).
176. Andrew Wasson, Taking Biologics for Granted? Takings, Trade Secrets, and Off-
Patent Biologics, 4 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 9 (2005).
177. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.1; 21 U.S.C. § 355.
178. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.2.
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the manufacturing ensures the drug's identity, strength, quality, and purity.'
8
'
The NDA even includes a section on environmental impact.'82
Drugs have to demonstrate safety and efficacy under a burden of sub-
stantial evidence. 183  They also have to submit preclinical data-animal
pharmacology and toxicology-to demonstrate current good manufacturing
practices, compliant product packaging and labeling, and follow postmarket-
ing requirements including reporting known adverse effects.'8
The NDA is assigned a Therapeutic Review Classification based on the
importance of the drug, which dictates the FDA's timeline for review. 185 The
FDA typically then utilizes an advisory committee to help evaluate the drug
and make a non-binding recommendation as to approval.' 86 Applications
with deficiencies receive a "complete response letter" describing the agen-
cy's findings of concern. 87 Drugs suitable for approval can then be ap-
proved and licensed under the FDCA to move in interstate commerce as long
as they are not adulterated or misbranded. 88 Any changes in indications,
manufacturing procedures, labeling, dosage form, or dosing, require a sup-
plemental application referred to as an NDA.
189
B. Biologics Defined
Biologic drugs are large molecule products, typically proteins, derived
from a living organism or one of its products and manufactured through a
181. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(b).
182. 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(1)(iii).
183. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
184. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC
DRUG COMPETITION, at 6 (2009), available at http:llwww.ftc.govlos/2009/06/P083901
biologicsreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC 2009 REPORTI; 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
185. CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., MANUAL
OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 6020.3 1, at (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downI oads/AboutFDA/ReportsManuasForms/StaffPoliciesandProcedures/ucm82000.pdf.
Drugs that provide a "significant improvement compared to marketed products," receive
priority review within six months, and remaining drugs are reviewed within a ten month time
frame. Id. at 1-2; FDA, Fast Track, Accelerated Approval and Priority Review, http://www.
fda.gov/ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForPatientAdvocates/SpeedingAccesstol mportantNewTh
erapies/ucm128291 .htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
186. See FDA, Advisory Committees, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.
htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). The FDA identifies forty-nine advisory committees. Id.
187. 21 C.F.R. § 314.110(a) (2009).
188. See 21 C.F.R.§314.105.
189. 21 C.F.R § 314.7(b). Supplemental applications are differentiated based on minor
changes to be described in an annual report, moderate changes which require a thirty-day
premarket notification to the FDA, and major changes which must be approved prior to distri-
bution of the drug. 21 C.F.R § 314.7(a)-(c).
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DNA or RNA pathway.1 90 Biologics comprise a large and diverse group of
products used in a myriad of diseases and conditions. Traditional drugs are
small molecule products produced by chemical synthesis combining chemi-
cals and reagents in inert reaction vessels.' 9' These drugs are well-defined
and thoroughly characterized; whereby biologics are typically less thorough-
ly characterized as they are derived from living materials, susceptible to en-
vironmental conditions and are of greater complexity. 92 Since biologics are
protein based, they are typically administered via injection to bypass enzy-
matic destruction in the stomach, whereas drugs are typically administered
orally.19 3 Biologics generally have less stability than traditional drugs and
often require refrigeration. 4
Biologics are biochemically complex, exhibiting a primary structure
(amino acid sequence), a secondary structure (disulfide bonding), tertiary
structure (elaborate bending), and a quaternary structure (final aggregation of
the compound).'95 Additionally, many of these products are glycosolated
having multiple shapes called isoforms. 196 Thus, biologics exist in multiple
conformations and may readily convert between each. 197 It is possible, in
fact, that all possible variants of a biologic are not fully characterized.
98
Manufacturing biologics is a highly sophisticated process, much differ-
ent from traditional drugs.'99 Biologics often utilize a specific cell line and
require precise and consistent manufacturing involving highly developed
190. See Michael Kleinberg & Kristen Wilkinson Mosdell, Current and Future Consid-
erations for the New Classes of Biologicals, 61 AM. J. HEALTH-SYs. PHARMACY 695, 697
(2004). In very basic terms a certain biologic (protein) is sought. See id. Scientists obtain the
gene to code for the protein. See id. at 698. This gene is then inserted into a living system-
typically bacteria, yeast or Chinese hamster ovary-which then produces the desired product,
which then is highly purified. See id. at 699. Interestingly, the first recorded use of biological
therapeutics involves the use of an antibiotic obtained from moldy soy in China, in 500 BCE,
to treat boils. Philip E. Johnson, Implications of Biosimilars for the Future, 65 AM. J.
HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY S 16, S 16 (2008).
191. These drugs refer to typical organic-based drugs such as aspirin, Lipitor and Norvasc.
See D.J.A. Crommelin et al., Shifting Paradigms: Biopharmaceuticals Versus Low Molecular
Weight Drugs, 266 INTL. J. PHARMACEUTICS 3,4 (2003).
192. See Kleinberg & Mosdell, supra note 190, at 696.
193. See A. Baumann, Early Development of Therapeutic Biologics-Pharmacokinetics, 7
CURRENT DRUG METABOLISM 15, 18 (2006).
194. Johnson, supra note 190, at S20.
195. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at4.
196. See id. at 6.
197. See Janet Woodcock et al., The FDA's Assessment of Follow-on Protein Products: A
Historical Perspective, 6 NATURE REVS. DRUG DisCov. 437, 438 (2007).
198. See id.
199. Johnson, supra note 190, at S16. Amazingly, bioengineering dates back to 4000
BCE, where yeast fermentation was used to produce alcohol for festivity. Id.
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fermentation processes and purification methods.20° Even very slight devia-
tions in the manufacturing process can result in an altered bioactivity chang-
ing the actions of the compound.'O Impurities and contaminants pose se-
rious threats and some may contain intrinsic infectious agents.2°
The cloning technology required to manufacture biologics originated in
the 1970s and is a highly complex and sequential process. 3 The first bi-
ologic approved was recombinant insulin (Humulin, Lilly), in 1982.204 Since
then more than 250 biologics have been approved and marketed in the Unit-
ed States. 20 ' These products range from botulinum neurotoxin for wrin-
kles,20 6 to monoclonal antibody based therapies for colon cancer,20 7 to vac-
cines for chicken pox, 208 to enzyme replacement therapy for Pompe dis-
ease.
209
As biologics are rather complex molecules, they carry risks not typical-
ly associated with traditional drugs.210 The most important of these risks is
immunogenicity. 211 Immunogenicity refers to neutralizing antibody forma-
tion against a foreign substance, in this case, a biologic.2 12 Biologics are
inherently immunogenic because of their biochemical composition.213 To
200. Felcone, supra note 10, at 26.
201. See Jeremiah J. Kelly & Michael David, No Longer "If" but "When": The Coming
Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-on Biologics, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 115, 120
(2009).
202. See Woodcock et al., supra note 197, at 438.
203. Robert I. Roth & Nicholas M. Fleischer, A Follow-on Biological Drug Is Not a Bio-
generic: Lessons from Omnitrope and Valtropin, 6 J. GENERIC MEDs. 237, 238 (2009). See
generally Johnson, supra note 190 (for a concise review). In 1958, Frederick Sanger won the
noble prize for his work in protein sequencing when he sequenced insulin. Frederick Sanger-
Autobiography, NobelPrize.org, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/chemistrylaureates/1958/
sanger-bio.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
204. Thijs J. Giezen et al., Safety-Related Regulatory Actions for Biologicals Approved in
the United States and the European Union, 300 JAMA 1887, 1887 (2008).
205. Id.
206. See Botox Cosmetic Home Page, http://www.botoxcosmetic.com/hom.aspx (last
visited Apr. 17, 2010).
207. Erbitux, http://www.erbitux.comlindex.aspx (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
208. Merck Vaccines: Varivax, http://www.merckvaccines.comlvaccines/vari/varivax.
html (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
209. The Successful Effort to Develop Myozyme for Pompe Disease at Genzyme FAQs,
The Successful Effort to Develop Myozme and Bring New Hope for to Families Affected by
Pompe Disease, http://www.genzyme.compompemovie/pompe-movie-faq.htm (last visited
Apr. 14, 2010). This drug is based on the research of a father with "two children with Pompe
disease." Id. The story is depicted in the movie, Extraordinary Measures. Id.
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confound the issue, biologics are almost universally injectable and thus pose
increased immunogenic potential.214 Immunogenicity tends to render a drug
ineffective and may cause allergic type reactions that could be fatal.1 5 Bi-
ologics may also pose an increased risk of infection and cancer compared to
traditional drugs.216 Traditional drugs may also be immunogenic, although
the concern is that biologics pose a greater risk.217
It is important to differentiate biologics from gene therapy and other
fields of biotechnology. Although these areas may ultimately merge, the
current state of technology is separate and regulation involving gene therapy
is at its infancy and beyond the scope of this paper.28
1. Biologic Regulation under Public Health Service Act
Biologics are a subset of drugs regulated primarily under Section 351 of
the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) and part 600 of title 21 of the Code of
Federal Regulations.2 '9 The PHSA was established in 1944 and served to
revise and consolidate the existing public health legislation including the
Biologics Control Act of 1902.20 Under the PHSA, biologics are defined as
"any virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, or analogous product applica-
ble to the prevention, treatment or cure of diseases or injuries of man. 22'
Biologics further intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treat-
ment, or prevention of disease are regulated as drugs and therefore subject to
the requirements of the FDCA and the PHSA.222
214. Scott Gottlieb, Biosimilars: Policy, Clinical, and Regulatory Considerations, 65 AM.
J. HEALTH-SYS. PHARMACY S2, S5 (2008).
215. Giezen et al., supra note 204 , at 1888.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See Johnson, supra note 190, at S19-20.
219. Public Health Service Act § 351,42 USC § 262 (2006); 21 C.F.R pt. 600 (2009).
220. David M. Dudzinski & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Scientific and Legal Viability of Fol-
low-on Protein Drugs, 358 NEw ENG. J. MED., 843, 844 (2008). In 1901, thirteen deaths of
children by tetanus were traced back to a diphtheria antitoxin obtained from the blood of local
horse named Jim. Linda Bren, The Road to the Biotech Revolution: Highlights of 100 Years
of Biologics Regulation, FDA CONSUMER, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 50, 51. At the same time, a
similar tragedy occurred in New Jersey. Id. These events prompted Congress to regulate
biologics with the passage of the 1902 Biologics Control Act, also known as the Virus-Toxin
Law. Id.
221. 21 CFR § 600.3(h) (2009).
222. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S3-S4.
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Interestingly, biologics are regulated within both CBER and CDER.22 3
Under the current regulatory framework, some "therapeutic biologic prod-
ucts" are reviewed and regulated by CBER, while others are reviewed by
CDER.2 4 Effective June 30, 2003, CDER regulates monoclonal antibodies
and proteins for therapeutic use, which comprise a rather significant propor-
tion of biologics. 225 CBER regulates cellular products, gene therapy, vac-
cines, allergenic extracts, blood and blood products, and certain fibrinolyt-
ics.226 Drugs licensed under the PHSA are exempt from the licensing re-
quirements of the FDCA. 27
a. Biologic Licensing Application
Biologics are developed similarly to traditional drugs and are subject to
the same rigors of pre-market clearance.228 Their research and development
follows a very similar pathway including preclinical evaluation and clinical
testing involving Phase I, Phase H, and Phase Ell studies. 229 Biologics almost
universally have some Phase IV requirements based on the anticipated risks
in large-scale populations.
230
Unlike traditional drugs, biologics are reviewed and approved under a
Biologic License Application (BLA).23' An approved BLA is analogous to
an NDA and provides the legal authority to move a biologic in interstate
commerce. 232 Generally speaking, a BLA is approved on the basis of safety,
purity, and potency of a biologic. 233 Additionally, the application must con-
223. Due to "historical vagaries," a number of recombinant biologics were approved under
an NDA and regulated by CDER. See Dudzinski & Kesselheim, supra note 220, at 844.
224. FDA, Transfer of Therapeutic Products to the Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CBER/ucmi33463.htm (last visited
Apr. 17, 2010); Drug and Biological Product Consolidation, 68 Fed. Reg. 38067, 38068 (June
26, 2003).
225. See FDA, Transfer of Therapeutic Products to the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, supra note 224. These include such drugs as cytokines-e.g. interferons-and
enzymes-e.g. thrombolytics. See id.
226. Id. These include such drugs as immunoglobulins and antivenims. Id.
227. See 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) (2006).
228. See Jessica R. Underwood, What the EU Has That the US Wants: An Analysis of
Potential Regulatory Systems for Follow-On Biologics in the United States, 10 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 419, 435 (2007).
229. See id. at 435-36.
230. See id. at 436.
231. 21 C.F.R. § 601.20 (2009).
232. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.20(b)(1), (d).
233. 21 C.F.R. § 601.20(c). New Drug Application (NDA) is predicated on safety, effica-
cy, and compliance with current good manufacturing practices. U. S. Food & Drug Admin.,
New Drug Application (NDA), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
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tain data on chemistry, manufacturing, and controls; non-clinical pharmacol-
ogy and toxicology; patent information; and labeling.234 The requirements
for approval of a biologic are often more challenging than traditional drugs
since any small deviation in manufacturing can result in a significant impact
on the bioeffectiveness, and the risk of unanticipated problems is a greater
threat.235
V. GENERIC DRUG REGULATION / DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT
TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984
During the 1970s and 1980s, drug prices began to increase rather dra-
matically.236 To complicate the issue, the wide availability and acceptance of
generic drugs was not to be found.237 Most states do not substitute laws for
the pharmacist, and generic manufacturers had to undergo costly and time-
consuming full-scale studies to gain approval. 38 Moreover, generic compa-
nies had to wait for a patent to expire before ever commencing research and
production, thus effectively extending the innovators patent.239 Suffice it to
say, the generic drug industry was not bountiful and brand companies en-
joyed lengthy patent protections.
Seeking to streamline this concern, increase the availability and use of
generic drugs, all while protecting innovation and patents, Congress passed
the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984.2
40
This landmark legislation, commonly referred to as the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments to the FDCA 1 sought to strike a balance between two impor-
tant competing interests: increased availability of generic drugs and en-
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplicationNDA/
default.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). Potency of biologics is essentially synonymous with
the term efficacy as it relates to drugs. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.20(c).
234. See 21 C.F.R. § 601.20.
235. See Underwood, supra note 228, at 436.
236. See David Pryor, Commentary, A Prescription for High Drug Prices, 9 HEALTH AFF.
101, 101-02 (1990).
237. See id. at 102-03.
238. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY 4 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf [he-
reinafter FTC 2002 STUDY].
239. Satish Chintapalli, Excessive Reverse Payments in the Context of Hatch-Waxman, 10
N.C. J. L. & TECH. 381, 388 (2009).
240. See generally Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
241. Named after Republican Senator Orrin Hatch (Utah) and Democrat Congressman
Henry Waxman (California). See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act
and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
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hanced patent protection for branded products.242 The Act consists of two
titles. Title I amended the FDCA and established an abbreviated approval
pathway for generic drugs under an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA). 24 3 It also provides exclusivity for brand drug approvals. 244 Title II
authorizes the extension of patent terms for approved new drug products.245
Brand drugs receive "an extension term equal to one-half of the time of the
investigational new drug (IND) period ... plus the NDA period .. . [with a]
maximum extension [of] five years and the total market exclusivity time
cannot exceed fourteen years.''246 Hatch-Waxman requires all drug applica-
tions under the FDCA to file patent information with the FDA.247 This way,
the agency has clear direction in granting exclusivity for brand drugs and
approving generic drugs. Hatch-Waxman only applies to drugs and the
FDCA, and did not include provisions to allow for an abbreviated approval
pathway under section 351 of the PHSA.24 8
In order to fully appreciate Hatch-Waxman, one must grasp the drug
approval process for generics. There are currently three mechanisms by
which a generic drug can enter the prescription market when a patent expires
on a brand product-NDA, ANDA, and Paper NDA. All three are available
under the FDCA.249 The use of an NDA for a generic drug is not commonly
used, based on the cost and complexity of the information included. The
ANDA is a much more efficient and cost effective route and is the most
commonly employed pathway. Another abbreviated approval mechanism is
the Paper NDA, more technically referred to as 505(b)(2) approval. The
Paper NDA is similar to an NDA but allows the FDA to rely on published
data and previously determined assessments of safety and efficacy in its ap-
proval. Although a paper NDA can apply to a generic drug, it is typically
reserved for minor changes of an existing drug, such as formulation or dos-
250ing.
242. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 101.
243. Id. Before the approval of this act, generic drugs were required to undergo the same
rigorous clinical trials as branded drugs. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 3. These were
typically large scale randomized controlled efficacy and safety trials. Id. Needless to say, this
research was cumbersome, costly, and complex. It was also unnecessary.
244. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 101.
245. Id. § 201.
246. Mossinghoff, supra note 241, at 190 (1999).
247. See id. at 189.
248. Dudzinski & Kesselheim, supra note 220, at 845.
249. 21 U.S.C. § 355(6)0) (2006).
250. Gregory J. Glover, The Influence of Market Exclusivity on Drug Availability and
Medical Innovations, 9 AM. Ass'N PHARMACEUTICAL SCL J. E312, E313 (2007).
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The generic drug industry is a true boon by all social accounts.25' Ge-
neric drugs represent almost seventy percent252 of all prescriptions filled, yet
account for only sixteen percent of the expenditure.253 The average brand
drug costs $120 per month and the average generic drug costs less than
$35.254 Over the past ten years, the United States healthcare has saved ap-
proximately $700 billion dollars through the use of generic drugs. 255 Generic
utilization occurs as follows. Physicians can prescribe a brand drug or a ge-
neric. 256 If the prescriber writes out a prescription for a brand drug, the
pharmacist typically substitutes a generic, if available. 57 In fact, under Med-
icare law, pharmacists are typically required to substitute.258 Alternatively,
many insurance companies may only pay for a generic if available.259 If a
patient insists on a brand product or there is no generic available, the patient
receives and pays for the brand drug.
2 60
Despite the considerable impact associated with generic drugs, the eco-
nomic framework remains somewhat musing and the full cost savings is of-
ten delayed and slow to materialize.2 6' The first generic to market is typical-
ly priced at about ninety-four percent of the brand drug's price, thus offering
a very nominal cost-savings.262 It is not until a second generic comes to mar-
251. See FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 9.
252. This is "up from 19 percent in 1984 when Hatch-Waxman was" approved. Id. at i.
253. Facts at a Glance, Generic Pharmaceutical Association, http://www.gphaonline.org/
about-gpha/about-generics/facts (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
254. Id.
255. Press Release, Congressman Frank Pallone, Jr., Pallone Statement at Health Hearing
on Follow-On Biologic Drugs 2 (June 11, 2009), available at http://energycommerce.house.
gov/PressI 11/20090611 /pallone.open.pdf.
256. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECT. GEN., GENERIC DRUG
UTILIZATION IN THE MEDICARE PART D PROGRAM 5 (2007).
257. See id. "Generic drug substitution is only possible when a health care provider pre-
scribes a multisource drug (i.e., a brand name multisource drug or its associated equivalent)."
Id.
258. See id. at 4.
259. See id. at 3.
260. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECT. GEN., supra note 256, at
3.
261. See FDA, Generic Competition and Drug Prices, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/CDER/ucm l29385.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
262. Id. Although this seems outrageous, it is actually quite logical. When a first generic
comes to market, insurers almost always require the generic drug over the brand drug, thus
significant market share is almost guaranteed. Nevertheless, once a second generic comes to
market, the less expensive product receives the great lion's share of market push, thus poten-
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ket that a substantial, fifty percent cost savings is seen, and it takes approx-
imately seventeen generics competing until a ninety percent cost-savings is
realized.2 63
B. Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)
Hatch-Waxman codified an abbreviated approval pathway for generic
drugs via 505(j) of the FDCA. 264 The general requirements of an ANDA are
chemistry, manufacturing, labeling, and proof of bioequivalence.265 Collec-
tively this is termed Therapeutic Equivalence. 266 The ANDA is considered
abbreviated because it does not require proof of preclinical or clinical data,
both of which are required in an NDA.267 Since generic drugs do not require
this information, the cost to bring a generic to market is greatly reduced.
Instead of relying on clinical data, the sponsor for a generic drug has to prove
bioequivalence to the brand drug.268 Bioequivalence is established when "the
rate and extent of absorption of the test drug do not show a significant differ-
ence from the rate and extent of absorption of the reference drug. ' 269 This is
essentially a surrogate marker used to demonstrate safety and efficacy of the
drug. In place of preclinical data, the sponsor submits only a section on
chemistry allowing the FDA to rely on the reference listed drug approval as
underpinning.27°
An ANDA also has to include information on patents. The generic
sponsor must "certify" the status of the patent they are copying. 27' There are
four types of certification available.272 Paragraph I certifies the challenged
drug has not been patented. 3 Paragraph I certifies the patent has already
expired on said drug.274 Paragraph Ell certifies the date the patent will expire
tially squeezing out the original generic if it does not lower its price. This window of oppor-
tunity is often short lived and not assured, so generic companies use it to maximize profit.
263. Id.
264. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 505(j), 21 U.S.C § 3550) (2006).
265. Id.
266. See id.
267. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)-(j).
268. 21 U.S.C. § 3550).
269. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS, supra note 14, at v.
The "[m]ethods used to define bioequivalence can be found in 21 C.F.R [§] 320.24 [2010] and
include (I) pharmacokinetic (PK) studies, (2) pharmacodynamic (PD) studies, (3) comparative
clinical trials, and (4) in-vitro studies." Id.
270. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(9).
271. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A)(vii).
272. Id.
273. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(l).
274. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(2)(A)(vii)(II).
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on said drug and assures that the generic drug will not go on the market until
that date passes.275 Paragraph IV certifies that the patent is not infringed or is
invalid.276
Paragraph IV certifications are the most controversial and contentious.
The first generic to successfully file Paragraph I certification receives a 180-
day marketing exclusivity. 277 This very clever provision is intended to pro-
mote immediate filing of an ANDA by creating a monopoly within a mono-
poly for the first generic approved. This incentive appears to be very intelli-
gently calculated and provides sufficient reward to increase generics without
too much hindrance on the overall market. Paragraph IV certifications re-
ceive a lot of press and have spawned a number of tactical business practices
and legal maneuverings.278
The filing of a Paragraph IV certification also triggers a peculiar thirty-
month stay provision preventing the generic drug to market. 279 A generic
company that files an ANDA must notify the FDA and the brand company
who then has forty-five days to file an infringement action, if so desired.28°
If no suit is filed and the application is complete and approvable, the FDA
can license the drug for immediate market.2 81 If the brand company does file
an infringement action, the FDA stays "approval of the ANDA until the ear-
liest of: 1) the date the patent[] expire[s]; 2) a final determination of non-
infringement or patent invalidity by a court in the patent litigation; or 3) the
expiration of 30 months from the receipt of notice of the [Plaragraph IV cer-
tification. '282 Practically speaking, by simply filing an infringement action,
the brand company receives a thirty-month stay of approval of the generic;
the theoretical approximate of the time to litigate the matter. Amazingly,
two and a half years of additional exclusivity comes with low risk and no-
minal costs-a noticeable incentive. This automatic stay frustrates the sys-
tem and further increases the gaming strategy employed in drug develop-
ment.
275. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(ll).
276. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
277. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 7; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)().
278. See, e.g., ParagraphFour.com, Paragraph Four Explained, The Generic Approval




282. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 39.
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C. Paper NDA and the Case of Omnitrope®
In addition to 505(j) approval with an ANDA, Hatch-Waxman also au-
thorizes 505(b)(2) pathway for abbreviated approval, the so-called paper
NDA.283 This application allows for a sponsor to rely upon previously pub-
lished literature for certain aspects of the application, including the FDA's
determination of safety and efficacy. 2 4 Data on the reference listed drug is
then used for the remaining requirements such as pharmacology and toxicol-
ogy.285 Drugs approved under a paper NDA are not necessarily substitutable
for the comparator product and not AB listed in the Orange Book.286 The
paper NDA is considered a potential source of approval for a generic biolog-
ic, although the impediments seem overwhelming and the framework is not
intended to regulate such actions and has never been used.287 Technically
speaking, there is no paper BLA and the authority for approval of a generic
biologic under the current regulatory system is uncertain.288
Interestingly, the paper NDA has been used to approve one biologic,
despite vigorous opposition and extensive legal wrangling.289 On May 30,
2006, the FDA approved Omnitrope®290 for marketing, despite a citizen's
petition from Pfizer, Biotechnology Industry Organization, and Genentech
urging otherwise. 91 Omnitrope® was approved, in part, through reliance of
the FDA's determination of safety and efficacy of the reference listed drug,
283. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2), (0); Glover, supra note 250, at E313.
284. Michael P. Peskoe, Paper NDAs and the Drug Price Competition Act: A Last Hur-
rah,? 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 323, 323 (1985); see also Letter from Steven K. Galson, Dir.,
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Kathleen M. Sanzo et al., Counsel for Petitioners 5
(May 30, 2006), available at http:lwww.fda.govlohrmsldockets/docketsl04p0231/0 4 p-02 3 1-
pdnOOOl.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Steven K. Galson] (describing the practice of a paper
NDA for drug approval).
285. See FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 5.
286. LIONEL D. EDWARDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF PHARMACEUTICAL
MEDICINE 383 (2007).
287. See Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
288. See Donald E. Segal et al., Regulatory Pathway for "Biosimilar" Products Debated,
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. D.C.), Feb. 2007, at 1, 2.
289. See id.
290. Growth Hormone Deficiency Treatment: Omnitrope, Sandoz, http://www.omnitrope.
com/omnitrope/index.html (last visited April 17, 2010). Omnitrope is a recombinant human
growth hormone manufactured by Sandoz. Id. The innovator product is Genotropin, mar-
keted by Pfizer, Inc. Genotropin Official Site-Human Growth Hormone, http://www.geno
tropin.com/content/lndex.aspx (last visited April 17, 2010).
291. Letter from Steven K. Galson, supra note 284, at 1; FDA, Drug Details, Omnitrope,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.DrugDet
ails (last visited April 17, 2010).
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Genotropin manufactured by Genetech, approved under an NDA. 92 FDA
review found the drug was "sufficiently similar . . .to warrant [such] re-
liance" despite strong protest.293 The application also included clinical data
obtained by Genentech. 294 The FDA found a relative lack of complexity of
the hormone and the availability of sufficient analytical techniques to ap-
prove the drug.295 The FDA was clear this route of approval would not apply
to biologics licensed under the PHSA or to products lacking a well-
documented history of use.296
D. Exploitation of Hatch- Waxman
Practically speaking, Hatch-Waxman accomplished its aim. By most, if
not all accounts, Hatch-Waxman increased access to generic drugs while
providing sufficient protection and incentives for brand companies to contin-
ue to be innovative. However, like most if not all legislation, Hatch-
Waxman is riddled with loopholes that have undermined some of its intent
and has been subject to exploitation and abuse by brand companies seeking
to maintain patent protection and prevent competition.297 The legality of
many of these strategies is made on a case-by-case basis and a number of
settlements and decrees have occurred.298
The loopholes center around two provisions of the Paragraph IV certifi-
cation: 180-day exclusivity and thirty-month stay. 299 Brand company mani-
pulation of the 180-day exclusivity center around payments to generic com-
panies not to market and the manufacturer of so called, "authorized gener-
ics.''3°° Brand companies have been accused of filing baseless infringement
actions to trigger the thirty-month stay provision and even file inequitable
patent applications to delay market entry.3" 1 Lastly, brand companies can
delist a patent after successful Paragraph IV certification to cause recertifica-
292. See Segal et al., supra note 288, at 2. Genotropin was approved under a NDA and
not a BLA although biochemically it is a biologic drug. FDA, Drug Details, Genotropin,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm?fuseaction=Search.Label-A
pprovalHistory#apphist (last visited April 17, 2010).
293. Letter from Steven K. Galson, supra note 284, at 8.
294. See Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
295. See Dudzinski & Kesselheim, supra note 220, at 845.
296. Id.
297. FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 39-40.
298. See id. at 16-17.
299. Avery, supra note 16, at 179.
300. Id. at l81.
301. Id. at 179-80.
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tion under Paragraph I and the subsequent loss of exclusivity by the gener-
iC.302ic.
3°
The FTC has investigated a number of agreements not to compete be-
tween a brand company about to lose patent protection and the generic com-
pany awarded 180-day exclusivity. 3 3 These "pay for delay" agreements
often involve a "reverse payment," whereas the brand company simply pays
the generic company to not compete during the exclusivity period.304 Interes-
tingly, courts have been inconsistent as to the legality of this practice and
some "pay for delay settlements" have been deemed legal.305 The Sixth Cir-
cuit has ruled that reverse payments are a per se violation.30 6 Meanwhile, the
Eleventh Circuit approaches the issue using an analysis somewhere between
per se and rule of reason.307 Using a three part analysis the court looks to
"(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to
which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompeti-
tive effects. 30 8
Authorized generics refer to drug products manufactured by a brand
company, identical to the brand product, but sold-i.e. authorized-as a ge-
neric.309 The brand company can either sell the drug directly or license it to
another company to label and sell. 310 Brand companies often introduce au-
thorized generics during the 180-day exclusivity period as a first generic. 1
Although this clearly undermines the intent of Hatch-Waxman, is anticompe-
titive, and diminishes the incentive for generic companies to compete, it ap-
pears fully legal.31 2 To date, the courts have upheld the legality of authorized
generics through two appellate cases.313 In fact, the United States Court of
Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, affirmed the decision to not even hear
a citizen's petition made by a generic company, Teva.31 4 Additionally, the
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, found no legal sufficiency to
302. Id. at 198.
303. See FTC 2008 REPORT, supra note 25.
304. Avery, supra note 16, at 181.
305. FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184, at i.
306. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 908 (6th Cir. 2003).
307. See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 & n.27 (11 th Cir.
2003).
308. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11 th Cir. 2005).
309. John M. Rebman, Dr. Strange Drug, or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love
Authorized Generics, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 159, 159 (2009).
310. Id.
311. Id. at 160.
312. See id. at 160, 181.
313. See Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Mylan
Pharms. Inc., v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 276-77 (4th Cir. 2006).
314. Teva Pharn. Indus. Ltd., 410 F.3d at 51, 55.
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disallow the entry of an authorized generic by the NDA holder as they were
within their statutory right.315
The thirty-month stay provision of Hatch-Waxman has been a real lure
for brand companies, who have in turn sought inventive ways to trigger the
stay.3 16 A number of these techniques have been tried in court. For example,
in the case of In re Neurontin Antitrust Litigation,3 17 Pfizer, the brand manu-
facturer of Neurontin, was accused of filing sham litigation against the ge-
neric company, submitting false and fraudulent patents for inclusion in the
Orange Book, and misconduct of patent prosecutions to impair competi-
tion.318 In Aventis Pharmaceuticals v. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,3 19
the court found incontrovertible evidence of inequitable conduct by the brand
company with intent to deceive the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in
failing to disclose information in a patent application.32°
The FTC stands in strong opposition to tactics aimed at undermining the
integrity of Hatch-Waxman.32t In fact, in 2008 the Commission issued a
report detailing these practices, describing their anti-competitive effects.322
The report was instrumental to changes in the original act that helped close
some of the loopholes at the time. Additional legislation has been proposed
to further close loopholes, but the system still remains open to manipulation
and exploitation.323
The transcendent value of Hatch-Waxman is grounded on its impact on
competition and, ultimately, drug prices. Although not perfect, the Act
spawned an entire generic drug industry, while maintaining and rewarding
innovation, which is no easy task.
315. Mylan Pharms., 454 F.3d at 276-77.
316. See, e.g., FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184, at 57, 7 1.
317. No. 02-1390, 2009 WL 2751029 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2009).
318. Id. at *1, *4; see FTC 2002 STUDY, supra note 238, at 40.
319. 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
320. Id. at 1349.
321. See FTC 2008 REPORT, supra note 25; see also John R. McNair, Note, If Hatch Wins,
Make Waxman Pay: One-Way Fee Shifting as a Substitute Incentive to Resolve Abuse of the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 119, 126.
322. FTC 2008 REPORT, supra note 25, at 1.
323. For example, the Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act (S. 369) prohibits
generic companies from entering into agreements with brand companies to delay or cease
from offering a generic option to the market. See PRESCRIPTION ACCESS LITIGATION FACT
SHEET: THE PRESERVE ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE GENERICS ACT (S. 369)/ THE PROTECTING
CONSUMER ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS ACT OF 2009 (H.R. 1706), July 22, 2009, http:llwww.




: Nova Law Review 34, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
2010] ANTITRUSTAND THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 663
VI. CURRENT STATE OF GENERIC BIOLOGICS
Hatch-Waxman established a mechanism for generic drugs in the Unit-
ed States.324 However, this act did not predict the role of biologics and a void
was created. Meanwhile biologics, constitute a rising market share, and as
patents continue to issue and expire, the need to substitute products in at-
tempted cost-savings is a major policy concern. In the aughts, there were a
number of failed attempts to regulate generic biologics; however, each meas-
ure was systematically defeated in Congress. 325
In June 2009, the Federal Trade Commission released a comprehensive
analysis on generic biologics. 326 The report found that competition between
a biologic and its generic counterpart is more likely going "to resemble
brand-to-brand competition, rather than [the traditional] brand-to-generic
competition," because of the cost and complexity of bringing a generic bi-
ologic to market.327 The report claimed that even in the presence of a generic
biologic, the brand product would retain seventy to ninety percent of its mar-
ket share, which is quite different than the current system, where erosion is
immediate and glaring.328  The report further asserted generic biologics
would provide a cost-savings of approximately ten to thirty percent.329 Over-
all, the report is clear that existing incentives provided for in Hatch-Waxman
are sufficient for biologics, signifying that anything longer than five years of
exclusivity will be anticompetitive.33°
A. Generic Biologics Defined
The BPCIA defines a generic biologic as "a biological product ap-
proved under an abbreviated application for a license of a biological product
that relies in part on data or information in an application for another biolog-
324. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006)).
325. See, e.g., Access to Life Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007); Pa-
tient Protection and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R. 1956, 110th Cong.
(2007); Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 1695, 110th Cong.
(2007); Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. (2008).
326. See FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184.
327. Id. at iii.
328. Id. at v.
329. Id. at v. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that generic biologics will be
priced at a twenty to twenty-five percent reduction initially and increase to forty percent by
the fourth year. CONG. BuDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 1695, BIOLOGICS PRICE
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2007 7 (June 25, 2008), available at http://www.cbo.
gov/ftpdocs/94xx/doc9496/s 1695.pdf [hereinafter CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE].
330. FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184, at 57.
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ical product licensed under section 351 of the Public Health Service Act. ,331
Biosimilarity is defined as a product "highly similar to the reference product
notwithstanding minor differences in clinically inactive components; and
there are no clinically meaningful differences between the biological product
and the reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and potency.332
Technically speaking, generic drugs refer to products manufactured
without trademark protection.33 Scientifically speaking, the term has come
to mean a drug that has the same dosage, safety, strength, route of adminis-
tration, quality, performance, and intended use as a brand drug-essentially
an exact copy. 334 A generic drug is considered an identical copy to a brand
drug with an associated cost-savings.335
Many claim the term "generic biologic" is a fallacy and inappropriate to
use.336 It is claimed that independently manufactured biologics should not be
considered identical to each other based on a number of manufacturing va-
riances and resulting subtleties.337 Biologics are manufactured in living sys-
tems and fluctuations inevitably occur.338 Instead, these copies are only con-
sidered similar and follow-on to a brand drug. 339 Accordingly, the choice
term represents a meaningful characterization of the issue and driver of some
of the legal, social, and scientific discussions.
Developing a generic biologic involves identifying the target drug, es-
tablishing duplicative or similar methods of production and product characte-
rization to validate similarity. Generic biologics are referred to by a myriad
of terms including: biosimilars, biogenerics, follow-on biologics, follow-on
proteins, and subsequent entry biologics (SUB). There is no officially ac-
cepted scientific nomenclature, although the term biosimilars appears to have
become vernacular in the United States with the passage of the BPCIA. Bio-
similar is the preferred term in Europe, whereas Canada utilizes SUB to refer
to these products. An all encompassing and adequate term may not exist.
331. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3139(a)(2), 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
332. Id. § 7002(b).




336. See, e.g., G. Gast] et al., ASHO Position Paper on Biosimilars, 2 MAG. EUR. MED.
ONCOLOGY, 2009, at 232.
337. EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY (EMEA), COMM. FOR MEDICINAL PRODS. FOR HUMAN USE,
GUIDELINE ON SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS 4 (Oct. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.ema.europa.eu/pdfslhumanlbiosimilar/043704en.pdf [herinafter EMEA 2005].
338. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
339. See id. at S2.
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Nevertheless, for the sake of discussion, generic biologic may be appro-
priately defined as a biological drug product with the same biochemical
structure and function as a trademarked product with equivalent purity, po-
tency, and safety.
1. Challenges with Generic Biologics
The primary goal of generic biologics involves product safety.340 As
with all drugs, safety is paramount and the production of an equivalent prod-
uct with an equivalent safety profile is essential. The practical goal, mean-
while, is to establish a system that supports substitution of the generic bi-
ologic at the pharmacy level with an associated cost-savings to the payor.34 '
Based on the complex biochemical nature of biologics, the creation of
an equivalent generic poses a myriad of challenges before it can be widely
produced and accepted. First, there must be a system to define and establish
structural equivalency. Replication must be feasible based on the patent and
there must be a method to characterize the product as equivalent. Next, there
must be a method to assure functional equivalency of products, namely safe-
ty, purity, and potency. Practitioners and patients must then have confidence
in the substitution of these products and payors must realize an actual cost-
savings.
The requirements for establishing equivalency are going to vary by the
drug involved.342 While certain classes of biologics may only require general
guidelines to establish equivalency, other, more complex agents may require
very specialized and particular approaches to demonstrate both structural and
functional equivalency. 43 The establishment and inclusion of Compendium
standards should be sought.3' Any variances determined will then have to
be supported by evidence of no effectual difference for equivalency to be
established. 34'
Structurally, generic biologics are thought to be extremely difficult to
produce an exact replica, unlike small molecule generics which are rather
easy to replicate and produce.346 Differences in cell lines, manufacturing
practices, temperature, pH, finishing and storage conditions, and protein ag-
340. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S3.
341. See id.
342. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
343. See id.
344. See Emily Shacter, Follow-on Biologics Workshop: Scientific Issues in Assessing
the Similarity of Follow-on Protein Products (2005), http://www.biosimilarstoday.com
Shacter.pdf.
345. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
346. See Woodcock et al., supra note 197, at 438.
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gregation, can all affect product structure. 47  Another challenge involves
analyzing these products for structural equivalency. 348 Traditional drugs are
considered easy to characterize, whereas characterization of biologics is ex-
tremely difficult.349 Crystal studies only capture the current confirmation of
a biologic, which can exist in multiple states.35° Highly advanced analytical
techniques such as X-ray crystallographic diffraction, MRI, and reversed-
phase high-performance liquid chromatography are going to be required to
establish structural equivalence, if at all possible under the current state of
technology. 351 Orthogonal methods will be needed and multiple techniques
may be required.352
Batch to batch variability inevitably occurs with biologics and impuri-
ties may be present 353 Brand companies have argued information on varia-
bility is a trade secret and confidential commercial information is available
only to the FDA.354 They argue that any use of protected information would
require the FDA to pay just compensation under the Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause.355
Establishing functional equivalency will also pose some challenges.
Even though we have reliable biomarkers to assess equivalence with most
drugs, the physical complexity of biologics and the various confirmations of
isoforms are problematic. 356 For instance, a biologic could have the same
response in a pharmacodynamic measure such as blood pressure with its
comparator, but have other, unanticipated responses, i.e. side effects, based
on its folding characteristics and the way it binds to a certain receptor.357
As immungenecity is a concern with all drugs, it becomes a greater
concern with generic biologics, especially when interchangeability is consi-
347. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
348. See id.
349. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
350. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 6.
351. See The Quality and Purity of Retacrit(R) Was Readily Demonstrated and Was
Shown to Maintain Haemoglobin Levels in Patients with Chronic Kidney Disease, MEDICAL
NEWS TODAY, May 27, 2009, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articies/151513.php.
352. See Shacter, supra note 344.
353. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
354. Letter from Kathy J. Schroeher, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Johnson & Johnson, to Divi-
sion of Dockets Management, Food & Drug Admin., Dep't of Health & Human Servs., (July
1, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/04p017l/04p-0171 -c000002
-01-voll.pdf.
355. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. Specifically, information on chemistry, manufac-
turing, and controls are believed to be widely protected. See Letter from Kathy J. Schroeher,
supra note 354, at 6 & n.9.
356. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 14.
357. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S4.
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dered.358 Since biologics are complex proteins, they can elicit a number of
immune responses, depending on a number of factors. 359 Although very sim-
ilar, two inexact biologics can elicit very different immune responses.
Overall, biologics represent a very diverse complexity of products, and
thus many of these considerations do not apply equally and the FDA will
have to deal with many of these issues on a case-by-case basis, at least in-
itially.36 The FDA has not yet developed a formal system to evaluate equi-
valence and is going to have to have an open approach, likely involving a
consensus of the professional and scientific communities.36z Only when
structural and functional equivalencies are truly established with confidence,
can we begin talking about product substitution and cost-savings.
The FDA will have to compile some system that supports substitution
for biologics, like the Orange Book's AB rating system for conventional
drugs.363 Once equivalency is established, it is likely that physicians and
pharmacists will be amenable to product substitution as the current system of
generics has demonstrated. Legislators can then move to require substitu-
tion. Opposition is expected with lobbying efforts by the Biotechnology
Industry Organization (BIO), and PhRMA, the biologic and drug trade asso-
ciations respectively, leading the way. Payors, concerned with the bottom
line, will likely push for substitution, helping advance the system and pro-
mote acceptance.
The cost of developing a generic biologic is large, estimated at $100-
$200 million; much greater than a traditional generic drug.364 There will be a
need for particular cell lines and highly specialized manufacturing processes,
the availability of which may prove a tough find. A full biogeneric industry
does not currently exist as the need has not arisen. 365 The review process is
going to be extremely challenging and may ultimately require a significant
amount of data, and may thus be costly to the generic company. 36 Neverthe-
less, once the regulatory framework is established, companies will step for-
ward as it remains a highly lucrative industry and drug prices should be ex-
pected to fall over time.
358. See J.L. Prugnaud, Similarity of Biotechnology-Derived Medicinal Products: Specif-
ic Problems and New Regulatory Framework, 65 BR. J. CLIN. PHARMACOL. 619,620 (2007).
359. See Crommelin et al., supra note 191, at 11.
360. See id.
361. See id. at S4, $7.
362. Richard G. Wenzel, Introduction, 65 AM. J. HEALTH SYST. PHARM. S 1, S i (2008).
363. See id.
364. Posting of Maggie Mahar, The Battle over Biologics Begins, to http://www.health
beatblog.com/2009/06/the-battle-over-biologics-begins-.html (June 26, 2009).
365. See Engelberg et al., supra note 5, at 1917-18.
366. Id. at 1918.
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B. International Regulatory Approach
Australia does not categorize biologics separate from drugs, so their po-
sition is less problematic. 367 Canada issued a Draft Guidance for Sponsors:
Information and Submission Requirements for Subsequent Entry Biologics
(SEBs) and Related Documents on January 30, 2008.368 The draft document
was revised and republished on March 27, 2009, and is amidst review and
further development.
369
Canada does not plan on establishing a new regulatory framework, but
will instead rely upon its existing statutory authority for Health Canada to
review and approve these products. 370 SEBs will be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis and reviewed as new drugs. 37' They will not follow the abbre-
viated approval pathway available for generic drugs nor be substitutable.372
They will have no exclusivity, per se.373 Nevertheless, the appeal is that the
submission can rely, "in part, on prior information regarding the authorized
innovative biologic drug in order to present a reduced clinical and non-
clinical package. 374 Additionally SEBs can be submitted for innovator bi-
ologics not approved in Canada.37
Overall, the Canadian approach appears to be a reasonable approach to
the issue. As technology further advances, costs continue to rise and patents
fall, Health Canada may need to reassess the issue and consider substitutabil-
367. See Prescription Drugs-Generic vs Brand Name, Crossborderpharmacy.com,
http://crossborderpharmacy.com/canadian-generics-vs-brand-name.html (last visited Apr. 17,
2010).
368. Health Can., Draft Guidance for Sponsors: Information and Submission Require-
ments for Subsequent Entry Biologics (SEBs) (March 27, 2009), available at http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt -formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/consultation/2009-03-seb-pbu-notice-avis-
eng.pdf [hereinafter Health Can., Draft Guidance for Sponsors].
369. See id. at a-b.
370. See id. at 2.
371. Id. at4-6.
372. Id. at 4.
373. See Health Can., Draft Guidance for Sponsors, supra note 368, at 4.
374. Id. at I.
[A] suitable reference biologic drug exists that: a) was originally authorized for sale based on
a complete data package; and b) has significant safety and efficacy data accumulated such that
the demonstration of similarity will bring into relevance a substantial body of reliable data; the
product can be well characterized by a set of modern analytical methods; and the biologic
drug, through extensive characterization and analysis, can be judged similar to the reference
biologic drug by meeting an appropriate set of pre-determined criteria. Products employing
clearly different approaches to manufacture than the reference biologic drug (for example, use
of transgenic organisms versus cell culture) will not be eligible for authorization as SEBs.
Id.
375. Id. at 3, 6. This is made upon request of the Minister and "must include sufficient
information to explicitly explain the link." Id. at 6.
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ity at the pharmacy level, the possibility of a reduced review time for the
agency and incentives for manufacturers to produce and market these prod-
ucts. The first drug approved under the subsequent entry biologic review
system was Omnitrope® on April 20, 2009.376
The European Regulatory Union maintains the benchmark regulation
for biosimilar review and approval in the world.377 This pathway was estab-
lished in June 2003 through modification of the EU's medical products sta-
tutes. 37 8 The European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products
(EMEA), the European equivalent to the FDA, oversees the implementation
of the review process. The regulations approach generic biologics as distinct
from traditional generic drugs based on complexity, thus requiring a different
approach to an abbreviated approval. 379 Review and approval occurs on a
case-by-case basis using product specific guidance documents issued through
an open and public process. 380 The system calls for "[ain appropriate compa-
rability exercise ... to demonstrate . . . similar profiles in terms of quality,
safety, and efficacy. ' '381 Although the system can approve a biosimilar drug,
it leaves the determination of substitution to national authorities.382 France
and Spain recently enacted legislation that prohibits automatic substitution of
a generic biologic, and the system as a whole is still in its infancy.
383
Under EMEA review, a biosimilar application contains non-clinical da-
ta, as well as clinical data.3' The section on non-clinical data is meant to
identify changes in response between the two products and is based on in
vitro studies, toxicokinetic measurements, etc.385 The clinical section is in-
376. Notice of Decision for Omnitrope, Health Canada I (May 15, 2009), available at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt'formats/hpfb-
dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/nd ad_2009_omnitrope_ I 13380-eng.pdf.
377. See Filiz Hincal, An Introduction to Safety Issues in Biosimilars/Follow-On Bio-
pharmaceuticals, 7 J. MED., CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, & RADIOLOGICAL DEF. 1, 4 (2009).
Interestingly, in 1986 the European Union initially approved a system to approve generic
biologics. Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S6. This system was quickly seen as incomplete and
problematic and abandoned. Id.
378. See EUROPEAN MEDS. AGENCY (EMEA), COMM. FOR MEDICINAL PRODS. FOR HUMAN
USE, GUIDELINE ON SIMILAR BIOLOGICAL MEDICINAL PRODUCTS CONTAINING
BIOTECHNOLOGY-DERIVED PROTEINS AS ACTIVE SUBSTANCE: NON-CLINICAL AND CLINICAL
ISSUES 3-4 (Feb. 22, 2006) available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/pdfs/human/biosimilar
/4283205en.pdf [hereinafter EMEA 2006].
379. See Gottlieb, supra note 214, at S3, S7.
380. Id. at S7.
381. EMEA 2006, supra note 378, at 3.
382. Nuala Moran, Fractured European Market Undermines Biosimilar Launches, 26
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 5, 5 (2008).
383. Id.
384. See EMEA 2006, supra note 378, at 4-6.
385. Id. at 4.
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tended to demonstrate clinical comparability, including efficacy and safe-
ty.386 The EMEA guidelines also require a full chemistry evaluation.
387
Guidance documents suggest that comparability efficacy studies may be
needed, although they are not required. 388 The extent of abbreviation varies
and some approvals will be akin to the brand drug's approval with rigorous
data requirements. 389 Additionally, class-specific guidelines can be estab-
lished for product reviews. 390 The EMEA system provides for an exclusivity
period of ten years for an innovator reference product.39 1 Moreover, the ap-
plicant can obtain another year of exclusivity, for a total period of eleven
years, if the biologic gains a new indication in the first eight years of its ex-
clusivity which provides a "significant clinical benefit in comparison [to]
existing therapies. ' '39' The regulations also require post-approval surveil-
lance to monitor such things such as immunogenicity.
393
The first drug approved under the biosimilar review process in Europe
was Omnitrope® in January 2006.394 In 2007, the world's bestselling biolog-
ic, erythropoietin, saw the approval of two biosimilar drugs in Europe, al-
though market penetration has been slow to transpire.395 The true impact of
biosimilars in practice has not yet come to fruition and in many ways the
system is still in its early infancy. Advances in technology, experience, and
legislation will refine the system over time.
C. Proposed U.S. Legislation
In the United States, the FDA approves drug products for marketing un-
der authority of the FDCA and the Public Health Services Act.3 96 It has been
"argued that the FDA has the authority to approve generic" biologics under
386. Id. at 5-6.
387. See id. at 5.
388. See, e.g., id. at 5-6.
389. See Frank, supra note 98, at 843.
390. See EMEA 2006, supra note 378, at 4.
391. EUROPEAN COMM'N, ENTER. & INDUS. DIRECTORATE-GEN., GUIDANCE ON ELEMENTS
REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE SIGNIFICANT CLINICAL BENEFIT IN COMPARISON WITH EXISTING
THERAPIES OF A NEW THERAPEUTIC INDICATION IN ORDER TO BENEFIT FROM AN EXTENDED (1 1-
YEAR) MARKETING PROTECTION PERIOD 1 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
enterprise/pharmaceuticals/eudralex/vol-2/c/guideline_1 4-11-2007.pdf.
392. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
393. See EMEA 2006, supra note 378, at 6-7.
394. Press Release, EUROPA, Biotech Medicines: First Biosimilar Drug on EU Market
(Apr. 20, 2006), http://europa.eu/rapidlpressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/51 1.
395. Moran, supra note 382, at 5.
396. See Underwood, supra note 228, at 432-33.
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an abbreviated follow-on pathway using the current regulatory framework.397
Nevertheless, the FDA has taken no action on the issue and has left the issue
to Congress to legislate.3 98
Over the last few years, there have been a number of proposed, and de-
feated, bills dealing specifically with generic biologics in the United
States.39  It was not until the push for a national healthcare reform bill
gained momentum did the prospect of legislation authorizing generic biolog-
ics become increasingly apparent and the chance of success elucidate. De-
spite strong opposition and quarrel, Congress maintained a steadfast move
toward approval of a healthcare bill under the unwavering persistence of
President Obama. One measure passed in the Senate4" and one in the House,
thus setting the stage for bicameral national health reform.4°' These two bills
each included a provision authorizing generic biologics.
On November 7, 2009, H.R. 3962, the Affordable Health Care for
America Act, passed in the House of Representatives by a 220 to 215 vote.40
2
Division C, Title V, Subtitle C, Part 2 dealt exclusively with Biosimilars. 403
The bill amended the PHSA and establisheed a framework to approve a ge-
neric biologic.4°4 A drug was considered "biosimilar" by evidence of analyt-
ical studies, animal studies, and clinical data that show no clinically mea-
ningful differences in safety, purity, or potency from the reference (brand)
product. 4 5 It also included a provision, whereby the HHS Secretary can
waive the requirement for clinical data; although this matter will need to be
further considered either by legislation or regulation. 4° It includes a section
397. Id. at 442.
398. See id. at 425-26.
399. See, e.g., Access to Life-Saving Medicine Act, H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007); Pa-
tient Protection and Innovative Biologic Medicines Act of 2007, H.R. 1956, 1 10th Cong.
(2007); Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2007, S. 1695, 110th Cong.
(2007); Pathway for Biosimilars Act, H.R. 5629, 110th Cong. (2008).
400. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009)
(enacted). This was originally a House bill, but was co-opted by the Senate, as all revenue
bills have to start in the House. Id.
401. See generally Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong.
(2009).
402. CNN.com, House Passes Health Care Reform Bill (Nov. 8, 2009), http://www.cnn.
com/2009/POLITICS/i I/07/health.care/index.html.
403. H.R. 3962, § 2575. Only one republican voted for this bill. See Robert Pear, Senate
Passes Health Care Overhaul on Party-Line Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 2009, at IA.
404. H.R. 3962 § 2575.
405. H.R. 3962 §§ 2575(a)(2), (b)(3).
406. H.R. 3962 § 2575(a)(2).
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on guidance documents, and empowers the FDA (HHS Secretary) to issue
product class-specific guidance in approving biosimilar drugs.4 °7
The bill provided for an exclusivity period of twelve years for innovator
products.4"8 There are no further exclusivity provisions for changes in indi-
cations, dosage form, or route of administration, unlike Hatch-Waxman.4' 9
The bill includes a rather complex process for patent disputes and includes a
provision whereby agreements between the brand and generic company relat-
ing to manufacture, marketing, or sale of biosimilar products must be re-
viewed by the Assistant Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission.4 °
It provides a mechanism, whereby a generic biologic can be established as
substitutable. 41 ' The first biologic considered "interchangeable" receives a
one year exclusivity to incentive filing, like Hatch-Waxman, authorized for
traditional drugs.412 Additionally, the bill provides for an additional six-
month exclusivity period for testing in a pediatric population and charges
user fees to the manufacturer, like those authorized under PDUFA.4 13
The Senate bill dealing with generic biologics was H.R. 3590, the Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act.414 On December 24, 2009 this bill
passed in the Senate by a vote of sixty in favor, thirty-nine opposed, and one
present/not voting.4 5  Title VII, Subtitle A was entitled "Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act of 2009" and was a close reflection of the
House bill.416 It provided a similar framework to approve a generic biologic
drug product through the PHSA.417 Under this act, a biologic is deemed bio-
similar to a reference biologic if analytical studies, animal studies, and clini-
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111 th Cong. § 2575 (2009).
410. See Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111 th Cong. § 2575(a)(2).
411. Id. (for biologics that are administered more than once the application must demon-
strate safety of switching back and forth).
412. Id. (interchangeability is established if the two products are biosimilar, expected to
provide the same clinical results, and there is no increased risk by alternating between the two
products).
413. Id.
414. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, l11th Cong. (2009)
(enacted).
415. Pear, supra note 403 (Not a single Republican voted in favor of this bill.). "Senator
Jim Bunning, Republican of Kentucky, did not vote." Id.
416. See H.R. 3590, § 7001 (2009).
417. This provision was authored by Senators Kay Hagan (D-N.C.), Mike Enzi (R-Wyo.),
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Barbara Mikulski (D-Md.). Press Release, Biotechnology Indus.
Org., Provisions in the Senate Health Care Bill Help Patients, Promote Innovation, Encourage
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cal data show no clinically meaningful differences in safety, purity, or poten-
cy from the reference (brand) product.418 Also like the House bill, it pro-
vided for an exclusivity period of twelve years for the innovator product,
granted a one-year marketing exclusivity for the first product deemed inter-
changeable, and included a six month pediatric exclusivity provision.419 Im-
portantly, the bill did not consider pay-to-delay agreements like the House
bill. 420 Lastly, the bill required a determination on the savings to the federal
government be calculated.42'
D. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act
On March 21, 2010, the House of Representatives voted in support of
the Senate-approved H.R. 3590 by a vote of 219-212,422 setting the state for
President Obama to sign into law landmark legislation involving healthcare
and for the first time authorizing generic biologics in the United States. On
March 23, 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act became
Public Law 11 1-148.423
The Act establishes a user-fee supported pathway for approving generic
biologics through the PHSA.424 The Act includes a section providing for
product class-specific guidance documents to facilitate approval, as are uti-
lized in Europe.425 It also provides a six month pediatric exclusivity provi-
sion which is a valuable social incentive.426 There is no Orange Book re-
liance for sharing of patent information, and instead the law details an infor-
mation sharing process between the brand and the generic company on intel-
427lectual property.
The generic company does not have to certify any of the brand holder
patents and there is no automatic thirty-month-stay provision, under the law
which effectively closes the problematic loophole of Hatch Waxman. In-
stead, the law delineates a multi-step process for patent infringement con-
418. H.R. 3590, § 7002(a)(2).
419. H.R. 3590 § 7002(a)(6)(A),(a)(7)(A), (m)(2)(a).
420. H.R. 3590 § 7002(a)(5)(B).
421. H.R. 3590 § 7003(a).
422. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-03,
124 Stat. 119 (2010). This bill was decided on strong partisan lines with 219 Democrats vot-
ing in favor and 34 voting against. All 178 Republicans voted in opposition.
423. See id.
424. See id. §§ 7001-03.
425. Id. § 7002.
426. Id.
427. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 7002.
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cerns and requires the generic company to notify the brand company 180
days prior to marketing.4 8 This preserves the brand company's ability to
seek a preliminary injunction.
The exclusivity period is twelve years from the date of brand drug ap-
proval.429 The debate on this issue was one of the most polarizing. BIO had
sought fourteen years.430 Generic trade associations sought eight years.43'
The White House and President Obama were somewhere in between, seeking
exclusivity of ten years.432 Clearly a significant exclusivity period is a requi-
site requirement. This issue has been a vital component to the widespread
success of the generic industry. Generic drugs often become available the
same day the FDA exclusivity period ends on the brand drug and the wide
spawn of generics has been notable. As the future of medicine is going to be
biologically based, pioneering companies must be confident in the ability to
recoup research, development costs, and make a significant profit on their
discoveries. However, based on the FTC report and the success of Hatch-
Waxman, twelve years seems overly generous and may in fact stifle competi-
tion.433
The Law provides a one-year exclusivity for the first interchangeable
product, which is greater than 180 days authorized under Hatch-Waxman.434
This provision should help incentivize development and provide reward for
generic manufacturers. Nevertheless, the Law failed to bar the use of autho-
rized generics by brand companies to undermine generic development. The
law also failed to prohibit pay-to-delay agreements. This has been a conten-
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. Ass'N, A FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGics REGIME WITHOUT STRONG
DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 5 (Sept. 26, 2007),
available at http://www.bio.org/healthcare/followonbkg/FOBSMarket-exclusivity-20070926.
pdf 5 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010). BIO cites empirical evidence that the breakeven point for a
biologic takes thirteen to sixteen years. Id. at 4.
431. See Gottlieb, supra note 214, at $7. Congressman Waxman, the House Energy and
Commerce Chairman, has reportedly sought exclusivity of five to seven years. Jessica Dye,
Obama Wants to Limit Biologic Protection in Health Bill, LAw360, Jan. 15, 2010,
http://www.law360.com/articles/143763.
432. Id.
433. See Press Release, GPhA Asks President Obama to Urge Congress to Strike Bioge-
nerics from Health Care Reform If Provisions Are Not Substantially Altered,
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/press-releases/2009/gpha-asks-president-obama-urge-
congress-strike-biogenerics-health-care-ref (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). Generic Pharmaceut-
ical Association strongly opposed this exclusivity period, calling the period "little more than
camouflaged protection of the unacceptable and unsustainable status quo." Id.
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tious issue for the industry and the courts, and Congress missed a ripe oppor-
tunity to voice its concern.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In Francisco's Money Speech, as Ayn Rand wrote in Atlas Shrugged,
"[w]ealth is the product of man's capacity to think.' 435 We are at the dawn
of landmark legislation geared to modernize the generic pharmaceutical in-
dustry and spawn the next era of lower cost medications. A properly struc-
tured abbreviated pathway will enhance existing research and discovery,
award generic companies the opportunity to compete and decrease the finan-
cial burden on the U.S. healthcare system. Clearly, there is a need for gener-
ic biologic legislation in the United States and the time has finally arrived.
The marketplace for biologics continues to expand, the price for prescription
drugs continues to surge, patents for existing products have begun to expire,
and analytical technology has reached a sufficient juncture. All the key
players are at the table and our elected officials accomplished the task. Now
the pressure is on the FDA to deal with the next set of challenges the law will
provide.
Undoubtedly, the FDA faces an enormous challenge with the passage of
an abbreviated pathway for biologics. As always, the FDA must assure that
patient safety trumps all. The FDA can then establish some equivalency
system to support product substitution, like the current system whereby some
products are substitutable, and others are not.436 Then, stakeholders such as
managed care organizations and pharmacy benefit managers can establish
protocols and clinical guidelines to drive practice and decrease costs.
4 37
Once generic biologics become available, the market influence and pe-
netration will be unique compared to the current system of traditional gener-
ics. Early competition will likely resemble brand-to-brand competition and
prices may not be as low as some may anticipate.43 8 The four dollar co-pay
435. AYN RAND, ATLAS SHRUGGED 381 (Signet 1996) (1957).
436. Individual states, regulating the practice of pharmacy, may establish a negative drug
formulary whereby pharmacists will have a list of drugs that, by law, they cannot substitute,
although the FDA finds them interchangeable. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64B16-27.500
(2010) (Florida's example of a negative drug formulary). This is a public policy issue where a
Board of Pharmacy has made a determination in opposition to the FDA. See id.
437. See id.
438. FTC 2009 REPORT, supra note 184, at iii; see also Emerging Health Care Issues:
Follow-on Biologic Drug Competition: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health Comm.
on Energy and Commerce, I 11 th Cong. 9 (2009)
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may be some time off.4 39 Additionally, in vast contrast to traditional gener-
ics, some early generic biologic companies may have to utilize unprecedent-
ed marketing campaigns to try and drive market share.44 Ultimately the
market acceptance to generic biologics will be similar to traditional drugs
over time and patients will see a significant increase in cost savings. Moreo-
ver, because the U.S. Government is the largest payor of prescription drugs
in this country, government acceptance of these products will have a pro-
found effect on market acceptance.4'
The likely players to emerge from the generic biologic marketplace are
biotechnology companies, big pharmaceutical companies, 442 and large gener-
ic houses. 43 Currently, it is traditional generic companies being the most
aggressive in developing biologics, especially those with a strong European
influence.4' Generic companies in India will also emerge as early players,
especially as that country is slow to respect U.S. patent law. 445 Some claim
that the approval of a generic biological approval pathway will deter venture
capitalism. 4 6 This is short sighted. The generic industry in this country has
blossomed since Hatch-Waxman and competition only works to make a sys-
tem more efficient and robust.
439. See Milt Freudenheim, Side Effects at the Pharmacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at
Cl (describing Wal-Mart's four dollar generic program and how it prompted its competition
like Target to also institute such a program).
440. See Moran, supra note 382, at 5.
441. Prescription Drugs: Overview of Approaches to Control Prescription Drug Spend-
ing in Federal Programs: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Federal Workforce, Postal Ser-
vice, and the District of Columbia of the H. Comm. On Oversight and Government Reform,
111 th Cong. 2 (2009) (Statement of John E. Dicken, Dir., Health Care, Gov't Accountability
Office). The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program is the largest employer-sponsored
health insurance program in the country covering about eight million federal employees, reti-
rees, and their dependents. Id. This includes Medicare, VA, DOD, and Medicaid. Id. at 1-3.
442. Merck, one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world, recently purchased
an entire platform of generic biologic-related assets from Insmed Inc., a smaller biotechnology
company, for $130 million. lnsmed Completes Sale of Follow-On Biologics Platform to
Merck & Co., Inc. for Gross Proceeds of $130 Million., PR NEWSWIRE, (Mar. 31, 2009),
http://investor.insmed.com/releasedetaii.cfm?ReleaselD=-3745 12.
443. Behnke et al., supra note 9, at 2.
444. Id.
445. Geeta Anand, Drug Makers Decry Indian Patent Law, WALL ST. J. (ONLINE), Feb.
I1, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB]0001424052748703455804575057621354459804.
html.
446. DON WARE & NICK LITrLEFIELD, FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS AND PATENT REFORM: WILL
THEY DISCOURAGE VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY? 5
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The passage of the BPCIA is essential to the future of healthcare and
cost containment in the United States. Expectedly, any legislation of this
complexity will open unanticipated loopholes. No system is perfect and the
law may need further revision and amendments over time. Nevertheless, the
future of medicine is upon us and the need for generic biologics is overdue.
Science continues to blaze its path, while the corresponding policy inevitably
lags. Meanwhile, we are only at the tip of the iceberg. Biobetters' 7 and
tailored gene therapy448 are evolving and will pose additional generic consid-
erations that will have to be dealt with. Remember, "[t]his shit's chess, [it
ain't] checkers." 449
447. Biobetters refer to new versions of existing brand drugs with enhanced characteristics
such as improved delivery, safety, or efficacy. Behnke et al., supra note 9, at 2. Frequently, a
basic manipulation of a single amino acid sequence or other biochemical change in an existing
drug can provide an improved profile. See id.
448. See generally W. Kalow, Pharmacogenetics and Pharmacogenomics: Origin, Status,
and the Hope for Personalized Medicine, 6 PHARMACOGENOMICS J. 162 (2006).
449. TRAINING DAY, supra note 1.
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The inherent ambiguity in defining what constitutes a "medically neces-
sary" or "experimental" treatment has been the center of much controversy in
the realm of employer-sponsored health benefit plans.' These uncertain
terms, which are found in almost all such plans, classify the types of medical
care that the insurer will or will not cover.2 Insurers will generally cover
only "medically necessary" treatments and deny coverage for "experimental"
treatments.3 As a result, insured participants and beneficiaries, whose only
interest is their own health, argue that the term "medically necessary" should
be interpreted broadly enough to cover any and all treatments ordered by
their physician.4 Insurers, however, contend that the term must be construed
very narrowly, so that coverage is limited and profit margins remain high.5
When benefits are denied based on an insurer's conclusion that a re-
quested treatment is not "medically necessary" or is "experimental," courts
must decide whether the denial was justified or wrongful. If a court con-
cludes that covered benefits were wrongfully denied and as a result, a partic-
ipant or beneficiary was harmed, then that individual is entitled to "appropri-
ate equitable relief' under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA).6 The next question becomes: What constitutes relief that is both
"appropriate" and "equitable"? When the United States Supreme Court has
been faced with this question, it has focused almost exclusively on ERISA's
use of the words "equitable relief," giving little credence to Congress's intent
of providing relief that is not only equitable but also "appropriate. 7 This
article considers the Court's interpretation of this issue and suggests an inter-
pretation that reconciles precedent with Congress's underlying intent of pro-
viding "appropriate" relief to those aggrieved.
I. STRUCTURES OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Due to the complex nature of our health system, this article requires a
basic understanding of how health insurance is currently structured and pro-
1. See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1684 (1992).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN & PETER D. JACOBSON, LAW AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM 336
(2006).
5. See PHYLLIS C. BORZI, CTR. FOR HEALTH SERVs. RESEARCH & POLICY, ERISA
HEALTH PLANS: KEY STRUCTURAL VARIATIONS AND THEIR EFFECT ON LIABILITY 3 (2002).
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vided in the United States. The two basic insurance models are private in-
surance and public insurance.8 Under the private insurance model, individu-
als and groups pay premiums related to that individual's or group's "risk of
requiring medical care and the likely expense of that care."9 The insurer's
main concern here is earning a profit for its shareholders.' ° On the other
hand, public insurance is a system whereby individuals pay a predetermined
fixed sum to be included in the program, regardless of the individual's actual
or expected medical care needs." Under this model, the insurer's main con-
cern is assuring that all members in the community have access to health
care. 12 In the United States, public insurance programs provide substantial
benefits to the elderly, poor, and disabled. 13 This article, however, focuses
exclusively on private insurance provided to employee-groups by their em-
ployers.
A. The Private Insurance Model
Under the private insurance model, individuals pay relatively small
premiums, usually on a monthly basis, in return for the insurance company's
promise to pay for any costs the participants or beneficiaries (the insured) of
the plan incur, resulting from covered illnesses or injuries. 4 Some partici-
pants will suffer from severe illnesses which will require the insurer to cover
treatments that far exceed those individuals' premiums, while other partici-
pants will remain healthy, costing the insurer very little or nothing. 15 Due to
this disparity, insurers reduce their risk of suffering devastating losses by
insuring large numbers of people, so that the healthy participants essentially
subsidize the treatment of those participants requiring frequent or expensive
care. 16 Insurers safeguard their economic viability by categorizing partici-
pants based on their "risk classification" and deciding whether they are worth




11. Id. at 110-11. The government's provision of police services is analogous to the
public insurance model in that its citizens pay the same amount for police protections regard-
less of where they live or what they own. Id. at I11.
12. Ford, supra note 8, at 110.
13. GoSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 336.
14. Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care Cov-
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the risk of insuring.'7 This decision making process is commonly referred to
as underwriting.' 8
In the underwriting process, insurers have broad discretion and use sev-
eral tools such as applications, forms, reports from physicians, and medical
examinations.' 9 If an applicant is approved, the insurer will offer coverage at
a specified monthly premium. 20 The premium is based on the risk or proba-
bility of the applicant requiring covered treatment.
21
The risk analysis mentioned above is determined differently depending
on whether the applicant is an individual or a group. When insurance is sold
to an individual, the insurer will take into account only that individual's
health risks in order to determine the premium amount.22 When, however, a
plan is offered to a group, such as employees, the insurer will assess the cha-
racteristics of the group as a whole and charge each member of that group
the same premium.
23
B. The Structure of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans
Employer-sponsored health plans are an important part of the United
States' health system. In fact, approximately ninety percent of Americans
receive their health insurance through their employer.24 Because employers
providing these benefits must tailor their plans to meet the needs of their
employees, as well as their own financial incentives, employers have sub-
stantial flexibility in designing the plan that they will purchase for their em-
ployees. 25  As further discussed below, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) governs the administration of employer-
17. Id. at 665-66.
18. Id. at 666.
19. Hoffman, supra note 14, at 666.
20. See id. at 665-66.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 666. The particular characteristics that insurers will look at include "gender,
age, industry of the group's employer, geographic area, . . . family composition, and group
size." Hoffman, supra note 14, at 666. "In many states, insurance providers are not required
to disclose the criteria they use in making insurance decisions, and ... state statutes provide
only vague guidelines." Id. at 666-67; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.062 (2009) (prohibiting the
rates from being "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory").
24. GOSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 4, at 334 (estimating that in 1999, ninety-three per-
cent of privately insured Americans received their insurance from their employers); Timothy
S. Jost, Pegram v. Herdrich: The Supreme Court Confronts Managed Care, I YALEJ. HEALTH
POL'Y L. & ETHICS 187, 187 (2001) (estimating that eighty-eight percent of Americans with
private health insurance have employment-based coverage).
25. See BORZI, supra note 5, at 2.
[Vol. 34
118
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/1
WRONGFULLY DENIED BENEFITS UNDER ERISA
sponsored health plans by establishing uniform minimum standards and lia-
bility for those in charge of carrying out the plans. 6
The structure of these ERISA plans often vary based on several fac-
tors.27 For instance, while some plans are sponsored by only a single em-
ployer, other plans have multiple sponsors.28 In all cases, however, the spon-
sor(s) must make certain important decisions in designing the appropriate
plan. Such factors include the extent of the sponsor's insurance risk, the
sponsor's level of involvement in the administration of the plan, the types of
benefits offered,29 "the methods by which benefits are delivered,"3° "the form
of the plan and the nature of the employer subsidy,"'3 and "the funding ar-
rangement for self-insured plans. ' 32 Although all of these factors are impor-
tant, only the sponsor's insurance risk and administrative involvement are
pertinent to this discussion.
With respect to insurance risk, a plan might be "fully insured," "self-
insured," or some type of combination of the two. 33 In a fully-insured plan,
the employer transfers the entire risk of payment to an outside insurance
company.34 Sponsors of "self-insured" plans, however, retain the full insur-
ance risk, except in those cases where the risk is shared through stop-loss
insurance or another type of reinsurance.3' Along with retaining the insur-
ance risk, some self-insured plans provide that the sponsor fully administer
the plan.36 In self-administered plans, the sponsor makes all coverage deci-
sions and retains all fiduciary obligations to participants and beneficiaries
under ERISA.37 If a sponsor is unable or unwilling to bear this burden, it
26. Id. at 2-3; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
27. Bonzi, supra note 5, at 2.
28. Id. The different types of plan sponsors include "single-employer plans," "multi-
employer plans," and "multiple employer welfare arrangements." Id.
29. See id. at 3. A sponsor may decide to offer one package of comprehensive health
benefits to its employees or put together different plans offering different benefits. Id. at 3-4.
30. BoRzI, supra note 5, at 4. Different benefit delivery methods may include "fee-for-
service," health maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations (PPOs),
or a combination of any of these. Id. at 5. Any discussion of the details of these different
methods is beyond the scope of this article.
3 1. Id. at 4. "[T]he form of the plan and the nature of the employer subsidy" determines
how much of the cost or financing of the insurance will be shared by the employer. Id.
32. Id. at 5. Self-insured plans may set aside funds to pay for claims in a tax-exempt
trust, usually a "voluntary employees' benefit association" (VEBA) or the employer may not
set aside any funds and pay claims from the general assets of the employer. BoRZI, supra note
5, at5.




37. BoRzi, supra note 5, at 3.
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may outsource the plan administration and relieve itself of some obliga-
tions.38
Unless otherwise noted, the ERISA plans discussed in this article are
presumed to be fully insured and administered by the insurer. Meaning that
the sponsoring employer paid an additional premium to an insurer so that the
insurer makes all coverage decisions, bears all of the risk, and the employer's
liability is limited.39
II. EMPLOYER SPONSORED BENEFIT PLANS UNDER ERISA
In order to fully appreciate the issues analyzed herein, a basic under-
standing on ERISA, its history, remedial scheme, and foundation in trust law
is necessary. Section A of this part gives an overview of what ERISA is and
why it was enacted. Section B discusses ERISA's preemptive authority over
state law. Section C identifies the remedies provided for by ERISA. Section
D outlines ERISA's foundation in trust law. Finally, section E defines the
roles of certain individuals subject to ERISA's provisions.
A. ERISA Generally
In 1974,40 Congress enacted ERISA 4 1 in response to the mismanage-
ment and failure of many employer-sponsored pension funds. This sequence
of statutes was necessary to protect employees who were receiving only a
small percentage of their promised benefits or none at all.42 Although Con-
gress's primary purpose for enacting ERISA was to protect employees
through the regulation of pension funds,43 its coverage expanded to include
all employer-sponsored benefit plans.44 In order to remedy the abuse in plan
38. Id. at 3-4.
39. See id.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1461(a) (2000). "The provisions of this subchapter take effect on Sep-
tember 2, 1974." Id.
41. See29U.S.C.§§ 1001-1461.
42. See, e.g., James A. Wooten, "The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business":
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 683, 683-
84 (2001). "Some received a lump-sum payment worth a fraction of the pension they ex-
pected, and others got nothing at all." Id.; see also ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE §§ 2-3
(Michael G. Kushner & Karen Hsu eds., 1999).
43. EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, PUB. L. No. 93-406, §2, 88
Stat. 829, 833. "It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this Act to protect ... the
interests of participants in private pension plans .. " Id. §2(c); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, pt. I, at
1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639. 'The primary purpose of the bill is the
protection of individual pension rights .... " Id.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (2000). This Act "shall apply to any employee benefit plan." Id.
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administration, the drafters applied the "rules and remedies similar to those
under traditional trust law, [which] govern[ed] the conduct of fiduciaries. '
These rules and remedies were intended to further Congress's goals of de-
veloping a uniform federal common law,46 ensuring the solvency of em-
ployee-benefits plans,47 and encouraging employers to provide fringe bene-
fits to their employees.48 Notwithstanding these goals, ERISA does not
mandate that any particular set of benefits or even that any benefits at all be
provided to employees.49
The two sections of ERISA that embody its purposes and goals are sec-
tion 514"0 and section 502.51 Section 514 outlines ERISA's preemptive ef-
fect on state laws 2 and 502 outlines ERISA's exclusive remedial scheme.53
B. ERISA Preemption
Section 514, often referred to as the "preemption clause, 54 provides
that ERISA "shall supersede any and all [s]tate laws insofar as they may now
45. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 295 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5076;
see also 120 CONG. REC. 29,932 (1974) (explaining that "[t]he objectives of these provisions
are to make applicable the law of trusts... and to provide effective remedies for breaches of
trust").
46. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995); see also Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
It is thus clear that ERISA's pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employ-
ers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are faced with the task of coordinating
complex administrative activities. A patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce consi-
derable inefficiencies in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with ex-
isting plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them.
Pre-emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit plan will be governed by on-
ly a single set of regulations.
Fort Halifax Packing Co., 482 U.S. at 11.
47. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at §§ 2-3.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, pt. I, at 1-2. The bill was designed to promote the expan-
sion of these plans and increase the number of employees receiving them. Id. at 2.
49. Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care, and How to Fix It:
Reinterpreting ERISA Preemption, 51 UCLA L. REV. 457, 465 (2003); see, e.g., 120 CONG.
REC. 4440 (1974) (Statement of Bill Archer) (noting that ERISA would not change the volun-
tary nature of benefit plans).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 514]. Section 514 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under § 1144, the two provisions are used
interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 502]. Section 502 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under § 1132, the two provisions are used
interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
52. 29 U.S.C. § 1144.
53. Id. § 1132.
54. Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299, 310 (1999).
2010]
121
: Nova Law Review 34, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA L4 W REVIEW
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan."55 Although this "relates to
clause" expresses ERISA's preemptive intent, it does not indicate how close
of a relationship is required to satisfy the "relate to" language. In 1987, the
United States Supreme Court applied a "broad common-sense meaning," to
the phrase "relate to" and concluded that it meant having "a connection with
or reference to."56 In 1995, the Court narrowed its definition in New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Co.,57 when it held that although Congress intended the provision to be ap-
plied broadly, it did not intend for it to preempt state laws that have only an
indirect economic effect on the subject matter of an ERISA plan.58
Even though the Court's definition of "relates to" does not offer much
guidance, the "Savings Clause" in § 514 limits the scope of ERISA from
being read too broadly. This clause provides that "nothing in this subchapter
shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
[s]tate which regulates insurance, banking, or securities. 59 Moreover, sec-
tion 514's "Deemer Clause" clarifies that self-insured employee benefits
plans do not constitute "insurance companies" that are exempt from
ERISA.6° In other words, an employer that acts like an insurance company
by providing a set of benefits to its employees-such as promising to pay
medical expenses-is governed by ERISA and not state insurance regula-
tions."
55. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (emphasis added). ERISA further defines an "employee benefit
plan" as any plan "established or maintained: (1) by any employer engaged in commerce or in
any industry or activity affecting commerce; or (2) by any employee organization or organiza-
tions representing employees engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting
commerce; or (3) by both." Id. § 1003(a).
56. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (quoting Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985)).
57. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
58. See id. at 661-62.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 144(b)(2)(A) (2000).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). Section 1144(b)(2)(B) states the following:
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not exempt
under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose of
providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be en-
gaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
Id.
61. See Troy Paredes, Note, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and ERISA: Defin-
ing the Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARv. 1. ON LEGIs. 233, 234-35 (1997).
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The plan described above fits into the category which ERISA defines as
an "employee welfare benefits plan,62 and in fact defines the type of plan
through which ninety percent of Americans receive their health coverage.63
Therefore, the vast majority of health plans in America are all covered by
ERISA and not the different and perhaps conflicting state and local insurance
regulations. 64 This furthers Congress's goal of creating a uniform federal
common law. It should be noted that § 514 also has the effect of complete
federal preemption, meaning that a defendant may remove any lawsuit
brought against it, relating to an alleged violation of an ERISA plan, from
state court to federal court, even if the plaintiff did not plead a separate fed-
eral law violation.65
C. ERISA 's Civil Enforcement Provision
Section 502, commonly referred to as ERISA's "civil enforcement" 66
provision, enumerates the exclusive remedies available in ERISA actions.67
It states as follows:
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought (1) by a participant or beneficiary
62. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000). Describing the term "employee welfare benefit plan" as
follows:
any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by
an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or
program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its participants or
their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or un-
employment ....
Id.
63. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
64. See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 657 (1995).
65. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1986). According to the "well-
pleaded complaint rule," a defendant may not invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction if the
plaintiff has not raised a federal law issue in the complaint. See id. The Court in Taylor,
however, established that section 1144 of ERISA completely preempts state law claims, and
according to the complete preemption doctrine, there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over
these claims. Id. at 66. "Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action
within the scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) removable to federal court."
Id.
66. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
67. See id.; see also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987) (stating that
"ERISA's civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive").
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(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable re-
lief(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of
this subchapter or the terms of the plan;
(g) Attorney's fees and costs; awards in actions involving delin-
quent contributions
(1) In any action under this subchapter.., by a participant, benefi-
ciary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasona-
ble attorney'sfee and costs of action to either party.68
As a result of three separate five-to-four Supreme Court majority opi-
nions-two of which were written by Justice Scalia-ERISA's remedial
scheme has been interpreted in such a way as to prevent those who were in-
jured as a result of wrongfully denied benefits from being "made whole. 69
The Court did so by interpreting the "other appropriate equitable relief'
language in § 502(a)(3)(B) to exclude entitlement to consequential or puni-
tive damages.7° As a result, injured employees are limited to recovering from
the insurer who wrongfully denied their benefits, only the monetary amount
of the denied treatments-plus costs and attorney's fees-regardless of ac-
tual injuries or costs resulting from the denial.7' In light of the purposes for
enacting ERISA, ERISA's foundation in trust law, and even Justice Scalia's
own words, it is apparent that the Court's interpretation of the civil enforce-
ment provision is flawed.
68. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (emphasis added).
69. See generally Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002);
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134 (1985).
70. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added) (noting that § 502(a)(3)'s provision
for other appropriate equitable relief does not permit the recovery of consequential damages);
see also Russell, 473 U.S. at 144 (asserting that the language of ERISA does not support "a
private right of action for compensatory or punitive relief").
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2000); see, e.g., Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. All Shore, Inc.,
514 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2008) (authorizing the award of reasonable attorney's fees and
costs to the prevailing party).
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D. ERISA's Relationship to Trust Law
As Professor Langbein explained, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
ERISA's remedial scheme is inconsistent with its roots in trust law.72 After a
review of ERISA's legislative history, it is beyond peradventure that its re-
medial scheme was drafted with the principles of trust law in mind.73 In fact,
ERISA even imposes a rule of mandatory trusteeship, requiring that "all as-
sets of an employee benefit plan shall be held in trust by one or more trus-
tees. 74 These trustees are subject to strict fiduciary duties, such as the duty
of loyalty and prudence.75 For instance, § 404(a)(1) of ERISA, which man-
dates that a fiduciary discharge his duties "solely in the interest of the partic-
ipants and beneficiaries," mimics the loyalty rule in the Second Restatement
of Trusts, requiring trustees to "administer the trust solely in the interest of
the beneficiary. 76
Most notable is the correlation between ERISA remedies and the reme-
dies available in trust law for breach of trust. First, the Second Restatement
of Trusts provides that in an action for breach of trust, the injured party may
recover for "any loss" incurred.77 This is analogous to § 502(a)(1), which
authorizes a participant and beneficiary to recover their initial losses, which
are generally the benefits that were wrongfully withheld by the fiduciary. 7
8
Second, an injured trust beneficiary is entitled to "any profits" that the
trustee made in breaching the trust.79 This is analogous to § 502(a)(2), which
entitles the plan to recover for any losses or profits resulting from the fidu-
ciary's breach of the ERISA plan.80 Although § 502(a)(2) entitles "the plan"
to recover and not the participant, this distinction is illusory as recovery by
72. For a detailed discussion on the relationship between ERISA and the trust law see
John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The Supreme Court's Trail of Error
in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1317, 1319 (2003).
73. See id. at 1331. "The Conference Committee explained that the drafters wanted to
'apply rules and remedies similar to those under traditional trust law to govern the conduct of
fiduciaries."' Id.
74. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(a). Note that § 1103(b) exempts a few categories of plans. Id. §
1103(b).
75. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 404]. Section 404 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under § 1104; the two provisions are used
interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
76. Compare 29 U.S.C. § I 104(a)(1) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1)
(1959).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTRUSTS § 205 (1959).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(2006).
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a.
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
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the plan is essentially the same as recovery by plan participants and benefi-
ciaries who receive their benefits from the plan.
Finally, the third breach of trust remedy includes any gains that would
have accrued but for the breach. 8' This remedy is analogous to the §
502(a)(3) "catchall" provision which "act[s] as a safety net, offering appro-
priate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that § 502 does not
elsewhere adequately remedy."82 Professor Langbein explains that this third
remedy should be interpreted broadly enough to achieve the core principle of
trust law, which is to "restore[] the victim to the position that he or she
would have had 'if there had been no breach of trust."'
8 3
E. ERISA Plan Sponsors, Fiduciaries and Providers
In addition to preempting state law and providing an exclusive remedial
scheme, ERISA mandates that every health benefits plan be established and
maintained by a "plan sponsor," 84 such as an employer providing health-
benefits to its employees. The role of the ERISA plan sponsor is analogous
to the role of a settlor in trust law.85 Similar to a settlor's ability to structure
the terms of the trust, a sponsor decides how it will structure the plan that it
offers.
ERISA further requires that every plan be in writing and have a "named
fiduciary. 86 The fiduciary may be any individual, corporation or other enti-
ty--even the plan sponsor-that has control over the management, operation,
and administration of the plan and its assets.87 This fiduciary is responsible
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. a.
82. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
83. Langbein, supra note 72, at 1335 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
205(c)).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B) (2006). A "plan sponsor" under ERISA includes (i) the
employer in the case of a "plan established or maintained by a single employer, (ii) the em-
ployee organization in the case of a plan established or maintained by an employee organiza-
tion, or (iii) . . .[the] joint board of trustees or other similar group of representatives" in a
multi-employer plan. Id.
85. A settlor is a person who creates a trust. GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 9 (6th ed.
1987).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2000) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 402]. Section 402 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under section 1102; the two provisions are
used interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
87. BORzi, supra note 5, at 18; 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c). Note that in addition to the named
fiduciary, another person or entity will be considered "a fiduciary to the extent that the person:
(1) exercises any discretionary authority or control over the management of the plan or depo-
sition of its assets, (2) renders investment advice regarding plan assets for a fee for other direct
or indirect compensation or has the authority or responsibility to do so, or (3) has any discre-
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for ensuring that the plan is properly administered and must discharge its
duties "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and for the
exclusive purpose of' paying benefits and incurring "reasonable" administra-
tive expenses.88 Pursuant to § 402(b)(2) of ERISA, a named fiduciary may
delegate fiduciary responsibilities to other fiduciaries or hire professional
advisors to help carry out its duties, so long as the delegation is permitted by
the health plan documents.89 These duties are analogous to those of a trustee
who protects the trust assets for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. 90 In the
event that an insured is injured by a fiduciary's breach of any of its duties,
ERISA's civil enforcement provision, § 502, specifies the manner in which
the insured may recover.9
Finally, for the purposes of this article a "provider" is the entity or indi-
vidual that actually provides the medical care to the insured, such as the doc-
tor or hospital, and who is compensated for such services by the insurer.92
Although generally a provider owes a fiduciary duty to the insured, its pa-
tient, providers that do not participate in the administration of the plan or
decide whether treatment is covered by the plan, are not subject to liability
under ERISA.93
III. AN ERISA FIDUCIARY'S DISCRETIONARY ROLE IN PROVIDING
BENEFITS
Similar to a trustee, ERISA fiduciaries generally have certain discretio-
nary decision making powers, one such power includes the determination as
to whether certain benefits are covered or denied. This determination is of-
ten guided by the specific terms defined in the ERISA policy. Section A
below discusses the terms often found in policies which limit the types of
benefits a fiduciary will deem covered. Section B explains how a fiduciary's
tionary authority or control over plan administration." BoRzi, supra note 5, at 18 (citing 29
U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 1 104(a)(1) (2006). ERISA fiduciaries are held to the standards of care of
a prudent person, which requires them to act "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence
under the circumstances ... that a prudent man acting in a like capacity" would use in similar
circumstances. Id.; see Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying
the prudent person standard); BoRzi, supra note 5, at 21.
89. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(2).
90. The trustee is the person who holds the title of the trust property, in trust for the bene-
ficiary of the trust. BOGERT, supra note 85, at § 1.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).
92. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
93. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 223 (2000) (distinguishing a health care pro-
vider from an ERISA fiduciary).
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role may give rise to certain conflicts of interest, and the final section dis-
cusses how this conflict has been addressed by the Supreme Court.
A. "Medically Necessary" and "Experimental" Treatments
As noted earlier, ERISA mandates that all health insurance contracts be
evidenced in writing.94 Although the drafters intended the terms of a plan to
be in black and white, inherently ambiguous terms have turned them grey.
For instance, ERISA plans generally limit coverage to benefits and treat-
ments that are "medically necessary. 95  The term "medically necessary,"
however, has a different meaning to physicians than it does to health plan
administrators or even among administrators and physicians.96 For instance,
''medically necessary" could "mean that a procedure or test is simply not
appropriate or effective for addressing a patient's condition" or it could
"mean that the marginal value of a test or treatment ... over the next best
test or treatment for the same condition is ... minimal in comparison to the
marginal cost of the test or treatment over the next best test or treatment.,
97
Moreover, ERISA plans usually exclude "experimental" or "investiga-
tional" treatments.98 The interpretation and application of these terms has
caused some disagreement among different courts.99 For example, in Cham-
bers v. Coventry Health Care of Louisiana, Inc.,'0° the ERISA policy defined
"'experimental or investigational procedures' as those services that do not
have 'a demonstrated value based on clinical evidence reported by peer-
review medical literature or by generally recognized academic experts. '
In this case, the patient offered expert testimony from two doctors that a
"PET fusion scan [was] widely accepted in the scientific community and in
the relevant medical literature," while the administrator offered testimony
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
95. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 1, at 1640-41.
96. See William M. Sage, Managed Care's Crimea: Medical Necessity, Therapeutic
Benefit, and the Goals of Administrative Process in Health Insurance, 53 DUKE L.J. 597, 601
(2003); see also Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs: Is
There a Problem? Is Medical Necessity the Solution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 13-18 (1999)
[hereinafter Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs] (noting that the term "'med-
ical necessity' could mean at least three different things").
97. Jost, The American Difference in Health Care Costs, supra note 96, at 13.
98. See e.g., Hall & Anderson, supra note I, at 1637-40.
99. See e.g., Chambers v. Coventry Health Care of La., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 382 (E.D.
La. 2004); Harris v. Mut. of Omaha Cos., 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
100. 318 F. Supp. 2d 382 (E.D. La. 2004).
101. Id. at 391.
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from another doctor'0 2 that PET fusion scans were experimental.0 3 Fortu-
nately for the insured, the court found that the participant had provided suffi-
cient evidence to prove that there was a substantial likelihood that the treat-
ment was not experimental and therefore covered. °4 In Harris v. Mutual of
Omaha, Cos.,105 however, the court affirmed a ruling that a cancer treatment
was experimental.' 6 The court based its decision on an appendix of articles
that had been published several years prior, notwithstanding expert testimony
that the treatment was no longer in its experimental phase and was in fact
"medically necessary."'' 0 7 This unpredictability is compounded by the fact
that ERISA plans often grant plan administrators absolute discretion to in-
itially determine whether requested benefits are "medically necessary," "ex-
perimental," or "investigational," regardless of the treating physician rec-
ommendation. 108
B. Conflict of Interest Resulting from a Fiduciary's Dual Role
In most cases, insureds cannot afford to undergo treatment that is not
covered by their ERISA plan.' °9 Therefore, the insurer's determination of
whether a treatment is "medically necessary" or "experimental" will general-
ly decide whether the treatment will ultimately be provided. As such, many
argue that the insured's treating physician who is most familiar with the
medical needs of the insured is in the best position to determine whether a
treatment is "medically necessary. ''  Others, however, argue that the ad-
ministrator who analyzes a vast number of cases and is more familiar with
the particular terms of the plan is best suited to make this determination."'
There is even a third group that believes that an unaffiliated third party pro-
fessional should have the final say as to whether benefits are covered.
212
102. Id. at 386. Note that the expert offered by the administrator worked as the Chief
Medical Officer and Senior Vice President of the administrating company. Id. at 387.
103. Id. at 386-87.
104. Chambers, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 391. This was a case in which the patient sought a
preliminary injunction in order to prevent the administrator from denying coverage of the PET
fusion scan. Id.
105. 992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
106. Id. at 707.
107. Id. at 709.
108. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 1, at 1669-70.
109. See id. at 1637-39.
110. Id. at 1649-50.
111. Id. at1665.
112. See id. at 1674.
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Unfortunately, most plans bestow this discretionary power on the plan
administrators who, in the case of fully insured and self-administered plans,
are the same entities that will ultimately be required to pay for the treat-
ments. ' 3 It goes without saying that such administrators have a "financial
incentive to deny benefits" in order to avoid the direct expenses they would
incur from approving requested treatments." 4 Therefore, an administrator
"benefits directly from the denial or discontinuation of benefits.""'  This
financial incentive to deny benefits appears to directly conflict with the ad-
ministrator's fiduciary duty to discharge his duties "solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries.""' 6
C. Litigating the Denial of Benefits
Due to the potential danger to one's health resulting from the denial of
requested benefits, insureds will often appeal a denial." 7 Generally, before
an insured is entitled to a judicial determination, ERISA plans require that
the insured first exhaust all of the insurer's internal appellate procedures." 8
All the while, the insured may be incurring additional injuries from passage
of time or the financial burden of employing legal counsel. Although §
502(g)(1) of ERISA provides for reasonable attorney's fees in litigation,
courts have consistently interpreted this provision to exclude those fees in-
curred in pre-litigation administrative processes." 9 If the denial of benefits is
affirmed and the insured still believes that the requested benefits are covered,
only then may he or she file suit in a court of law.
Although Congress did not specify a particular standard for reviewing
the denial of benefits, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 20 the United
States Supreme Court focused on ERISA's purpose of protecting employees
and its basis in trust law to establish the appropriate standard.' 21 In Fire-
113. See Hall & Anderson, supra note 1, at 1669-70.
114. See id. at 1666, 1668; see, e.g., Post v. Hartford Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 154, 161-64 (3d
Cir. 2007); Carolina Care Plan, Inc. v. McKenzie, 467 F.3d 383, 386-87 (4th Cir. 2006);
Killian v. Healthsource Provident Adm'rs, Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 1998); Brown v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561, 1566-67 (11 th Cir. 1990).
115. Killian, 152 F.3d at 521.
116. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
117. See Sage, supra note 96, at 597-98.
118. Id. at624.
119. See Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1010-11 (8th Cir.
2004); Rego v. Westvaco Corp., 319 F.3d 140, 150 (4th Cir. 2003).
120. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
121. Id. at 115.
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stone, it concluded "that a denial of benefits 2 ... is to be reviewed under a
de novo1 23 standard, unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fidu-
ciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to con-
strue the terms of the plan," in which case, abuse of discretion review ap-
plies. ' 24 Under the abuse of discretion standard,1 2' an administrator's deci-
sion "will not be disturbed if reasonable.' 26 The Court noted that in cases
where the fiduciary has a conflict of interest, such as a financial incentive to
deny benefits, conflict should be considered as a factor in determining
whether the insurer abused its discretion.' 27 Unfortunately, the Court in Fire-
stone did not specify exactly how these conflicts of interest should be
weighed or how to determine whether a conflict in fact exists. As a result,
disagreement among the Federal Circuits ensued.' 28
Recently, the Supreme Court reviewed the issue and stated as follows:
Often the entity that administers the plan, such as an employer or
an insurance company, both determines whether an employee is el-
igible for benefits and pays benefits out of its own pocket. We
here decide that this dual role creates a conflict of interest; that a
reviewing court should consider that conflict as a factor in deter-
mining whether the plan administrator has abused its discretion in
denying benefits; and that the significance of the factor will de-
pend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
129
122. Note that the Court referred only to challenges under § 502(a)(1)(B) for benefits due.
Id.
123. Reviewing these decisions de novo requires an analysis which is similar to construing
trust provisions "without deferring to either party's interpretation." Id. at 112. Instead, the
court would interpret the terms of the policy in light of all the circumstances and other evi-
dence of intent. Id.
124. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115.
125. This standard requires an assessment of whether the refusal of coverage is arbitrary
and capricious, reversing the insurer's decisions only if it appears to be "without reason, un-
supported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law." Fay v. Oxford Health
Plan, 287 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438,
442 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Firestone, 489 U.S. at 102. This standard is rooted in principles
of trust law, because the insurer's discretion in determining what is medically necessary is
analogous to a trustee's discretionary powers. See id. (noting that when a trustee is conferred
with certain powers the exercise of that power is "not subject to control by the court except to
prevent an abuse").
126. Id.
127. Id. at 115.
128. See, e.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 378-79 (3d Cir.
2000).
129. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2346 (2008).
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Justice Scalia, however, wrote a scathing dissent primarily attacking the
majority's "totality of the circumstances" approach. 3° He contends that in
light of ERISA's roots in trust law, courts should apply a similar standard to
that of a trust fiduciary with a conflict.' 31 Succinctly, he asserts that the con-
flict described above should not be considered "unless the conflict actually
and improperly motivates the decision. ' 132 Justice Scalia reconciles this con-
clusion with the opinion in Firestone by disregarding, as "throwaway dic-
tum," the language indicating that conflicts should be weighed as a "fac-
tor.' ' 133 Regardless of whether the conflict factor is used, if a court ultimately
concludes that an administrator has wrongfully denied covered benefits, the
injured participant is entitled to some relief under ERISA's remedial provi-
sions.1
34
It should be noted that some states have attempted to eliminate the con-
flict of interest altogether. 35  For instance, in Standard Insurance Co. v.
Morrison,3 6 Montana's Commissioner of Insurance denied an insurer's ap-
plication for approval of "proposed disability insurance forms which con-
tained discretionary clauses.' ' 137 This denial was based on a state law that
gave the Commissioner the authority to deny insurance forms that contained
"inconsistent, ambiguous, or misleading clauses or exceptions and conditions
which deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed in the general cov-
erage of the contract." 138 The insurer argued that the Commissioner was
without authority to do so based on ERISA preemption. 39 The court, how-
ever, ultimately concluded that ERISA's savings clause applied to exempt
the state law from preemption.' 40 It noted that both factors of the savings
clause were met because the law was "'specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance"' and "'substantially affect[ed] the risk pooling ar-
rangement between the insurer and insured."",14' The result of laws, such as
130. See id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2357-58.
132. Id. at 2357.
133. Id. at 2357-58.
134. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
135. See, e.g., Standard Ins. Co. v. Morrison, 584 F.3d 837, 849 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming
the denial of insurance forms containing discretionary clauses); Am. Council of Life Insurers
v. Ross, 558 F.3d 600, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding a rule prohibiting insurers from market-
ing products containing discretionary clauses).
136. 584 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2009).
137. Id. at 841.
138. Id. at 840 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-1-502 (2009)).
139. Id. at 841.
140. Id.
141. Standard Ins. Co., 584 F.3d at 842 (quoting Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,
538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003)).
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the one in Morrison, which prohibit insurers from making discretionary deci-
sions is that in the event an insured appeals the denial of benefits, the court
will have de novo review instead of the insurer-friendly abuse of discretion
standard. 14
2
IV. REMEDIES FOR WRONGFULLY DENIED BENEFITS
A. Contrasting State Law and ERISA Remedies for Wrongfully Denied
Benefits
As noted in section I.B above, the vast majority of Americans receive
their health insurance from their employers; and as a result, their potential
remedies are governed by federal law. Those who receive benefits from
sources not governed by ERISA, however, play by a different set of rules.
If an individual is injured as a result of wrongfully denied benefits un-
der a plan that is not covered by ERISA, he or she may seek relief under the
appropriate state law and potentially recover an array of monetary damages,
which are typically unavailable to ERISA insureds. 4 3 For instance, a plain-
tiff might recover compensatory damages, including past and future physical
and "emotional pain and suffering, as well as medical expenses, lost wages,
and .. .other ... form[s] of economic damages." 1" Such economic relief
might include necessary and reasonable medical expenses to correct or miti-
gate an insured's injuries, future nursing care, hospital care, laboratory tests,
medicines, or therapy. 145  Some plaintiffs may even recover damages for
mental anguish, anxiety, or depression caused by the harmful effects of their
injury.146 Finally, under certain circumstances plaintiffs recover "attorneys'
fees, costs, punitive damages, and prejudgment interest.' ' 47 The potential
awards under state laws have sometimes proven to be enormous, ranging
upwards of $80 million. 4 '
142. Id. at 840.
143. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985) (asserting that the
language of ERISA does not support "a private right of action for compensatory or punitive
relief').
144. Stephanie L. Schaeffer, Cause of Action Against a Health Maintenance Organization
Under State Tort Law, in 17 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 193, § 18 (2009).
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id.; see also Williams v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 112, 113 (Ct. App. 1994).
148. See, e.g., Humana Health Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Chipps, 802 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (awarding nearly $80 million against Humana for terminating coverage
for a special therapy program for a child with cerebral palsy). Note, however, that the award
was set aside for improper jury instructions and evidentiary errors. Id. at 496-97.
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In contrast to the wide array of potential avenues of recovery under state
laws, § 502 of ERISA limits the available remedies that can be recovered for
wrongfully denied benefits. First, § 502(a)(l)(B) provides that a participant
may "recover benefits due to him," "enforce his rights," or "clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan."' 4 9 This provision is relatively
straightforward and means that: (1) if an insured believes that covered bene-
fits were wrongfully denied, then that individual is entitled to bring suit to
recover the cost of those denied benefits; or (2) if there is a dispute over the
meaning of precise terms of the plan, the court will clarify those terms.'50
Second, § 502(a)(3)(A) provides that an insured may seek "to enjoin
any act or practice which violates . . . the terms of the plan.""'' This provi-
sion is also straightforward, authorizing a participant to ask a court to prevent
the plan administrator from further violating the terms of the plan.
The main controversy arises with respect to the interpretation of §
502(a)(3)(B). This subsection provides that an insured is entitled "to obtain
other appropriate equitable relief.., to redress such violations."'' 52 In ana-
lyzing this provision, the Supreme Court held that it precludes any right to
consequential or punitive damages. 153 This means that if an insured was
wrongfully denied benefits, such as a necessary surgery, and as a result his
arm had to be amputated, that individual would be able to recover only the
cost of the surgery, but no money for the loss of his arm. This would be the
case even if the plan administrator knew that the surgery was covered under
the plan and denied the benefits anyway.
Accordingly, the Court's interpretation appears to leave those injured as
a result of wrongfully denied benefits without a sufficient remedy and may
even encourage some administrators to arbitrarily deny benefits. Without a
doubt, this directly contravenes Congress's intention of protecting employees
and "replicat[ing] the core principles of trust remedy law, [which include]
the make-whole standard of relief.'
' 54
149. 29 U.S.C. § l132(a)(l)(B).
150. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 210 (2004).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A).
152. Id. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
153. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145, 150 (1985) (stating that the
"appropriate equitable relief' section does not create an implied cause of action for remedying
consequential injuries).
154. Langbein, supra note 72, at 1319.
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V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "OTHER APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE
RELIEF" BEFORE SEREBOFF
ERISA's remedial scheme limits the remedies that are available to in-
surers as well as the insured. Although both sides have sought monetary
relief under the other appropriate equitable relief language, for the most
part, neither has been successful. 5 Section A provides a brief synopsis of
the Supreme Court's initial attempts to define the subject language in breach
of fiduciary duty cases brought by insureds. Section B discusses how the
provision was similarly applied to an insurer's attempt to recover monetary
relief. Section C points out some apparent flaws in the Court's interpretation
of the language, and section D identifies the Court's most recent step in the
right direction.
A. The Law Before Knudson
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,156 the Supreme
Court set the stage for its current interpretation of § 502(a)(3)'s other appro-
priate equitable relief language. 57 In Russell, a beneficiary of an ERISA
health benefits plan brought suit to recover consequential and punitive dam-
ages for the improper processing of her claim for disability benefits under
sections 409118 and 502(a)(2) of ERISA. 159 The Court reversed the lower
court's ruling that pursuant to § 409, a beneficiary is entitled to compensato-
ry damages "'that [would] compensate [her] for all losses and injuries sus-
tained as a direct and proximate cause of the breach of fiduciary duty,' in-
cluding 'damages for mental or emotional distress."" 6  The Court also re-
versed the ruling that pursuant to § 409, punitive damages were recoverable
under ERISA when a fiduciary "'acted with actual malice or wanton indiffe-
rence to the rights of a participant or beneficiary.' 1 6' Because these types of
155. See Langbein, supra note 72, at 1318-19.
156. 473 U.S. 134 (1985). Note that this case was decided by a five to four majority opi-
nion. Id. at 135.
157. See id. at 150.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000) [hereinafter referred to in text as § 409]. Section 409 of
ERISA is also printed in the United States Code under § 1109; the two provisions are used
interchangeably. See ERISA: THE LAW AND THE CODE, supra note 42, at xviii.
159. Russell, 473 U.S. at 136-138.
160. Id. at 138 (quoting Russell v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. (Russell 1), 722 F.2d 482, 490
(9th Cir. 1983), rev'd, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)).
161. Id. (quoting Russell 1, 722 F.2d at 492). The Supreme Court rejected the court of
appeals' findings that a plan beneficiary could be entitled to compensatory and punitive dam-
ages based on section 409 of ERISA and the accompanying legislative history because that
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damages were not expressly enumerated in § 502, the Court held that they
were non-recoverable. 6 2 This conclusion was based on the Court's assertion
that because ERISA remedy law was so carefully and comprehensively
drafted, any omission of a particular remedy must have been deliberate.'
16 3
The Court supported its conclusion with the pronouncement that in enacting
ERISA the drafters "were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of
plan assets, and with remedies that would protect the entire plan, rather than
with the rights of an individual beneficiary."'" 6
In his concurrence, Justice Brennan identified portions of the majority
opinion which he believed were "both unnecessary and to some extent com-
,,165pletely erroneous. Although he agreed with the Court's decision that §
409 provides remedies only for the plan as a whole and not individual partic-
ipants or beneficiaries, he noted that beneficiaries "must look elsewhere in
ERISA for personal relief."166 For instance, he explained that the Court did
not decide the issue of whether a fiduciary may be held personally liable
under § 502(a)(3)'s other appropriate equitable relief language. 167 He also
noted that the main architect of ERISA, Jacob Javits, intended for §
502(a)(3) to be used by the courts to work out appropriate remedies in light
of the purposes of ERISA. 1
68
Seven years later, in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,'69 the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether § 502(a)(3) authorizes money damages for the
breach of a fiduciary duty. 7° In analyzing the provision, it noted that the
term other appropriate equitable relief could mean one of two things, either:
(1) "whatever relief a court of equity is empowered to provide in the particu-
provision was only intended to provide relief to the plan itself, not beneficiaries or partici-
pants. Id. at 138-140.
162. Id. at 146.
163. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-47 (stating that "[tlhe six carefully integrated civil enforce-
ment provisions ... provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other
remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly") (emphasis omitted).
164. Id. at 142.
165. Id. at 155 (Brennan, J., concurring).
166. Id. at 150.
167. Id.
168. Russell, 473 U.S at 156 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29,942
(1974) (statement of Sen. Javits)); see also Langbein, supra note 72, at 1343. Justice Brennan
also reiterated that ERISA's legislative history demonstrated that Congress intended courts to
enforce the fundamental concept of trust law of "[awarding] beneficiaries ... such remedies
as are necessary for the protection of their interests." Russell, 473 U.S. at 156-57 (quoting 3
AUSTIN SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 199 (3d ed. 1967)).
169. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
170. See id. at 249-50. In this case, the ERISA beneficiaries sought damages from non-
fiduciaries who knowingly participated in the fiduciary's breach of fiduciary duty. Id.
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lar case at issue;" or (2) "those categories of relief that were typically availa-
ble in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compen-
satory damages)."'' The majority opted for the second interpretation pri-
marily based on Justice Scalia's assertion that the first meaning was too
broad and would render the word "equitable" superfluous.7 2 In the dissent-
ing opinion, however, Justices White, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor
argued that the first definition should apply. 173 The dissenting Justices in-
sisted that the drafters of ERISA intended the term other appropriate equita-
ble relief to be interpreted with respect to its roots in trust law. 7 4 Specifical-
ly, they focused on the remedy for breach of trust, which includes the right to
compensatory damages.175
B. Knudson and Where the Court Went Next
In Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,176 decided in
2002, the Supreme Court once again tackled the interpretation of other ap-
propriate equitable relief.177 The issues in Knudson differed significantly
from those in Russell and Mertens. In Knudson, an ERISA insurance com-
pany sought reimbursement from a plan beneficiary pursuant to a reim-
bursement provision in the ERISA policy. 178 This provision entitled the in-
surer to repayment for medical expenses paid on the beneficiary's behalf out
of the settlement proceeds the beneficiary received from the third-party tort-
feasor responsible for her injuries.179 In delivering the Opinion of the Court,
Justice Scalia reiterated the Mertens rationale and applied the typically equit-
171. Id. at 256.
172. Id. at 257-58. Another reason why the majority chose the "typically equitable" defi-
nition is that elsewhere in ERISA and other federal statutes, Congress indicated its intention to
broaden available remedies by using the terms "legal" or "remedial" in addition to "equita-
ble." See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257-60.
173. See id. at 263-74 (White, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 265-66 (stating that "[t]he traditional 'equitable remedies' available to a trust
beneficiary [for breach of trust] included compensatory damages"). The dissent further em-
phasized that making victims of fiduciary breaches whole by providing monetary relief avoids
the "anomaly of interpreting ERISA [in such a way that] leave[s] those Congress set out to
protect-[ERISA participants and beneficiaries]-with 'less protection ... than they enjoyed
before ERISA was enacted."' Id. at 266-67 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 114 (1989)).
175. Id.
176. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
177. See id. at 209-10.
178. Id. at 207-09.
179. Id. at 207.
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able interpretation of § 502(a)(3).8 ° The Court concluded that the insurer
could not prevail due to the fact that it was seeking to impose personal liabil-
ity on a beneficiary "for a contractual obligation to pay money-relief that was
not typically available in equity.'' In support of this conclusion, Justice
Scalia cited the following portion from his dissenting opinion in Bowen v.
Massachusetts.1
8 2
Almost invariably... suits seeking (whether by judgment, injunc-
tion, or declaration) to compel the defendant to pay a sum of mon-
ey to the plaintiff are suits for "money damages," as that phrase
has traditionally been applied, since they seek no more than com-
pensation for loss resulting from the defendant's breach of [a] le-
gal duty.'
83
Based on this rationale, Justice Scalia rejected the insurer's claim that
its cause of action for reimbursement should be classified as injunctive relief,
a typically equitable remedy.' 84 The Court noted that only in rare cases, such
as those that would avoid future losses, would the Court of Equity specifical-
ly enforce a contract to transfer funds. 185 The Court also rejected the insur-
er's argument that it was seeking the typically equitable remedy of restitu-
tion. 86 As dicta, the Court stated that in order to seek equitable restitution,
one must ordinarily do so "in the form of a constructive trust or an equitable
lien, where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to
the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the de-
fendant's possession."'' 87 Finally, the Court concluded that the "restitution"
sought by the insurer is not equitable but a "freestanding claim for money
damages."'' 8
8
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens wrote strong dissenting opinions.
Justice Stevens emphasized that he agreed with Justice Ginsburg that it is
unlikely that the 1974 Congress "intended to revive the obsolete distinctions
180. Id. at 209-10 (stating that "'[e]quitable' relief must mean something less than all
relief.' ... [It] must refer to 'those categories of relief that were typically available in equity"')
(quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. at 256, 258 n.8 (1993)).
181. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210.
182. 487 U.S. 879 (1988).
183. Id. at 918-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
184. See Knudson, 534 U.S. at 210-11. The insurer argued that it was seeking to enjoin





188. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 219 n.4.
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between law and equity ... for defining the remedies" under ERISA.189 Fur-
ther, he noted that he understood § 502(a)(3)(B) to authorize any appropriate
order that would remedy a violation of an ERISA plan, regardless of what
was available in English chancery courts.' 90 Justice Ginsburg elaborated on
how unreasonable it was for the majority to focus on ancient classifications
and emphasized that principles of equity are flexible and were introduced to
accommodate the changing needs of society. 9 '
C. Flaws in the "Typically Equitable" Definition
As a result of Russell, Mertens, and Knudson, relief available under §
502(a)(3)(B) has been limited to the specific classes of remedies that Justice
Scalia would consider typically equitable, such as mandamus, injunction, and
restitution. 192 This narrow interpretation of typically equitable remedies ex-
cludes the possibility of recovering compensatory damages primarily be-
cause Justice Scalia believes that suits for money are essentially actions at
law and therefore not equitable. 93 There are several flaws in this interpreta-
tion. First, as Professor Langbein explained, mandamus was exclusively a
common law remedy and never typically equitable.'94 Second, although the
Court asserted that restitution is typically equitable, the law of restitution was
only created after the fusion of the courts by the American Law Institute in
the Restatement of Restitution (1937), by integrating the equitable rule of
constructive trusts and common law rule of quasi-contract.' 95 Finally, and
most significantly, Justice Scalia's interpretation erroneously excludes mone-
tary damage awards because he considered them to be the "classic form of
legal relief."'' 96 This interpretation ignores the fact that the payment of mon-
ey is in fact a "classic form of equitable relief' for trust beneficiaries seeking
equitable redress for a fiduciary's breach of trust. 197 In fact, the Uniform
Trust Code clearly states that in order "[t]o remedy a breach of trust, ... the
court may... compel the trustee to redress a breach of trust by paying mon-
ey." 98 Keeping in mind that ERISA was drafted based on trust law and the
189. Id. at 221-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 228, 233 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993).
193. See id. at 255-56.
194. See Langbein, supra note 72, at 1353-54 (noting the origins of a writ of mandamus in
English common law).
195. Id. at 1357.
196. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255.
197. Langbein, supra note 72, at 1352.
198. UNIF. TRuSTCODE § 1001(b)(3) (2000) (amended 2004, 2005) (emphasis added).
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fact that an ERISA fiduciary's breach of its duty is analogous to a breach of
trust, Congress likely intended § 502(a)(3)(B) to include monetary relief.
D. A Step in the Right Direction
Four years after Knudson, the Supreme Court decided Sereboff v. Mid
Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.'99 In Sereboff, the Court once again took on
ERISA's other appropriate equitable relief language.200 The facts of Sere-
boff were essentially the same as those in Knudson.2°' Without abrogating or
overruling Knudson, however, the Court enforced an ERISA plan's reim-
bursement provision based on the typically equitable theory of constructive
trust.20 2 The Court distinguished the two cases on a fact that seems arbitrary
and may actually encourage fraudulent and unethical conduct. °3 In essence,
the Court enabled an insurer to enforce a monetary reimbursement provision
of an ERISA plan based on semantics and quick thinking. 2°4 Succinctly,
because the typically equitable definition of § 502(a)(3)(B) would not permit
the insurer to assert a cause of action for reimbursement under the terms of
the plan, the insurer merely re-classified the remedy sought as one for a con-
structive trust over the specific trust in which the settlement proceeds were
deposited.2 °5
The result in Sereboff is bitter-sweet. The Court took a step in the right
direction by permitting the recovery of money to be considered other appro-
priate equitable relief The method used to achieve this result, however, will
be difficult for insureds to take advantage of when seeking money for wrong-
fully denied benefits. This is due to the fact that when an insurer denies a
request for benefits, it generally does not earmark and deposit money that
would make an injured insured whole into a separate fund over which a con-
structive trust may be imposed.
VI. PROPERLY DEFINING "OTHER APPROPRIATE EQUITABLE RELIEF"
Without regard to the plan administrator's underlying motivation, the
fact remains that courts have and will continue to conclude, from time to
199. 547 U.S. 356 (2006).
200. See id. at 361.
201. Robert C. Sheres, Setting the Stage for Creative Lawyering in ERISA Reimbursement
Actions, 31 NOVA L. REV. 187, 201-02 (2006) (comparing Sereboff and Knudson).
202. Sereboff, 547 U.S. at 367-69.
203. See Sheres, supra note 201, at 208-10.
204. See id.
205. For a detailed discussion on Sereboff, see Sheres, supra note 201.
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time, that covered benefits were wrongfully denied.206 The type of benefit
denied and the resulting injuries vary from case to case. For instance, an
insurer might deny coverage for extended hospital stays,20 7 prescription
drugs,2 °8 or crucial surgeries.2°9 As a result of the denial, the insured might
incur injuries ranging from allergic reactions, 210 to the loss of a limb211 or
even death.12 In spite of the devastating losses and injuries that may result
from a wrongful denial, insureds under an ERISA plan are limited to relief
under § 502, which currently precludes consequential and punitive damag-
es. 213 As a result, injured participants and beneficiaries are without appropri-
ate relief to redress the damages caused by plan administrators.
This unjust result stems from the Supreme Court's unbalanced emphasis
on Congress's use of the word "equitable" in § 502(a)(3)(B) and disregard
for the fact that such relief must also be "appropriate." If Justice Scalia was
correct, then every word used in ERISA's remedial scheme was deliberate,
including the word "appropriate." Although the Court has stated that when
considering the meaning of "appropriate" equitable relief, courts should
"keep in mind the 'special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans,"' 214
it does not appear to have done so itself. The primary purposes of ERISA
are to provide benefits to and protect employees. Therefore, the remedies
available to those employees should redress the specific injury incurred by
the employee.
A. Typically Equitable and Appropriate Remedies
The current interpretation of other appropriate equitable relief limits
the remedies available to those typically equitable remedies identified by the
Court which include injunction and equitable restitution.2 5 Courts are given
a "high degree of discretion" when awarding these remedies, enabling them
to be flexible and "measure, shape or tailor relief to fit [the court's] view" of
206. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004).
207. See, e.g., Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322 (5th Cir. 1992).
208. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 205.
209. See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 362-63 (2002).
210. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc., 542 U.S. at 205.
211. See, e.g., Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 811 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
212. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Cigna Healthcare of Me., Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d 286, 290 (D.
Me. 2008).
213. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993).
214. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996).
215. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
2010]
141
: Nova Law Review 34, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
NOVA LAW REVIEW
what is fair in a particular situation.216 As such, courts should use the flex-
ibility of these equitable remedies to alleviate the damage caused by the
wrongfully denied benefits.
1. Injunction
An injunction is a command from the court to a defendant requiring the
defendant to act or avoid acting in a certain way.217 Due to their flexible
nature, injunctions have been used in a variety of ways to prevent violations
of rights, restore "rights that have already been violated," and even "establish
rights" that did not otherwise already exist.218 Because there is no general
limiting principal, an "injunction is a potential remedy in any case in which it
may provide significant benefits that are greater that its costs or disadvantag-
es. ' 219 The following are a few examples on how injunctive relief may be
fashioned to "appropriately" remedy wrongfully denied benefits in particular
situations.
In Wickline v. State,22° Mrs. Wickline, a plan beneficiary underwent
several major surgeries on her nerves and arteries. 22' After the surgeries, the
plan administrator rejected the surgeon's determination that Mrs. Wickline
should remain in the hospital for eight additional days.222 As a result, she
was discharged. 2 3 While at home, her leg became infected and ultimately
had to be amputated. 224 The surgeon concluded to a medical certainty, that
had Mrs. Wickline remained in the hospital for the entire eight days, as he
suggested, she would not have lost her leg. 25 Therefore, in this instance, the
wrongful denial of benefits resulted in the loss of Mrs. Wickline's leg. Even
though a court could not award compensatory damages to Mrs. Wickline or a
similarly situated insured for their loss, perhaps it could use its injunctive
powers to fashion an appropriate remedy. For instance, it might issue an
injunction requiring the plan administrator to provide Mrs. Wickline with a
216. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.4(1), at 67
(2d ed. 1993).
217. Id. § 2.9(1), at 162.
218. Id. § 2.9(2), at 165.
219. Id. at 166.
220. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986).
221. Id. at 812-13. Note that although this was not an ERISA case, the same concept
would apply.
222. Id. at 813-15.
223. Id. at 815.
224. Id. at 816.
225. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
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prosthetic leg and rehabilitative therapy.226 Of course the administrator will
argue that requiring the plan to pay for such relief is essentially the same as
awarding consequential damages. This argument should fail in light of the
Court's ruling in Sereboff, which permitted an insurer to recover money by
fashioning a method in which the money was recovered as equitable.
In Jacobs v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan Inc. ,227 an ERISA plan be-
neficiary was bulimic, however the administrator refused to pay for any out-
of-plan treatment because it considered alternative treatments available from
the plan provider to be reasonable.228 The court ultimately determined that
the treatment provided by the plan provider was not reasonable and therefore
benefits for the requested out-of-plan treatment were wrongfully denied.2 29 If
a court was faced with a similar situation, its injunctive power could be used
to order the plan to adopt a form of bulimia treatment that is reasonable.
Because bulimia is often a lifelong struggle, this prospective remedy may be
"appropriate."
In Nolte v. BellSouth Corp.,23° the plaintiff brought a class action suit
for breach of fiduciary duty, under ERISA §502(a)(3)(B), against the plan
administrator for improperly denying benefits under a Short Term Disability
Plan (STDP). 3' She alleged that the administrators failed to apply the cor-
rect definition of the term "disability. 2 32 As an appropriate equitable reme-
dy, the plaintiff asked the court
to order the removal and replacement of the alleged breaching fi-
duciaries .... further enjoin the violation of the fiduciary duties
owed to Plaintiff, . . . [and] appoint an "independent neutral body
to substitute for those removed fiduciar[ies],". . . which would
reopen "each [STDP] claim" and determine whether the claim
warranted an award of disability benefits.
2 33
226. Note that the administrator will likely argue that requiring the plan to pay for these
additional treatments is the same as giving the patient the money and therefore essentially the
equivalent of awarding her consequential damages. The administrator might also argue that
this type of remedy does not serve ERISA's purposes because the funds would be taken out of
the plan's account and therefore cause all plan members to bear the cost, possibly raising
premiums.
227. 265 Fed. Appx. 652 (9th Cir. 2008).
228. Id. at 653-54.
229. Id. at 654.
230. No. 1:06-cv-762-WSD, 2007 WL 120842 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2007).
231. Id. at*l.
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The plaintiff further requested "an order establishing an administrative com-
mittee to audit and review" the administrator's compliance with the previous
order and disgorging all profits realized from past violations.2 34 Although the
court dismissed the plaintiff's case, it did not refute that this type of injunc-
tive relief could be "appropriate equitable relief. 2 35 In fact, in Russell, the
Supreme Court specified that the phrase "other equitable or remedial relief'
as used in § 409(a) of ERISA is similar to "other appropriate equitable relief'
in §502(a)(3)(B) and includes the "removal of [a breaching] fiduciary. 2
36
Another potential equitable remedy might be an order requiring admin-
istrators who have previously been found to have wrongfully denied benefits
to refer all future benefit disputes for external review at the administrator's
cost. "External review is a formal process to resolve disputes between health
plans and patients by submitting those disputes to expert decision makers,
independent from either the health plan or the patient., 237 It has been shown
that external review uncovers that approximately fifty percent of the re-
viewed decisions by administrators were incorrect; therefore, this would like-
ly be a very effective way of preventing future wrongful denials.
238
It should be noted that courts have used their injunctive power to award
monetary relief in an effort to make whole those aggrieved.239 For example,
in Dunnigan v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., ° the court held that pre-
judgment interest on late benefit payments does not constitute an award of
compensatory damages.24n In fact, the court held that if "interest is sought to
make the plaintiff whole by eliminating the effect of a defendant's breach of
234. Id.
235. See Nolte, 2007 WL 120842, at *6, *7. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs case
asserting that pursuant to Varity Corp. v. Howe, a plaintiff cannot seek remedies under §
502(a)(3) when other remedies are available through another specific provision of ERISA
such as § 502(a)(l)(B). Id. at *6. Note, however, that other courts have interpreted Varity
Corp. differently. See, e.g., Devlin v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 89-90
(2d Cir. 2001) ("Varity Corp. did not eliminate a private cause of action for breach of fidu-
ciary duty when another potential remedy is available; instead, the district court's remedy is
limited to such equitable relief as is considered appropriate.").
236. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 142, 150 (1985) (It is abundantly
clear that ERISA's "draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan
assets").
237. Kathy Cerminara, Dealing with Dying: How Insurers Can Help Patients Seeking
Last-Chance Therapies (Even When the Answer is "NO"), 15 HEALTH MATRIx 285, 306
(2005).
238. See id. at 311.
239. See id. at 327.
240. 277 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2002).
241. Id. at 229.
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a fiduciary duty, [there is] no reason why such interest should not be deemed
'appropriate equitable relief within the scope of § 502(a)(3)(B). ' ' 42
2. Equitable Restitution
In addition to its injunctive power, a court may also use the remedy of
restitution to assist in making an injured participant or beneficiary whole
after being wrongfully denied benefits. 243 Dan Dobbs explains that although
in some cases restitution may provide compensation for a plaintiff, the goal
of restitution, "is to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant by making
him give up what he wrongfully obtained from the plaintiff."'2" There are
several different types of equitable restitution including: "(1) the construc-
tive trust, (2) the equitable lien, (3) subrogation, (4) . . . accounting for prof-
its," (5) equitable rescission, and (6) reformation of instruments. 45 Due to
the flexible nature of equitable remedies and the court's discretionary power,
it is likely that several of these restitutionary remedies could be used in crea-
tive ways to address wrongful denials of benefits. This portion of the article
will discuss the possible use of reformation and equitable rescission to
achieve this goal.
Reformation is a traditionally equitable remedy which enables the court
to alter a contract so that it more accurately meets the agreement of the par-
ties.246 This remedy, however, may also be used to reform or alter a contract
to meet other legal standards such as the doctrine in insurance law which
requires insurance policies to meet an insured's reasonable expectations.247
Such expectations may have arisen from brochures or other representations
by the insurer or administrator, despite contrary provisions in the written
policy.248 Therefore, if in a particular case the court finds that as a result of a
plan administrator's representations, a participant or beneficiary reasonably
expected certain benefits to be covered, a plan that excludes these benefits
should be reformed to meet the expectations of that participant or benefi-
ciary.
Equitable rescission is a court order that causes a contract to be "un-
made," meaning that all benefits received under the contract are restored to
242. Id.
243. See DOBBS, supra note 216 § 1.1, at 4.
244. Id.
245. Id. § 4.3(1), at 391-92.
246. Id. at § 4.3(7), at 416.
247. Id. at § 4.3(7), at 418 (citing Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Ex-
pectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 825 (1990)).
248. DOBBS, supra note 216 § 4.3(7), at 418.
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their original party.249 Generally, the benefits received by the plan adminis-
trator are the premiums paid by the participant, and the benefits received by
the participant would be the medical services rendered. Therefore, if the
participant has paid more in premiums than he has received in benefits be-
fore being wrongfully denied, perhaps a court would award the difference to
the insured. Of course, the participant would now no longer have any insur-
ance, which may not be the most desirable result.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Knudson, while referring to the majority's interpretation of other ap-
propriate equitable relief, Justice Ginsburg notes in her dissent that "[i]t is
particularly ironic that the [Court] acts in the name of equity as it sacrifices
congressional intent and statutory purpose to archaic and unyielding doc-
trine. '250 This emphasizes the fact that ERISA was enacted to protect em-
ployees and provide them with "appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready
access to the Federal courts. '251 The current interpretation of § 502(a)(3)(B)
contravenes this goal by refusing to allow participants and beneficiaries to be
made whole by way of consequential damages. What makes this fact even
more troubling is that an award of consequential damages was in fact a tradi-
tionally equitable remedy for breach of trust, the theory upon which
ERISA's remedial scheme is based. Although the decision in Sereboff re-
quired that the compensatory damages awarded be cloaked as equitable re-
lief,2 52 hopefully courts will view that decision as the beginning of equitable
revolution relieving ERISA insureds from the Court's flawed and archaic
limitations on available remedies.
For the time being, it appears as though counsel for the insured will
need to be creative in fashioning the relief they seek so that it will be consi-
dered traditionally equitable. This author suggests, however, that a clear
declaration by the Supreme Court that the proper interpretation of other ap-
propriate equitable relief is the one that Justice Scalia and the majority in
Mertens disposed of as too broad. Until this is done, courts should use their
discretionary power to mold the currently permissible remedies such as in-
junction, restitution, and rescission to provide equitable relief that appro-
priately addresses the injuries caused by the wrongful denials of covered
benefits.
249. Id. at § 4.3(6), at 414.
250. Great-West Life Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 228 (2002) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
251. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006).
252. See Sereboff v. Mid At. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368-69 (2006).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Following the deinstitutionalization of the American mental health care
system, which transferred the locus of psychiatric care from public inpatient
institutions to community-based treatment facilities, the nation's prisons and
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jails became filled with mentally ill offenders.' Instead of being diverted
into mental health systems, and unable to conform their behavioral symp-
toms to the societal norms that comprise lawful activity, these individuals
slipped through the holes of a ragged safety net into the criminal justice sys-
tem.2 Today, although mentally ill prisoners have a constitutional right to
basic mental health care, shortfalls in the identification of those in need of
these services, as well as the punitive, stressful nature of the penal system,
often exacerbate or even create additional symptoms of mental illness.3
Despite this, prisons may nonetheless present a unique opportunity for
meaningful psychiatric intervention. However, to the extent that some men-
tally ill offenders may achieve psychiatric stability while incarcerated, that
stability is threatened when they are subsequently released to the streets with
no home, no source of income, no social network, and no access to the medi-
cations and other care needed to maintain their newfound psychiatric stabili-
ty. As a result, these individuals, who disproportionately experience addic-
tion, may decompensate to the point of psychiatric crisis, triggering addition-
al contact with the criminal justice system, and eventually succumbing to
drug addiction, homelessness, and recidivism. This is the revolving door of
America's correctional system, through which the nation's seriously mental-
ly ill cycle over and over again.
Mental health advocates argue that two strategies in particular-
diversion and discharge planning-are the best ways in which to combat this
revolving door problem; 4 however, both strategies are of little help to the
vast numbers of America's seriously mentally ill who, destitute and without
access to public benefits, are completely unable to procure community-based
psychiatric treatment. Instead, policy makers should focus on instituting
programs that make Medicaid and other social benefits immediately availa-
ble to seriously mentally ill offenders upon their release. And while mental
health advocates have for years championed this particular strategy, an ex-
I. CHRIS KOYANAGI, KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, LEARNING FROM
HISTORY: DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION OF PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS PRECURSOR TO
LONG-TERM CARE REFORM 1, 10 (2007), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/
7684.pdf [hereinafter LEARNING FROM HISTORY]; see also MARCIA K. GOIN, AM. PSYCHIATRIC
Ass'N, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: REDIRECTING RESOURCES
TOWARD TREATMENT, NOT CONTAINMENT 2 (2004), available at http://archive.psych.org/edu/
otherres/libarchives/archives/200401 .pdf.
2. GOIN, supra note I, at 2-3.
3. See id. at 3-4.
4. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQuIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
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ploration of the legal framework that makes it possible has not received sig-
nificant attention in legal literature.
Part II of this Article discusses the origins of the revolving door prob-
lem, paying specific attention to the individuals trapped within its turning,
how they got there, and why they cannot escape. Next, Part III addresses
some of the more common strategies advanced by mental health advocates
for stopping the door's revolution. Finally, Part IV identifies timely access
to Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid as one strategy for ending
the revolving door cycle, ultimately concluding that mentally ill offenders
residing in prisons could most directly benefit from this strategy, which re-
quires both state administrative action and stakeholder buy-in for the creation
of a uniform mental health policy.
H. THE REVOLVING DOOR OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA'S
PRISONS AND JAILS
Empirical data suggest that over half of the men and women incarce-
rated in prisons and jails throughout the United States suffer from some form
of mental illness.5 Ten percent to twenty-three percent of these mentally ill
offenders suffer from psychotic symptoms, such as those with schizophrenia
or who experience certain forms of bipolar disorder.6 This disproportionate-
ly high population of mentally ill inmates housed in correctional facilities has
made the U.S. penal system the nation's largest provider of mental health
services.7
Because of the criminal justice system's new, de facto role in the provi-
sion of mental health services, incarceration may present a unique opportuni-
ty for psychiatric intervention. Many mentally ill offenders are poor, unin-
sured, and eligible for Medicaid prior to their incarceration.8 However, many
have never signed up for public benefits; consequently, their inability to pay
5. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL
HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.
gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
6. See id. at 3. The report found that 15.4% of prisoners with mental health problems in
state prisons, 10.2% in federal prisons, and 23.9% in state jails exhibited symptoms of psy-
chotic disorders. Id.
7. See GOIN, supra note 1, at 2.
8. HEATHER BARR, CORR. ASS'N OF N.Y. & URBAN JUSTICE CTR., PRISONS AND JAILS:
HOSPITALS OF LAST RESORT iii (1999), available at http://www.urbanjustice.org/pdf/
publications/mentalhealth/PrisonsJails.pdf (stating that "[p]rior to incarceration, very few [of
New York's mentally ill prisoners] were employed; most relied on public benefits or had no
income. The vast majority received Medicaid or had no insurance at all.").
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for psychiatric services translates into a similar inability to address mental
illness in any meaningful way prior to serving a criminal sentence. 9
But even to the extent that individuals do achieve stability resulting
from psychiatric care received while incarcerated, that stability is often de-
stroyed when seriously mentally ill offenders are released to the streets fol-
lowing the completion of their sentences, without the resources necessary to
continue the very treatment that allows them to conform their behaviors to
the societal norms that comprise lawful activity; as a result, they recidivate.' 0
This is often because of the unavailability of immediate federal entitlement
benefits upon release from incarceration, as well as the delays inherent in re-
enrollment and other application procedures."
This Section will provide information regarding the rates of mental ill-
ness in U.S. prisons and jails, pointing out that the population of incarcerated
mentally ill offenders is disproportionate to rates of mental illness in the pub-
lic at large. It will then discuss the deinstitutionalization of the U.S. mental
health care system and the subsequent "transinstitutionalization" of the men-
tally ill from public, inpatient mental hospitals to the country's correctional
facilities, with the result that America's prisons and jails have become the
nation's largest provider of mental health services. Finally, it will explain
how any stability resulting from psychiatric intervention during incarceration
may be threatened by discharge to the streets without insurance benefits fol-
lowing the completion of a term of imprisonment.
A. Rates of Mental Illness in the U.S. Correctional System
The specific rates of mental illness represented among inmates of U.S.
prisons and jails have, historically, been difficult to accurately determine.'2
This may be due to the fact that there is high turnover among mentally ill
offenders, 3 whose sentences generally result from conviction for nonviolent
offenses warranting relatively short terms of incarceration. 4 However, in a
9. See Jamie Fellner, A Conundrum for Corrections, A Tragedy for Prisoners: Prisons
as Facilities for the Mentally 111, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 135, 136 (2006).
10. See BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, A BETTER LIFE-A SAFER
COMMUNITY: HELPING INMATES ACCESS FEDERAL BENEFITS 1-2 (2003), available at
http:/lwww.bazelon.orglissues/criminalization/publicationslgainslgains.pdf.
11. Id. at 7; see also BARR, supra note 8, at 34-35 (explaining the labyrinthine structure
of the Medicaid re-enrollment process for those with mental illnesses).
12. 1 NAT'L COMM'N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, THE HEALTH STATUS OF SOON-TO-BE-
RELEASED INMATES, A REPORT TO CONGRESS 22 (2002), available at http:/www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/nij/grants/1 89735.pdf.
13. Id.
14. See GOIN, supra note I, at 2.
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recent report, the Bureau for Justice Statistics issued new data confirming
that over half of all inmates in U.S. prisons and jails experienced mental ill-
ness. 15 Consequently, rates of mental illness within correctional facilities
have been shown to far outweigh rates of mental illness represented in the
country's general population, 6 and may be as much as four times that of the
general public. 17 Estimates place the total number of mentally ill offenders
contained in prisons and jails at more than 1.2 million. 8 Of that number,
approximately one in five may experience a serious mental illness.' 9 This
classification typically includes major depression and manic conditions, such
as bipolar disorder, as well as schizophrenia and other psychotic conditions.20
The prevalence of specific symptoms sufficient to support diagnosis of
a serious mental illness, when considered individually, places the dispropor-
tionately high rates of mental illness in the U.S. criminal justice system into
greater perspective. Approximately forty-three percent of state prisoners and
fifty-four percent of those in state jails meet the criteria for mania. 2' Roughly
twenty-three percent of those incarcerated in state prisons and thirty percent
of those in state jails report symptoms consistent with a diagnosis for major
depression.22 Further, some fifteen percent of state prison inmates and twen-
ty-four percent of those in state jails present symptoms that satisfy the crite-
ria for psychotic disorder.23 One report concluded that, every day, as many
as 100,000 inmates throughout the prison system may be actively psychot-
ic. 2
4
15. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 5, at 1. The report found that, in 2005, "705,600 inmates
in State prisons, 78,800 in Federal prisons, and 479,900 in local jails" experienced some form
of mental illness. Id. These numbers accounted for 56% of state, 45% of federal, and 64% of
local jail populations. Id.
16. See Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of 12-Month
DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 62 ARCHIVES OF GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 617, 619 (2005) (showing that 26.2% of adults in the general population expe-
rience some form of diagnosable mental illness); JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 5, at 3 (showing
that the rate of mental illness within the prison system is more than double that among Ameri-
cans generally).
17. See Jeffrey L. Metzner et al., Treatment in Jails and Prisons, in TREATMENT OF
OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS 211 (Robert M. Wettstein ed., 1998).
18. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 5, at 1.
19. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES IN JAILS AND PRISONS xix (2d ed.
2000).
20. See, e.g., Fellner, supra note 9, at 135.
21. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 5, at 1.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Fellner, supra note 9, at 135-36.
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Because mentally ill prisoners have a constitutional right to receive mi-
nimally necessary medical treatment for serious mental health conditions,25
the high rates of these illnesses in prisons and jails pose particular challenges
for criminal justice systems, which were not designed to address meaningful-
ly the delicate work of treating this population.26 Perhaps more importantly,
these rates pose significant challenges to communities, which are forced to
address the continuing needs of the formerly imprisoned mentally ill offend-
er, released into the community without immediate access to the benefits
necessary to access treatment.
27
B. The Road to Transinstitutionalization
Beginning in the mid 1950s and continuing throughout the 1980s, the
United States saw a shift in the locus of mental health care from public, inpa-
tient institutions to community-based treatment facilities.28 The effects of the
"deinstitutionalization" of the American mental health care system, although
gradual, were vast: The population of state-run mental health hospitals de-
clined from 559,000 in 1955 to 49,000 in 2006.29
The deinstitutionalization of mental health care within the U.S. came as
the result of several factors working in tandem, resulting in "a mass migra-
tion of persons with mental illness out of mental hospitals and into the com-
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04
(1976) (holding that the intentional refusal of necessary medical treatment for serious injury or
illness violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Bowring v. Godwin, 551
F.2d 44, 47-48 (4th Cir. 1977); Jones'EI v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1117 (W.D. Wis.
2001) (holding that the Eighth Amendment protects a prisoner's right to treatment for both
serious physical and mental illnesses). In Bowring v. Godwin, the court held that prison in-
mates are
entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a physician or other health care provider,
exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of observation, concludes with reasonable medi-
cal certainty (1) that the prisoner's symptoms evidence a serious disease or injury; (2) that such
disease or injury is curable or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) that the potential for
harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of care would be substantial.
551 F.2d at 47. The court further held that "[tlhe right to treatment is, of course, limited to
that which may be provided upon a reasonable cost and time basis and the essential test is one
of medical necessity and not simply that which may be considered merely desirable." Id. at
47-48.
26. GOIN, supra note 1, at 2.
27. Id.
28. See LEARNING FROM HISTORY, supra note 1, at 1; see also GOIN, supra note 1, at 2-3.
29. LEARNING FROM HISTORY, supra note 1, at I; NAT'L ASS'N OF STATE MENTAL
HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS. RESEARCH INST., INC., STATE PROFILE HIGHLIGHTS: STATE
PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS: 2006, No. 06-4 (Nov. 21 2006), available at http://www.nri-
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munity."3 ° First, new pharmaceutical therapies proved effective in the treat-
ment of mental illness, thus offering alternatives to traditional methods that
were best administered in inpatient settings.3 These drugs were accompa-
nied by "the belief that mental illnesses could be better treated in communi-
ties than in hospitals that were often more warehouses than therapeutic insti-
tutions. 32
Second, the federal government's formal push for the deinstitutionaliza-
tion of mental health care, which began in 1961, began to exert financial
pressure on the institutional framework.33 That year, the Joint Commission
on Mental Illness and Health, created to examine the state of the American
mental health care system, issued to Congress a report recommending the
funding and implementation of a federally based program to shift mental
health care from public hospitals to community-based treatment facilities.'
In 1965, Congress responded by passing a law authorizing the construction
of community mental health centers (CMHCs), 35 and then amending that law
to fund the staffing of those centers.36 Deinstitutionalization had begun in
earnest.
Third, litigation in the federal courts produced decisions that both
strengthened the procedural requirements and the criteria for achieving the
involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill individuals.37 It also affirmed
the constitutional right of mentally ill individuals to live in and be members
of a community, regardless of whether they choose to receive psychiatric
30. GOIN, supra note 1, at 2.
31. See Ralph Slovenko, The Transinstitutionalization of the Mentally Ill, 29 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 641, 644-45 (2003) (describing how "the development of anti-psychotic medication
resulted in a decrease in the use of physical restraints, psychosurgery, electroshock, hydrothe-
rapy, insulin coma, and other physical means of treatment."); see also GOIN, supra note 1, at
2; LEARNING FROM HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4.
32. GoIN, supra note I, at 2.
33. See LEARNING FROM HISTORY, supra note 1, at 4; Slovenko, supra note 31, at 646-47.
34. See JOINT COMM'N ON MENTAL ILLNESS & HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH:
FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH xiii-xiv (1961).
35. Community Mental Retardation and Community Mental Health Center Construction
Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-164, § 201-07, 77 Stat. 282, 290-94 (1963).
36. Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction
Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-105,79 Stat. 427 (1965).
37. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1093 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that
involuntary commitment was only appropriate when "there is an extreme likelihood that if the
person is not confined he will do immediate harm to himself or others"), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318,
1321 (E.D. Wis. 1976); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1978) (holding that
the Fourteenth Amendment requires proof by clear and convincing evidence in civil commit-
ment procedures).
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treatment.38 These decisions resulted in an increasingly large population of
both treated and untreated mentally ill individuals residing within communi-
ties.39
However, this increase was not accompanied by the funding necessary
to implement adequate community-based treatment.40 Thus, while federal
deinstitutionalization policy envisioned the withdrawal of federal funds from
public mental health institutions and the reinvestment of those funds in
community-based treatment programs,4 that funding never came "close to
approaching the early promises or projections of need., 42 Further, the aver-
age state contributions to the operation of public mental health institutions
were not fully shifted to these programs. 43 Adjusted for inflation, these con-
tributions amounted to thirty percent less in 1997 than in 1955.44 As a result,
those mentally ill individuals who do wish to find treatment for their condi-
tions while living within their communities are more likely to be denied
access because of either the scarcity of treatment programs or their inability
to pay.45
Additionally, the increased community presence of mentally ill individ-
uals was not accompanied by a concurrent rise in their acceptance by other
community members. 46 To the layman observer, many behavioral symptoms
of mental illness can be perceived as "bizarre," "disruptive," or "danger-
38. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587-88 (1975) (holding that states may
not confine non-dangerous individuals with mental illnesses when it has been demonstrated
that the individual is capable of living in the community with the willing support of others);
Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that, absent an emergency, an
involuntarily committed patient who had been found competent had a right to refuse psycho-
tropic medication); Rogers v. Comm'r of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314, 323
(Mass. 1983) (holding that committed mental patients, both voluntary and involuntary, cannot
be forcibly medicated except in emergency situations, and therefore have a right to refuse
treatment).
39. Linda A. Teplin, Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate of
the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 794, 795 (1984).
40. See LEARNING FROM HISTORY, supra note 1, at 7-8; see also Teplin, supra note 39, at
795; GoIN, supra note I, at 2; Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill:
Is Their Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON U. CIv. RTS. L.J. 157,
157 (2000).
41. See JOINT COMM'N ON MENTAL ILLNESS & HEALTH, supra note 34, at xiii-xiv.
42. LEARNING FROM HISTORY, supra note 1, at 11.
43. Id.
44. ROBERT BERNSTEIN & CHRIS KOYANAGI, BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW,
DISINTEGRATING SYSTEMS: THE STATE OF STATES' PUBLIC MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEMS (2001).
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ous.''47 As a result, law enforcement officers are often the very first called
upon to address community concerns regarding these behaviors.48
Once engaged, police officers may conclude that, because the process of
civil commitment is filled with procedural hurdles, and because many of the
available community-based treatment programs will not accept patients who
are perceived as "dangerous," charging that individual with a crime is "a less
cumbersome and more reliable way of removing the person from the com-
munity. '49 Or, the responding officer may simply not have sufficient training
to recognize the symptoms of mental illness, which may appear very similar
to intoxication. 50 Regardless of the reason for the diversion of mentally ill
people into the criminal courts, the criminal justice system's lack of suffi-
cient criteria for excluding those individuals, and its ready acceptance of any
individual whose actions do not conform with the law, may very well make it
the only institution, aside from hospital emergency rooms, that "cannot say
no" to the treatment of mentally ill persons.51
This is compounded by the fact that there has been a trend among the
states throughout the past two decades to increase the criminal penalties for
"lifestyle crimes," which are typically nonviolent offenses that do not cause
direct harm to others, but do create feelings of unease among community
members.52 These crimes are most often related to drug and alcohol use, the
rates of which are especially high among the mentally ill, who, in many cas-
es, use them in a desperate attempt to self-medicate.53
The net effect of these factors is that seriously mentally ill individuals,
who, prior to deinstitutionalization, would have been diverted into the public
mental health system, now receive the bulk of their long-term care from pris-
ons or jails.54 This phenomenon, which has come to be known as "transinsti-
tutionalization," is particularly troubling to mental health advocates, who




50. GOIN, supra note 1, at 3.
51. Teplin, supra note 39, at 795.
52. GOIN, supra note 1, at 4; see also, e.g., William K. Rashbaum, In New Focus on
Quality of Life, City Goes After Petty Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at Al.
53. See GoIN, supra note 1, at 3; JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 5, at 5-6; Slovenko, supra
note 31, at 657.
54. Teplin, supra note 39, at 795.
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handle the job,55 and that "formerly hospitalized patients" have "needlessly
become prisoners. '"56
C. Opportunities for Psychiatric Intervention in the Criminal Justice
System
A determination of the quality of the psychiatric treatment provided in
the criminal justice system is too broad an undertaking to be addressed in any
meaningful way in this article; however, there is significant evidence, de-
scribed infra, indicating that it is less than adequate. But regardless of
whether U.S. prisons and jails were ever intended to be providers of psychia-
tric treatment to the mentally ill, or whether that treatment can be considered
adequate, penal institutions have become the largest "purveyor" of mental
health services for the seriously mentally ill. 57 To that extent, they are uni-
quely positioned to intervene in the psychiatric disorders of those mentally ill
offenders who become incarcerated.58
I. Incarceration as a Unique Opportunity for Psychiatric Intervention
Incarceration may itself present an opportunity for many mentally ill of-
fenders to meaningfully address their psychiatric conditions.59 The potential-
ly unique opportunity for psychiatric intervention presented by incarceration
is likely due to the fact that the mentally ill experience poverty and home-
lessness in disproportionately high numbers, making them unable to pay for
the treatment they need. 60 Because of the scarcity of charity mental health
care programs, the burden of paying for that care has been shifted largely to
the patient.6' Considering that an estimated one in twenty Americans with a
55. Slovenko, supra note 31, at 641; Stavis, supra note 40, at 157. See generally HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4.
56. See Stavis, supra note 40, at 158.
57. E. Fuller Torrey, Editorial: Jails and Prisons-America's New Mental Hospitals, 85
Am. J. PUB. HEALTH 1611, 1611 (1995) (describing how "jails and prisons are replacing pub-
lic mental health hospitals as the primary purveyors of public psychiatric services for individ-
uals with serious mental illnesses in the United States").
58. See GoIN, supra note 1, at 4.
59. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 27.
60. Id. See generally Christopher G. Hudson, Socioeconomic Status and Mental Illness:
Tests of the Social Causation and Selection Hypotheses, 75 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 3, 16
(2005) (finding a "remarkably strong and consistent negative correlation between socio-
economic conditions and mental illness"); JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 5, at 4-5 (finding
disproportionately high rates of homelessness and unemployment among mentally ill prison
and jaili nmates).
61. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 21.
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severe mental illness is homeless, accessing the resources to pay for private
psychiatric care can be exceedingly difficult, if not totally impossible.62
And while there are undoubtedly some mentally ill Americans who
have sufficient social resources, such as family members, who are capable of
footing the bill, those who need public mental health services the most are all
too often unable to attain them until their symptoms have deteriorated to the
point that they "are deemed a danger to themselves or to others," at which
point they can be committed to a public hospital.63 However, at that point,
because the few existing community-based treatment programs typically
employ admissions criteria that exclude individuals whose behavior seems
"dangerous," or who have been previously incarcerated, the most severely
mentally ill members of the community may have no options for treatment
other than that provided in prison.64
2. Psychiatric Treatment and Relapse in America's Prisons and Jails
In addition to government-run psychiatric institutions, America's jails
and prisons are perhaps the only places where individuals have a constitu-
tional right to receive basic mental health care.65 However, only one-third of
state prisoners, one-fourth of federal prisoners, and less than one-fifth of jail
inmates with mental health problems actually receive mental health treatment
while incarcerated.6 This treatment is most often provided in the form of
prescription medication, although many of those who do receive mental
health treatment during incarceration have some access to professional men-
tal health therapy.67
Although some seriously mentally ill prisoners receive psychiatric
treatment while incarcerated, the punitive environment inherent to prisons
and jails may actually exacerbate mental illness.68 Prisons and jails are
62. TASK FORCE ON HOMELESSNESS & SEVERE MENTAL ILLNESS, OUTCASTS ON MAIN
STREET 18, 31 (1992); see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 2 1.
63. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 21.
64. See Teplin, supra note 39, at 795.
65. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, How AND WHY MEDICAID MATTERS FOR PEOPLE WITH
SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESS RELEASED FROM JAIL: RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS, available at http:lI
reentrypolicy.org/jc-publications/how-why/How_.WhyMedicaid.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL
OF STATE Gov'TS, How AND WHY MEDICAID MATTERS]; see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457
U.S. 307, 317 (1982) ("When a person is institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the
State .... a duty to provide certain services and care does exist.").
66. See JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 5, at 9.
67. Id.
68. See TERRY A. KUPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS
AND WHAT WE MUST Do ABOUT IT 161 (1999); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 53;
GOIN, supra note 1, at 4; Bonnie J. Sultan, The Insanity of Incarceration and the Maddening
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"tense and overcrowded places in which all prisoners struggle to maintain
their self-respect and emotional equilibrium despite omnipresent violence,
exploitation, and extortion; despite an utter lack of privacy" and "stark limi-
tations on family and community contacts." 69 These conditions make it chal-
lenging enough for prisoners without mental illness to cope with the traumas
of imprisonment; but, for the seriously mentally ill offender, these conditions
can be debilitating.70
The problem of overcrowding in U.S. prisons has long been docu-
mented, with some estimates showing that they operate at 150 to 200 percent
beyond capacity. 71 Cells often measure eight feet by six feet, and are occu-
pied by two individuals, requiring one inmate to sit on a bunk when the other
must access the toilet.72 These close quarters, and the consequent loss of
privacy, can cause the seriously mentally ill to decompensate to the point of
psychiatric relapse. 73 Even those who were not mentally ill prior to incarce-
ration can develop psychiatric symptoms for the first time, resulting in in-
creased rule breaking, violence, and suicide.74
In addition to the challenges to creating psychiatric stability that are in-
herent to the prison and jail environment, there are impediments created by
the very structure of the mental health programs within these facilities. First
among these is that, as a general matter, correctional officers are typically
not trained mental health professionals, with the knowledge and expertise
necessary to recognize and react appropriately to the behavioral symptoms of
mental illness.75 As a result, the officers may mistake a bona fide psychiatric
episode that makes it impossible for an inmate to conform his or her behavior
for aggression, manipulation, or willful disobedience.76 The consequence of
most of these mistaken assessments, especially when the misunderstood be-
havior can be construed as "violent," is that mentally ill prisoners "are met
with more and harsher punishment instead of treatment. '77 This is reflected
by statistics showing that mentally ill state prison inmates are far more likely
to be charged with rule violations than other prisoners, and on average serve
Reentry Process: A Call for Change and Justice for Males with Mental Illness in United
States Prisons, 13 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL"Y 357, 366 (2006).
69. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 53.
70. Sultan, supra note 68, at 366.
71. KUPERS, supra note 68, at 47.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 48.
74. Id. at 47-48.
75. See Sultan, supra note 68, at 365.
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four months longer.78 One of the common forms of punishment imposed on
mentally ill offenders is solitary confinement, which itself has been shown to
exacerbate the symptoms of mental illness.79
Another barrier to achieving adequate psychiatric services in prisons
and jails is the chronic understaffing of mental health programs.80 Current
staffing trends do not come near the levels proposed by experts, not only
because correctional facilities are chronically underfunded for psychiatric
care, but also because that already inadequate funding has failed to increase
in relation to growing prison populations. 8' Pay for these positions is low,
and turnover is high, largely because the work is difficult, often unpleasant,
and commonly requires a lengthy commute.82 As a result, "counselors" who
are typically not required to hold any formal credentials, overwhelmingly
outnumber licensed mental health professionals. 83 This has huge clinical and
ethical implications regarding the care of mentally ill offenders, because
"under-trained, and under-qualified personnel end up making clinical deci-
sions about appropriate treatment strategies and crisis interventions for se-
riously mentally ill prisoners. 84
Further, comprehensive policies and programs designed to screen for
mental illness are missing from most prisons and jails, contributing to the
inefficacy of their mental health programs.85 This may be part of the reason
that so few seriously mentally ill prisoners actually receive treatment. As a
result, mental disorders may be inadvertently allowed to decompensate, re-
sulting in full psychiatric crisis. 86 Or, prison officials may erroneously con-
clude that a prisoner's symptoms are an attempt to earn special treatment, or
to otherwise manipulate the system.87 However, even when mentally ill in-
mates are properly diagnosed, consistent delays in the delivery of psychiatric
treatment may further inhibit the achievement of stabilization.88
The interplay of these factors-the trauma associated with the loss of
personal space and privacy, the severe punishment of uncontrollable beha-
vior, and the inaccessibility of adequate psychiatric services-may have the
cumulative effect of exacerbating mental illness, or even creating it. Either
78. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 5, at 9-10.
79. KUPERS, supra note 68, at 53.
80. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 95.
81. Id. at96.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 99.
84. Id. at 100.
85. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 101.
86. See id. at 106.
87. Id.
88. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, supra note 19, at 4.
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way, the mentally ill offender runs the serious risk of exiting the criminal
justice system far worse off than when he or she entered it.89 As a result, the
Eighth Amendment guarantee that prisoners are entitled to adequate medical
treatment while in the state's custody becomes, in many ways, no more than
an empty promise.
D. The Loss of Psychiatric Stability upon Community Reentry
Although there is no empirical data relating to actual rates of psychiatric
stabilization among mentally ill offenders during periods of incarceration, it
is reasonable to assume that some do become stabilized by the time they are
released from prison or jail. 90 However, any newfound stability is lost when
those individuals are released into the community without adequate dis-
charge planning, and without access to the resources they need to prevent an
interruption in their treatment.91 With no access to medication, and with sig-
nificant stressors associated with readjustment to community life, many men-
tally ill former inmates turn to alcohol and drugs as a form of self-
medication, become homeless, and eventually recidivate. 2 Thus begins
again the turning of the cycle between incarceration, release and psychiatric
crisis, in which the most serious of America's mentally ill too often find
themselves.
Long periods of incarceration can have a detrimental effect not only on
one's mental health, but also on virtually every other facet of one's life. 93
Thus, even when mentally ill former inmates achieve stabilization and are
released into the community, they may face other challenges that threaten
their ability to continue the treatment necessary to protect their mental
health, and increase the possibility of recidivism. 94 These challenges are
most often associated with loss of housing, unemployment, frustration of
social relationships, and access to adequate mental health care.95 Without
assistance in connecting with community services to assist in making a suc-
cessful reintegration, many mentally ill former inmates may simply slip
through the holes of a ragged safety net.96
89. Sultan, supra note 68, at 372.
90. See BARR, supra note 8, at 40.
91. See id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 192; Sultan, supra note 68, at 373.
92. BARR, supra note 8, at 36; Sultan, supra note 68, at 378.
93. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, HOW AND WHY MEDICAID MATTERS, supra note 65.
94. See id.
95. BARR, supra note 8, at 31-35.
96. See Sidney D. Watson, The View from the Bottom: Consumer-Directed Medicaid
and Cost-Shifting to Patients, 51 ST. Louis U. L.J. 403, 404-05 (2007).
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Social relationships can easily suffer when an individual is incarcerated,
especially when that imprisonment is for an extended period.97 This can be
attributed to a host of reasons, including limitations on the time allotted for
visitation, the tendency to assign an inmate to a facility geographically dis-
tant from his or her home, the commonplace harassment of visitors by prison
staff, and the excessive screening of personal correspondence.98 In fact, the
maintenance of relationships may be intentionally frustrated by the correc-
tional system as part of the punishment for having committed a crime. 99
Evidence suggests, though, that social relationships are an incredibly impor-
tant part of maintaining stability upon release, and indicates that the same
policies seeking to isolate prisoners from society in fact exacerbate psychia-
tric crisis, not only behind bars, but also once the former inmate has reen-
tered the community.'00
Similarly, incarceration brings about a necessary interruption of em-
ployment, which in turn amounts to an interruption of income.' 0 ' Many of
the mentally ill offenders who are incarcerated were, prior to their imprison-
ment, already poor.10 2 Following release, they may not be able to find im-
mediate employment, because of their criminal record.'0 3 They may there-
fore find themselves completely unable to afford the costs of housing, food,
and purchasing the medications they need to remain stabilized.
Although many mentally ill offenders are homeless at the time of their
incarceration, many more become homeless after being discharged from
prison or jail.I"4 Even a small period of incarceration can result in eviction or
foreclosure. If these individuals no longer have a social network to fall back
on, they may have little choice but to attempt to find temporary housing in a
shelter.' O5 However, "[s]helters are not funded or staffed to provide ongoing
psychiatric and substance abuse treatment.''I6 Furthermore, because most
shelters operate on a first-come basis, there is no guarantee that there will be
a bed available on any given night.'07 Instead, the recently discharged indi-
vidual may find herself sleeping on the streets, which are dangerous, violent
97. BARR, supra note 8, at 31-32.
98. KUPERS, supra note 68, at 162-63.
99. Id. at 163.
100. Id. at 162-63, 172-73.
101. BARR, supra note 8, at 33-34.
102. Id. at iii.
103. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, HOW AND WHY MEDICAID MAT-ERS, supra note 65.
104. BARR, supra note 8, at 33.
105. See id.
106. Sidney D. Watson, Discharges to the Streets: Hospitals and Homelessness, 19 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 357,363 (2000).
107. Id. at 364.
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places that "invite[] backsliding" because of the availability of drugs and
alcohol. 10 8 And, once homeless, it may become even more difficult to find
work.
Access to mental health services may also be affected by the kindred
problems of unemployment, homelessness, and the destruction of social rela-
tionships. It can also be linked to the lack of available charity mental health
programs."°9 However, lack of access to needed psychiatric treatment is most
often traced to the loss of, or difficulty in acquiring, public benefits such as
Supplemental Security Income (SSI), Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI), and Medicaid." 0 What's more, even if these individuals do find a
treatment program that can help them, those services typically employ
enrollment policies that exclude those with a history of dangerous behavior,
a criminal record, or several previous hospitalizations.'
Without access to housing, income, necessary mental health care or
safety net programs, the mentally ill former inmate will almost certainly be
re-incarcerated, typically within the first six months following release." 2
Recent statistics not only confirm this, but also paint a grim picture of the
possibility that a mentally ill offender will escape this cycle: In 2004, ap-
proximately half of mentally ill state prisoners and forty-two percent of men-
tally ill jail inmates had three or more incarcerations or probations." 3
III. EFFORTS TO CLOSE THE DOOR: COMMON PROPOSALS FOR ENDING THE
CYCLE OF RECIDIVISM
Advocates for the mentally ill have tended to suggest two primary ways
in which states may curb the cycle of recidivism plaguing this population."
4
The first of these is "diversion," by which the seriously mentally ill escape
conviction for low-level, nonviolent offenses, and are instead routed into the
mental health system in order to get the psychiatric care they need." 5 The
second of these is discharge planning, through which mentally ill offenders
are connected with community-based housing, employment, and health ser-
vices prior to their release in order to maintain a continuum of care."
16
108. Id. at 363.
109. See id. at 369-72.
110. BARR, supra note 8, at 34-35.
IIi. See Teplin, supra note 39, at 795.
112. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 193.
113. JAMES & GLAZE, supra note 5, at 8.
114. See BARR, supra note 8, at 42-56.
115. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 26.
116. See id. at 192-93.
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A. Diversion
Diversion strategy, in addition to being promoted for mentally ill of-
fenders, has also been implemented in relation to substance abusers, with the
creation of "drug courts" to divert low-level offenders into drug and alcohol
abuse treatment programs.' 17 Because of the close relationship between sub-
stance abuse and mental illness, and a consequent overlap of services, these
voluntary drug courts may already be somewhat effective in diverting the
mentally ill from the criminal justice system.'18
Today, mental health courts are becoming increasingly more common.
In 2004, there were roughly 11 mental health courts in operation throughout
thirty-two states.' 9 These courts operate by diverting individuals with men-
tal illnesses into community-based programs that are supervised by the
courts. 120 Participation by the defendant is voluntary, incentives and sanc-
tions are offered to encourage compliance, and social service and mental
health professionals review treatment plans regularly.
121
While mental health courts have been shown to both reduce recidivism
and to be cost-effective,' 22 the creation of a mental health court system that
diverts a majority of mentally ill offenders out of prisons and jails is unlike-
ly. First, because of the problem of "functional siloing," whereby actors
within a system become so focused on their own performance and needs that
they become increasingly unaware of how their action-or inaction-affects
detrimentally a larger issue. 13 The problem of functional siloing may be best
illustrated by an example of its common operation: An administrative agen-
cy is asked to determine whether it should forgo funding in order to allow
another agency, which may arguably be better suited to the task, to assume
that particular responsibility. Because the loss of these funds is likely unde-
sirable to the agency, the prospect of that loss may have the effect of skewing
the agency's view of its efficacy. Translated into the immediate context, to
the extent that prisons and jails receive funding based on the number of in-
117. Id. at 26. See generally C. WEST HUDDLESTON, III ET AL., NAT'L DRUG COURT INST.,
PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG COURTS AND OTHER
PROBLEM SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (2005).
118. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 26.
119. HUDDLESTON, Ill ET AL., supra note 117, at 16 tbl.vi.
120. Id. at 13.
121. Id.
122. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 27.
123. See S.G. Parker & S.J. Byrne, Functional Siloing? Towards a Practical Understand-
ing of Operational Boundaries Using Critical Systems Heuristics, FIRST INT. CONF. ON SYS.
THINKING IN MGMT. 503, 503 (2000), available at http://ftp.informatik.rwth-aachen.de/
Publications/CEUR-WSNol-72/080%20Parker%20Siloing.pdf.
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mates housed within those facilities, those prisons and jails may resist the
removal of those inmates and funds, and their redistribution to other pro-
grams. Secondly, because the mentally ill in general and mentally ill offend-
ers in particular lack political power, they may not be capable of creating the
momentum required to effectuate this type of immense bureaucratic shift. 4
B. Discharge Planning
These reasons make it more likely that the second suggested strategy-
the provision of comprehensive discharge planning by correctional facilities
prior to release-may be the most immediate way of combating the revolv-
ing door problem faced by the mentally ill who become entangled in the
criminal justice system. Because discharge planning is conducted while an
individual is incarcerated, it is possible to avoid the problem of functional
siloing, since the point of service could remain within correctional facili-
ties.' 25 As a result, there need be no withdrawal or redistribution of federal
and state funds from these facilities, and consequently far less political fric-
tion than that which may arise in regard to proposals for diversion.
Although approximately 600,000 men and women are released from
prisons every year, many states do nothing in the way of providing discharge
planning services to assist mentally ill offenders with reintegration into so-
ciety, despite significant evidence showing that doing so reduces the risk of
recidivism. 126 The mentally ill, who face greater challenges in transitioning
from incarcerated life, are particularly susceptible.
127
While referrals to housing, employment and mental health services are
all extremely important to the mentally ill former inmate, it is the connection
with needed psychiatric services that is arguably the most important. How-
ever, almost thirty-five percent of prisons and jails do nothing to connect
mentally ill offenders with community-based treatment once they are re-
leased. 128 Mentally ill offenders are seldom released with a sufficient supply
of medication to carry them through until they procure community-based
services. 129 Furthermore, the quality of the referral services provided by
those facilities that do assist in linking mentally ill offenders with communi-
124. See Fellner, supra note 9, at 141.
125. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 194-96.
126. See id. at 192-93.
127. Id. at 192.
128. Id. at 192; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH
TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS, 2000, 5 (2001), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf.
129. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 4, at 192.
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ty-based treatment, as well as the number of referrals made annually, has
gone unreported. 3 ° Thus, there is no reliable data by which society may
evaluate the adequacy and the efficacy of the discharge planning services
that do exist.
The call for comprehensive discharge services by advocates and scho-
lars has recently begun to echo in the halls of our nation's courts. 3 ' In 2000,
fueled by anecdotal accounts describing how seriously mentally ill inmates
in New York were released from Riker's Island with nothing more than
$1.50 in cash and $3.00 in subway tokens, unable to procure the medication
needed to treat their conditions, the Supreme Court of New York ruled in
Brad H. v. City of New York132 that the state's prisons and jails must provide
adequate discharge planning. 33 Similarly, in Wakefield v. Thompson,'34 the
Ninth Circuit held under similar facts that California must provide to mental-
ly ill inmates on release a supply of psychotropic medication sufficient to
ensure that their treatment is not interrupted during the time reasonably ne-
cessary to procure a new source for that treatment. 35 Today, some states do,
as a matter of course, provide mentally ill prisoners with psychotropic medi-
cations when they are discharged.
36
But even mere discharge planning may not be enough. The fact that
correctional facilities provide mentally ill offenders with a short supply of
medication and a referral for mental health services does not mean that indi-
viduals are regularly capable of accessing those services. Without an in-
come, or some other means of paying for treatment, the mentally ill are left
walking a psychiatric tightrope, poised to fall, and with only a tattered safety
net.
IV. ACCESS TO MEDICAID BENEFITS AS A SOLUTION
Medicaid is a means-tested, public insurance program designed to
shoulder the costs of medical care for the nation's poorest and its disabled
citizens. 37 States are free to "opt out" of participation in Medicaid; however,
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., Brad H. v. City of New York, 712 N.Y.S.2d 336, 339-40 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
132. 712 N.Y.S.2d 336 (Sup Ct. 2000).
133. Id. at 339-40, 345.
134. 177 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 1999).
135. Id. at 1164.
136. Nebraska provides a two-week supply; Arkansas provides a one-week supply; and
both Virginia and North Carolina provide a one-month supply. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra
note 4, at 194-95.
137. Watson, The View from the Bottom, supra note 96, at 405-06; see 42 U.S.C. § 1396
(2006).
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if they choose to receive federal matching funds, state Medicaid programs
are required to cover a number of specific services. 138 In addition to this
mandatory coverage, states have the discretion to fund further "optional ser-
vices," as well as to increase eligibility. 139 Further, states may add other
home- and community-based services not outlined in the federal statute by
seeking a waiver from the Secretary of Health and Human Services, who
maintains broad approval authority. 4 ' And while levels of coverage vary
from state to state, every state offers comprehensive mental health care ser-
vices for those individuals with severe mental illnesses.
141
Those mentally ill offenders who are enrolled in Medicaid at the time of
their discharge from prison or jail are far more likely to be able to access
available community-based services. 142 Formerly incarcerated mentally ill
offenders receive far more outpatient care than their counterparts without
coverage, and their actual rate of using community-based mental health ser-
vices double. 143 Additionally, those with immediate Medicaid coverage upon
release access services far more quickly than those not enrolled in Medica-
id.' 44 They are less likely to be arrested or detained once enrolled, and more
likely to remain within their communities for more than one year. 45
A. The Effects of Incarceration on Medicaid Benefits
Many mentally ill prisoners may be, immediately prior to their incarce-
ration, eligible for Medicaid coverage. 146 This makes sense in light of the
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a.
139. Id.; Watson, The View from the Bottom, supra note 96, at 405.
140. Watson, The View from the Bottom, supra note 96, at 405 n. 12.
141. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE / MENTAL HEALTH CONSENSUS
PROJECT, 400 app. C (June 2002), available at http://consensusproject.org/downloads/
Entirereport.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, THE CONSENSUS PROJECT].
142. See generally JOSEPH P. MORRISSEY, MEDICAID BENEFITS AND RECIDIVISM OF
MENTALLY ILL PERSONS RELEASED FROM JAIL (2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles I/nij/grants/214169.pdf.
143. Id. at 13. This is based on a Washington State study showing that the average use of
outpatient health services by mentally ill offenders with Medicaid was forty-six days versus
the twenty-eight day average of those without Medicaid. Id. Further, ten percent of those
outpatient days were used for mental health care among Medicaid enrollees, while those with-
out Medicaid only sought mental health services five percent of the time. Id.
144. Joseph P. Morrissey et al., Medicaid Enrollment and Mental Health Service Use
Following Release of Jail Detainees with Severe Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES
809, 813-14 (2006).
145. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, How AND WHY MEDICAID MATTERS, supra note 65.
146. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, ENSURING TIMELY ACCESS TO MEDICAID AND SSIISSDI
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fact that homelessness, extreme poverty, and severe mental illness are so
closely linked. 147 But the fact that an individual is eligible for Medicaid cov-
erage does not necessarily mean that the individual is actually enrolled in
Medicaid. However, even to the extent that a significant number of mentally
ill offenders may be enrolled in Medicaid at the time of their incarceration,
far fewer complete their sentences with their enrollment intact.'48
Whether an inmate loses his or her Medicaid benefits while incarcerated
depends on the length of the incarceration, whether the individual's Medicaid
benefits are linked to Supplemental Security Income (SSI), whether the
state's Medicaid laws allow for suspended enrollment, and whether the indi-
vidual's Medicaid card is lost during the incarceration period. 49 Generally,
federal law mandates that states may not receive matching Medicaid funds
for medical services provided to qualified individuals during periods of in-
carceration.15° However, it does not require states to drop those otherwise
qualified individuals from the rolls for the mere fact of their incarceration.
151
Therefore, in principle, an individual who went into prison with a Medicaid
card need only have benefits suspended, and should be able to immediately
access those benefits upon his or her release.
5 2
Despite this, incarcerated Medicaid enrollees are, in reality, often im-
mediately dropped from Medicaid programs because: 1) federal guidelines
allow states to adopt more stringent policies than the federal government for
maintaining Medicaid eligibility; and 2) limitations to state information man-
agement infrastructure make it impossible for many states to keep track of
suspensions. 53 Thus, even though states are authorized to merely suspend
Medicaid benefits during incarceration, shortcomings in the state information
management technology make it far easier for the state to simply terminate
benefits entirely. 154 Things can even be more difficult for those inmates
whose Medicaid benefits are tied to SSI benefits: They always lose Medica-
Medicaid andSSISSDI forPeoplewith_Mental_IllnessReleased_from_PrisonFour_
StateCaseStudies.pdf [hereinafter COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, ENSURING TIMELY ACCESS].
147. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, THE CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 141, at 257.
148. Id. at 403.
149. Id.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(28)(A) (2006).
151. Social Security Act § 1905(a)(28)(A) (2009).
152. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, THE CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 14 1, at 403.
153. Id.; PATRICIA A. GRIFFIN ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., MAINTAINING MEDICAID BENEFITS FOR JAIL DETAINEES WITH CO-OCCURRING MENTAL
HEALTH AND SUBSTANCE USE DISORDERS, I (Summer 1999/Revised Spring 2002), available
at http://gainscenter.samhsa.gov/pdfs/integratingMaintaining-Medicaid_02.pdf.
154. See COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, THE CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 141, at 403.
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id coverage if their SSI eligibility is terminated, and almost always do if it is
suspended.155
If, during an incarceration, an individual loses Medicaid coverage for
any reason, the reapplication process can take months to complete. 56 Fur-
ther, that individual may have to "jump through many administrative hoops"
before Medicaid coverage is reinstated. 157 That is because the application
process itself is "bewildering even for people who are not dealing with men-
tal illness and the upheaval of having recently left jail or prison.' 58 For ex-
ample, one description of the application process in New York City explains:
For example, to apply for Public Assistance, Food Stamps and
Medicaid, an applicant must first figure out which Income Support
Center to go to. The closest Income Support Center is not neces-
sarily the right one; Income Support Centers are down-sizing and
merging, and Income Support Centers' overworked staff some-
times tell new applicants that the Center is not taking any more
applications. Once the appropriate center is located, the applicant
must arrive before 9 a.m., complete a complicated application
form, present identification and documentation of rent expenses
and/or lack of cooking facilities, and be interviewed by a case-
worker.
The applicant will then be directed to the Eligibility Verifica-
tion Review office in Brooklyn Heights for a painstaking interview
intended to detect fraud. Then, Eligibility Verification Review
will send the Front End Detection System workers, who carry
badges and announce themselves as "the FEDS," to visit the appli-
cant's house and verify residence. If, after three visits, the FEDS
have not found the applicant at home, the case will be closed.
159
This stressful set of events, and the inherent delay between the applica-
tion for and the conferral of benefits, prevents recently released mentally ill
offenders from tending to their most basic needs, or accessing psychiatric
care other than emergency room services."6  Without access to needed
treatment, or the stability of knowing where he or she will be eating and
sleeping, these individuals run the risk of undoing "any stabilization the in-
155. Id. States are not required to terminate the Medicaid eligibility of individuals whose
SSI eligibility is merely suspended, but they almost always do. Id.
156. See BARR, supra note 8, at 35.
157. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS, THE CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 141, at 404.
158. BARR, supra note 8, at 34.
159. Id. at 34-35.
160. GRIFFIN ETAL., supra note 153, at 1.
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dividual gained while in jail, placing the individual at risk of... return[ing]
to the criminal justice system."' 16'
B. Pre-Release Enrollment in SSI as a Means of Ensuring a Continuum of
Care
To reiterate, there is compelling evidence suggesting that the revolving
door cycle of the arrest, release, and re-arrest of severely mentally ill offend-
ers can be meaningfully addressed through the provision of comprehensive
discharge planning. Discharge planning can be an incredibly powerful tool
in combating recidivism within this population, by linking mentally ill in-
mates with the housing, employment, and necessary medical services that are
instrumental in the reintegration of these individuals into society. And
though social insurance benefits make access to care far more likely, former
inmates very seldom receive timely enrollment. 62 As shown, access to Me-
dicaid is often frustrated by state policies that create lengthy delays in the
application process, and that generally favor termination versus suspension
of Medicaid eligibility during periods of incarceration.1 63 Further, because
states overwhelmingly deny initial determinations of eligibility to those who
are incarcerated, it can be very difficult for the mentally ill offender to pro-
cure needed medical care for months following release.16' The inaccessible
nature of public benefits is perhaps best illustrated in regard to mentally ill
offenders incarcerated in prisons, because their longer periods of incarcera-
tion are more likely to disrupt Medicaid and other social benefits.
1 65
Although the provision of housing has itself proven effective in increas-
ing the likelihood of successful community reentry among those with psy-
chiatric disabilities, 66 referrals to prospective living arrangements and em-
ployers may mean nothing to those who experience severe mental illness and
are incapable of paying for the psychiatric care and medication they need to
maintain stability. Similarly, medical coverage is little to the person who is
unsure where he or she will live, or where his or her next meal will come
from. Consequently, it is imperative that mentally ill prisoners be given





165. See BARR, supra note 8, at 34.
166. See Sam Tsemberis et al., Housing First, Consumer Choice, and Harm Reduction for
Homeless Individuals with a Dual Diagnosis, 94 AMER. J. PUB. HEALTH 651, 654-55 (Apr.
2004) (concluding that access to stable housing may positively influence successful communi-
ty reentry for individuals experiencing mental illness and substance abuse disorders).
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also to the funds necessary to procure housing, food, and other essentials.
This is especially true for those mentally ill offenders serving prison sen-
tences-arguably, their longer sentences are the result of more severe of-
fenses or a higher frequency of violating criminal statutes. Luckily, this can
be accomplished in most states by the pre-release enrollment of mentally ill
prisoners in SSI.
SSI is a federal program designed to provide a "minimum level of in-
come" to the nation's elderly and disabled "who do not have sufficient in-
come and resources to maintain a standard of living at the established Feder-
al minimum income level."'167 Consequently, to obtain benefits, applicants
must show that they: (1) meet the income requirement; and are, (2) disabled,
(3) blind, or (4) over sixty-five years old. 168 The significance of this program
is that, in addition to monthly financial support, SSI eligibility also confers
immediate Medicaid eligibility in most states. 169 This is because the Social
Security Act allows states the attractive opportunity to authorize SSA to
make Medicaid eligibility determinations in tandem with SSI determinations,
which has the effect of reducing state administrative costs. 70 But, as a gen-
eral matter, residents of "public institutions," including prisons, are presump-
tively ineligible for SSI. 171 As a result, benefits are suspended for periods of
incarceration lasting more than one month,'72 and are terminated when the
period of incarceration lasts for one year or more.
173
However, in a 1995 amendment to the Social Security Act, Congress
charged the Social Security Administration (SSA) with "develop[ing] a sys-
tem under which an individual can apply for supplemental security income
benefits ... prior to the discharge or release of the individual from a public
institution.' 74 SSA implemented just such a system, amending its own Pro-
gram Operations Manual System (POMS) in 1996 to allow correctional insti-
167. 20C.F.R. § 416.110(2009).
168. Id.
169. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'Ts, THE CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 141, at 400. Pur-
suant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.2101, states may confer on SSA the ability to make Medicaid eligi-
bility determinations based on the application for SSI. 20 C.F.R. § 416.2101 (2009); see
COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, THE CONSENSUS PROJECT, supra note 141, at 400. Nearly all
states grant SSA that authority, and thus grant immediate enrollment in Medicaid to those
individuals who are deemed SSI-eligible. Id. The states that do not are: "Connecticut, Ha-
waii, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma
and Virginia." Id. at n.3.
170. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.2101.
171. 20 C.F.R. § 416.211.
172. 20C.F.R. § 416.1325.
173. 20C.F.R. §416.1335.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(m) (2006).
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tutions to enter into prerelease agreements with the agency. 17' As a result,
despite the presumptive ineligibility that exists for the incarcerated, other-
wise qualified individuals who are residents of public institutions may now
apply for SSI months in advance of his or her prospective release date,176 so
long as the individual: (1) "appear[s] likely to meet the criteria for SSI eligi-
bility when [he or she is] released from the institution;" and, (2) "may poten-
tially be released within 30 days after notification of potential SSI eligibili-
ty.' 77 However, because SSA also instituted a policy of accepting all "ap-
plication[s] under the prerelease procedure without regard to whether an
agreement exists with the institution,"1 78 such agreements may not be the
most fundamental component of an effective prerelease enrollment plan.
Although it is doubtless that they do, and will continue to, play an important
part in the prerelease enrolment process, it may be that the most important
piece of these programs is that eligible prisoners be provided access to both
the necessary paperwork and to the assistance they need to make a complete
submission.
If, through these prerelease procedures, eligibility is determined prior to
release, SSI benefits are suspended until the date of the prisoner's reentry. 79
And, since benefits are immediately payable to individuals whose eligibility
has merely been suspended, and not terminated, it is possible for mentally ill
offenders to walk out of prison and into benefits. 80 In states that confer im-
mediate medical eligibility in tandem with SSI eligibility, or that allow a
simplified Medicaid application process for those who are SSI-eligible, this
can mean immediate access to the funds necessary to pay for basic needs,
and the medical coverage necessary to create a continuum of care.
Additionally, it makes logistical sense for prisons to deliver this service
to mentally ill prisoners. Because prisons are charged with the treatment of
the mentally ill prisoners that are incarcerated there, they ostensibly have on
hand the very medical information used as evidence in state and federal de-
terminations of disability. Ostensibly, through the provision of treatment, the
prison's medical personnel will have become familiar with the applicant.
175. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM (POMS)
§ S1 00520.900 (2009).
176. Id. § SI 00520.900(A).
177. Id. § SI 00520.900(B).
178. Id. § 00520.900(C)(1).
179. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1325 (2009).
180. See id.
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And, because the full application is relatively short, and can for the most part
be completed online, it does not consume an inordinate amount of time.'18
Prerelease enrollment in SSI and Medicaid has, over the years, increa-
singly become an integral part of the plans promoted by mental health advo-
cacy groups seeking to address the revolving door problem of mental illness
in the criminal justice system. 182 For example, the Judge David L. Bazelon,
Center for Mental Health Law, has drafted a model act in which the provi-
sion of prerelease enrollment services plays the central figure.183 And this
focus on prerelease planning is beginning to pay off. Now, almost half of the
states have in place programs for assisting prisoners with establishing or
reinstating social entitlements and other benefits for which they are eligi-
ble."'
However, it remains troubling that more than half of the states do not
assist mentally ill prisoners in accessing the benefits they need to remain
stable, successful members of communities when they are released from in-
carceration. 85 In order to close the revolving door for good, the states must
be willing to implement policies that favor suspension of Medicaid eligibility
during periods of incarceration as opposed to termination. 86 To be success-
ful, these policies must also mandate that prisons implement programs for
assisting eligible mentally ill offenders in applying for SSI in time to receive
those benefits upon release. Furthermore, states must grant SSA the authori-
ty to make Medicaid eligibility determinations in tandem with SSI determi-
nations. But, arguably most importantly, the states must implement perfor-
mance measures designed to determine to what extent prisons are successful-
ly enrolling eligible mentally ill offenders in these programs.
To be successful, states will have to acquire the universal buy-in of all
stakeholders, necessitating the fostering of communication between various
state agencies, and the encouragement of agreements between those depart-
181. The application is filled out online, and consists of short answer questions. See So-
cial Security Online, Apply for Disability Benefits, http://www.ssa.gov/applyfordisability/
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
182. See BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, BUILDING BRIDGES: AN ACT TO
REDUCE RECIDIVISM BY IMPROVING ACCESS TO BENEFITS FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH PSYCHIATRIC
DISABILITIES UPON RELEASE FROM INCARCERATION, 1 (2002), available at http://www.bazelon.
org/issues/criminalization/publications/buildingbridges/BuildingBridges.pdf [hereinafter BAZ-
ELON CTR., Building Bridges].
183. See id. at 1-2.
184. NANCY LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST., RELEASE PLANNING FOR A SUCCESSFUL
REENTRY: A GUIDE FOR CORRECTIONS, SERVICES PROVIDERS, AND COMMUNITY GROUPS app. C
(2008), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411767_successful-reentry.pdf.
185. Id.
186. BAZELON CTR., BUILDING BRIDGES, supra note 182, at 15.
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ments to promote administrative efficiency. 187 This could be best accom-
plished through the creation of a central agency to coordinate the state's ef-
forts, and by restructuring informational technology infrastructures as neces-
sary to allow greater ease of interagency data sharing.188
Recent legislation introduced to the United States House of Representa-
tives seeks to encourage states to adopt policies favoring Medicaid suspen-
sion over termination for those inmates incarcerated for periods of one year
or more. 89 The Recidivism Reduction Act, introduced in June 2009, would
require the provision of Social Security benefits for those individuals who
file a Request for Reinstatement and were "eligible . . . on the basis of disa-
bility" but were thereafter "ineligible for such benefits because the individual
was an inmate of a jail, prison, penal institution, or correctional facility for a
period of 12 or more consecutive months."'19 Further, the Act would ensure
that those former prisoners who were enrolled in Medicaid prior to their in-
carceration, but whose coverage was suspended as a result of their incarcera-
tion, would have coverage "reinstated upon release. . . unless and until there
is a determination that the individual is no longer eligible to be so
enrolled."'19' Finally, the Act, by pledging to increase federal matching rates
over the course of one year for those states who update their information
technology systems so that they are capable of administering a reinstatement
program, would incentivize the institution of benefits suspension policies. 192
While the revision of state correctional health policy as it relates to
those with mental illnesses will undoubtedly present a significant up-front
cost to government in the form of Medicaid expansion, it must be noted that
those funds may present an incredibly wise long-term investment. For years,
scholars have attempted to solve the puzzle of cost-effectiveness in health
care, including the provision of mental health services in communities rather
than in prisons. 193 Studies have shown, though, that locating psychiatric
treatment in communities rather than in prisons has a positive increase on
cost-effectiveness. 194 States may, therefore, rightly consider it a prudent fis-
cal move.
187. See COUNCIL OF STATE GoV'TS, ENSURING TIMELY ACCESS, supra note 146.
188. See id.
189. See Recidivism Reduction Act, H.R. 2829, 111 th Cong. § 2(5)-(8) (2009).
190. H.R. 2829 § 3(a)(ii)(1)(aa)-(bb).
191. H.R. 2829 § 5(a)(1).
192. H.R. 2829 § 5(a)(2).
193. See Embry M. Howell et al., What Is Known About the Cost-Effectiveness of Health
Services for Returning Prisoners?, 10 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 399 (2004).
194. Id. at411.
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V. CONCLUSION
Although diversion and comprehensive discharge planning are neces-
sary components of a new mental health policy, they are not alone sufficient
to carry the day. Instead, policy makers must focus on the reason why many
of the severely mentally ill recidivate in the first place: the unavailability of
the funds and medical coverage necessary to remain stabilized after they
have been released from incarceration. Programs diverting mentally ill of-
fenders into community-based programs mean nothing to the patient who
cannot pay. Similarly, while discharge planning may assist with housing,
employment, and may net a referral to an outpatient treatment facility, it does
nothing to ensure that the mentally ill offender is able to afford the medica-
tion and treatment he or she needs to maintain psychiatric stability.
The starting point in the creation of a uniform correctional mental
health policy is the enactment of legislation ensuring timely access to Medi-
caid and other public benefits for mentally ill offenders. This can, in most
states, be accomplished through the pre-release enrollment of mentally ill
offenders in SSI, which generally carries with it a presumption of Medicaid
eligibility. This is especially important for those mentally ill offenders living
in state prisons, who arguably warrant particular consideration, since they
have arguably committed a greater number of offenses which are likely more
serious in nature than those held in jails.
To succeed, states must necessarily procure the buy-in of all stakehold-
ers. And while the resultant broadening of state mental health policies would
require an up-front fiscal investment, that investment is likely sound consi-
dering the cost-effectiveness of community, as opposed to correctional,
health care. In the end, unless Medicaid, or other safety net programs, are
made immediately available to seriously mentally ill offenders, they will
continue to cycle in and out of the criminal justice system, presenting not
only a self-perpetuating monetary cost to taxpayers, but also an immeasura-
ble human cost to society.
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Joe Druggie" visits Pain Clinic X complaining of minor back pain.' A
prescription is written. Within minutes, he arrives at Pain Clinic Y with the
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same "pain" complaints. Another prescription is issued. After filling the
two prescriptions at different pharmacies, he walks into Pain Clinic Z, which
is owned by a non-doctor with a criminal record, and receives an on-site dis-
tribution of pain medication. Can this type of "doctor shopping" happen in
Florida? For now, yes.2 However, strict enforcement of new legislation may
help control such widespread "doctor shopping" in Florida.3
On June 18, 2009, a hopeful Charlie Crist, Governor of Florida, signed
legislation designed to halt the rising problem of prescription drug abuse in
the State of Florida. 4 Section 893.055 of the Florida Statutes -Prescription
Drug Monitoring Program-requires the Department of Health to design and
implement a comprehensive state-wide electronic database system "to pre-
vent the inadvertent, improper, or illegal use of controlled substances." 5 Af-
ter a decade of increasing prescription drug misuse and abuse, Florida be-
came the thirty-ninth state to implement such a system.
6
Providing a general analysis of section 893.055 of the Florida Statutes,
this article will trace the rise of prescription drug abuse in Florida and give
insight into Florida's fight against this problem. Part II of this article will
begin by familiarizing the reader with a background of prescription drug
abuse, and introducing the specific prescription drug diversion methods of
doctor shopping and pill mills. Part II will then address how Florida, in par-
1. See R. Kenneth Bluh, Prescription Drug Registry Brings Florida into 21st Century,
SOUTH MIAMI NEWS, Jan. 12, 2010, at 6, available at http://www.communitynewspapers.com/
html/index.php?option=com-wrapper&ltemid=1552.
2. Id.
3. See Act effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-198, 2009 Fla. Laws 1978, 1978 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 893.055 (2009)); Bluh, supra note 1.
4. See FLA. STAT. § 893.055 (2009); see also Bob LaMendola, Governor Signs Law to
Rein in Pain Clinics-New Database Aims to Curb Pill Shopping, SUN-SENTINEL, June 19,
2009, at IA [hereinafter LaMendola, Governor Signs Law]. Codified as section 893.055 of
the Florida Statutes, Senate Bill 462-Prescription Drug Monitoring Program-declares:
WHEREAS, while the importance and necessity of the proper prescribing, dispensing,
and monitoring of controlled substances, particularly pain medication, have been established,
controlled prescription drugs are too often diverted in this state, often through fraudulent
means, including outright theft, phony pharmacy fronts, loose Internet medical evaluations,
and inappropriate importation; in addition, there is a criminal element that facilitates the pre-
scription drug abuse epidemic through illegal profitmaking from the diversion of certain con-
trolled substances that are prescribed or dispensed by physicians, health care practitioners, and
pharmacists ....
Ch. 2009-198, 2009 Fla. Laws at 1980.
5. Fla. S. Comm. on Controlled Substances/Prescription Monitoring, CS for SB 462
(2009) Staff Analysis I (Mar. 6, 2009), available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/
2009/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/2009s0462.hr.pdf [hereinafter CS for SB 462 Staff Analysis].
As "part of a prescription drug validation program," the system will contain data regarding
controlled substance prescriptions provided to it by pharmacies and dispensers. Id.
6. See LaMendola, Governor Signs Law, supra note 4.
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ticular, contributes substantially to the dismal statistics of prescription drug
abuse. By the end of Part H, this article will illustrate why strong measures
need to be implemented to regulate prescription drug abuse in Florida. Then,
Part III will introduce the reader to the legislative history and enactment of
section 893.055. Specifically, the article will discuss the purpose and com-
ponents of the new legislation designed to combat the prescription drug war.
Part 1V of this article will then view section 893.055 from critics' perspec-
tives, including alternative measures and possible downsides to the new leg-
islation. Part V of this article will discuss what the future holds for those
affected by section 893.055. Finally, Part VI will conclude the analysis of
section 893.055.
H. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Prescription Drug Abuse
According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse, the Nation's rising
drug problem lies not merely in the use of illegal substances, but even more
so in the illegal misuse and abuse of legal prescription drugs for nonmedical
use.7 According to a 2008 drug report from the Florida Medical Examiners
Commission, lethal amounts of prescription drugs are found in deceased per-
sons more often than illicit drugs.8 Although managing pain through narcot-
ics is a legal medical practice and can be done responsibly,9 excessive use of
prescription drugs alters brain activity, leading to abuse, addiction and de-
pendence.'0 The National Institute on Drug Abuse lists the three most com-
monly abused classes of prescription drugs: opioids, central nervous system
depressants, and stimulants. 1 More commonly referred to by their "street
names," these drugs include OxyContin, Vicodin, Demorol, Valium, Xanax,
7. See NAT'L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
RESEARCH REPORT SERIES: PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: ABUSE AND ADDICTION 1 (2005), available
at http://www.drugabuse.gov/ResearchReports/Prescription/Prescription.htm [hereinafter
NIDA]; see also Prescription Drugs: State Monitoring Programs May Help to Reduce Illegal
Diversion: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th
Cong. 1 (2004) (Statement of Marcia Crosse, Director, Public Health and Military Health Care
Issues) [hereinafter Prescription Drugs Hearing].
8. MED. EXAM'RS COMM'N, FLA. DEP'T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, DRUGS IDENTIFIED IN
DECEASED PERSONS 2008 REPORT ii (2009), available at http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/
getdoc/a37959db-85e0-42f9-b6d6-cdef532f22f8/2008DrugReport.aspx.
9. See NIDA, supra note 7, at 1; see also Scott Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills,
MI, I HERALD, Apr. 5, 2009, at I A [hereinafter Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills].
10. NIDA, supra note 7, at 1.
11. Id.
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and Ritalin.12 Long-term abuse of opioids, typically prescribed to manage
pain, and depressants, prescribed to treat anxiety and sleep disorders, leads to
physical dependence and addiction. 13 Similarly, high doses of stimulants
may lead to compulsive use, paranoia, "dangerously high body temperature,
and an irregular heartbeat."'
14
A recent survey from the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services
Administration indicates that "7.0 million . . . persons aged 12 or older...
used prescription-type psychotherapeutic drugs nonmedically in the past
month."'15 Nonmedical use is defined by the Substance Abuse and Health
Services Administration to mean "the use of prescription-type drugs not pre-
scribed for the respondent by a physician or used only for the experience or
feeling they caused."' 6 Second only to marijuana use, nonmedical prescrip-
tion drug use is one of the most common forms of drug abuse in the United
States. 17 With percentages of the population using such prescription drugs
for nonmedical purposes starting at a low of 2.48% in the District of Colum-
bia, that number climbs to 7.92% in Florida. 8
Aside from the staggering number of prescription drug abusers, the
amount of deaths from the misuse and overuse of these drugs is quickly be-
coming equally astounding, particularly in Florida. 9 Experts note a "107
percent jump in oxycodone deaths [in Florida] in two years."20 According to
the Florida Medical Examiners Commission, "Some traces of oxycodone
were found in 1253 overdoses in 2007. Oxycodone-related overdoses con-
tinued to climb in ... 2008. ''2I With deaths from prescription drugs averag-
ing about 8.6 deaths per day, prescription drug abuse has become a grave
problem.22
12. See id. at 2-4.
13. See id.
14. Id. at4.
15. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Controlled Substances, CS for HB 897 (2009) Staff Analysis 4
(Apr. 21, 2009), available at http://www.flsenate.govldatalsessionl2009/Houselbillsl
analysis/pdf/h0897f.CGHC.pdf [hereinafter CS for HB 897 Staff Analysis]; see also OFFcE
OF APPLIED STUDIES, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., THE NSDUH REPORT: NONMEDICAL USE OF PAIN RELIEVERS IN
SUBSTANCE REGIONS: 2004 TO 2006 (June 19, 2008) [hereinafter NSDUH REPORT].
16. NSDUH REPORT, supra note 15.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills, supra note 9.
20. Id. George Hime, the Assistant Director of Toxicology for the Miami-Dade County
Medical Examiner's Office called the rate of overdoses "incredible" and warned, "It is the
new epidemic of drug abuse." Id.
21. Id.
22. See CS for HB 897 Staff Analysis, supra note 15, at 5.
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What is the reason for this increasing "diversion of prescription drugs
for illegal purposes or abuse"? 23 According to Dr. Nora D. Volkow, the Di-
rector of the National Institute on Drug Abuse, "[A]ccessibility [to prescrip-
tion drugs] is likely a contributing factor." 24 While prescription drug diver-
sion activities can come in many forms, the two most common sources of the
problem are doctor shopping and pill mills.
25
I. Doctor Shopping
Through a method known as doctor shopping, drug users continuously
switch physicians, obtaining excessive amounts of prescription drugs. 26 Af-
ter obtaining the prescription drugs, doctor shoppers either take the medica-
tion themselves or sell the pills for a lucrative profit.2  Doctor shoppers
sometimes start out with legitimate medical needs, but become dependent on
the drugs, thereby seeking more and more drugs to feed their addiction.28
Other doctor shoppers may fraudulently obtain prescription drugs for non-
medical recreational use.29 In doing so, the drug seekers use forged medical
records, fake test results, or fake identification to justify their needs for pre-
scriptions.3° Finally, the purely profit-driven doctor shoppers may obtain
prescriptions only to turn around and sell them to other drug users for a high-
er price.31 Regardless of the motive, without a record of the prescriptions,
prescribing doctors or pharmacists may be unaware of the patient's addition-
al active prescriptions.32 Thus, addicts and drug dealers posing as patients
with legitimate medical needs are able to take advantage of the system.33
23. Prescription Drugs Hearing, supra note 7, at I.
24. NIDA, supra note 7, at I (emphasis added).
25. See CS for HB 897 Staff Analysis, supra note 15, at 3.
26. Id. According to the United States General Accounting Office, "[d]iversion activities
can include 'doctor shopping' by individuals who visit numerous physicians to obtain multiple
prescriptions, illegal sales of prescription drugs by physicians or pharmacists, prescription
forgery, and purchasing drugs from Internet pharmacies without valid prescriptions." Pre-
scription Drugs Hearing, supra note 7, at 1.
27. See Vanessa Blum, These 'Tourists' Seek Pain Drugs, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 4,
2006, at B7. Prescription pills like oxycodone can sell for "almost 10 times what they cost at
a pharmacy." Id.
28. See CS for HB 897 Staff Analysis, supra note 15, at 3.
29. Id. at 3-4.
30. Scott Hiaasen, Pills from S. Fla. Flood Appalachian States, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6,
2009, at IA [hereinafter Hiaasen, Appalachian States].
31. Id.
32. See CS for HB 897 Staff Analysis, supra note 15, at 3.
33. See id.
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2. Pill Mills
Adding to the Black Market sale of illegal prescription drugs are pain
clinics that deal out prescriptions without thoroughly examining patients.' 4
At these pill mills, doctors-"dispensing practitioners"-have special au-
thority to dispense the controlled substances directly to the patients, without
any pharmacist intervention. 35 Describing a typical "pill mill," investigators
say that many are now "disguised as independent pain-management cen-
ters. 36 Furthermore, certain "signs" make pill mills distinguishable: cash
only, no physical exams, treatment with pills only from "their" pharmacy,
and huge crowds of people waiting to be seen.37
As an example, in Deonarine v. State,38 the defendant, a physician, was
convicted of drug trafficking in a controlled substance after evidence re-
vealed that he wrote multiple prescriptions for controlled substances in bad
faith.39 Following the death of one of the defendant's patients from a drug
overdose, suspicious law enforcement officials reviewed the pharmacy and
medical records of the patient and began investigating the defendant.4" One
patient's testimony revealed that the defendant "did not review her general
medical history, . . . did not inquire about her limitations in activity, and did
not discuss alternatives to pain medication."'" Subsequently, after severing
the doctor-patient relationship with the patient, the defendant continued to
write regular prescriptions for the patient, even increasing the patient's pre-
scription doses.42 Furthermore, evidence showed that the defendant was
aware that the patient "was using multiple pharmacies to fill the prescrip-
tions. 43 This incident, which occurred in South Florida, reveals the "dan-
gers of prescription drug abuse." 44 Furthermore, although Deonarine exem-
plifies Florida's awareness and efforts to restrain prescription drug abuse,45
how successful are these measures in curbing such illegal activity?
34. Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills, supra note 9 (discussing how investigators
predict many of these pill mills "feed narcotics to 65 patients a day or more").
35. Id.
36. What's a Pill Mill?, http://www.cbsnews.com/blogs/2007/05/31/primarysource/entry
2872835.shtml (May 31, 2007).
37. Id.
38. 967 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
39. Id. at 335-36.
40. Id. at 334.
41. Id. at 335.
42. Id.
43. Deonarine, 967 So. 2d at 335.
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B. Florida: A Magnet for Doctor Shoppers and Pill Mills
1. Intrastate Problem
While abuse of prescription drugs is a nationwide problem, the Drug
Enforcement Administration specifically notes the high concentration of
doctor shopping and pill mills in Florida.46 The Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration estimates that in the past year, the number of pain clinics in Florida-
South Florida in particular-has skyrocketed from 60 to 150.47 Furthermore,
within six months in 2008, Broward County doctors dispensed upwards of
6.5 million oxycodone pills, which equals roughly "four pills for every Bro-
ward resident. '48 According to additional data from the Drug Enforcement
Administration, Florida distributes more oxycodone than any other state.49
Mark Trouville, a Drug Enforcement Administration special agent, discussed
how just forty-five doctors in South Florida dispensed about nine million
oxycodone pills in six months. 50 Dr. Charles Grudem, a board member of
the Florida Society of Interventional Pain Physicians, calls this behavior
"[t]otally suspicious."'"
Furthermore, prescription drug overdoses in Florida alone climbed from
2780 in 2006, to 3317 in 2007, to about 4000 in 2008.2 According to ex-
perts, "[T]he growth in unscrupulous pain clinics is contributing to a rise in
prescription drug overdoses. 53  Furthermore, police reported that over
"4,000 Floridians died from prescription drug overdoses last year, about 11 a
day, up by 20 percent over the year before.
54
2. Interstate Problem
Florida pill mills and doctor shopping do not stop at state borders.5 5 Ra-
ther, "travelers come [to Florida] by the thousands, narcotics investigators
46. What's a Pill Mill?, supra note 36.
47. Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills, supra note 9. With Broward County alone
having eighty-nine pain clinics, Hollywood Police Captain, David Siegel, stated, "Broward




51. Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills, supra note 9.
52. Bob LaMendola, Profiting from Pain: Clinics Face Scrutiny, SUN-SENTINEL, Apr. 7,
2009, at I A [hereinafter LaMendola, Profiting from Pain].
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Hiaasen, Appalachian States, supra note 30. Rick Zenuch, an agent with the
Florida Department of Law Enforcement, stated, "We've seen people coming from all over
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say, from Kentucky, Ohio, West Virginia, Massachusetts and other states"
5 6
because of Florida's "lax oversight of prescription drugs."57 This "'drug run'
phenomenon in South Florida ' 58 contributes to the "startling rise in prescrip-
tion-drug overdose deaths in Florida, including [the] 107 percent jump in
oxycodone deaths in two years. 59
In April 2009, a sting operation dubbed "Operation Pill Crusher," in-
volving both state police and officers from the Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration, resulted in the arrest of two dozen alleged drug dealers who traveled
from Kentucky to Florida to obtain prescription drugs from Florida's pill
mills.' Charged with "trafficking in a controlled substance," these individu-
als are only a handful of the thousands of Kentuckians suspected of travel-
ling to South Florida to obtain prescription drugs.6'
A recent Miami Herald article reported that "Dr. Roger Browne was
once one of Kentucky's most popular pain doctors. 62 No startling fact-
however-until one considers that Dr. Browne's office was over eight hun-
dred miles away from Kentucky. 63 In fact, Dr. Browne's pain clinic, Ameri-
care Health and Rehabilitation, was located in Coral Springs, Florida.64 Dr.
Browne's pain clinic is just one of the many Florida pain clinics that has
become popular with out-of-state patients.65 For instance, some Florida pain
clinics post signs boasting such obvious tip-offs as "Out of State Patients
Welcome" and "No Wait for Walk-Ins. 66 These pill mills lure drug seekers
with promises of on-site drug dispensing, "with coupons and discounts ad-
vertised in the back pages of alternative weekly newspapers, or on bus
benches and billboards," and even with gasoline vouchers for travelers.67
With such sales tactics as these, it is no wonder why out-of-state drug seek-
ers and addicts travel across the country to obtain prescription drugs from
Florida pain clinics.
the Southeast United States .... The fact is, illicit-drug traffickers don't see state lines as any
boundary." Blum, supra note 27.
56. Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills, supra note 9.
57. Blum, supra note 27. Furthermore, "[t]he unwanted tourism alarms state officials
who have watched deaths from prescription pain medication skyrocket in recent years." Id.
58. Id.
59. Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills, supra note 9.
60. Valarie Honeycutt Spears, 24 Drug Arrests in Interstate Sting, MIAMi HERALD, Apr.
16, 2009, at 1A [hereinafter Honeycut Spears, 24 Drug Arrests in Interstate Sting].
61. Id.
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C. The Need for Regulation
With the rampant spread of prescription drug abuse, many states have
implemented strict monitoring programs or criminal punishments for doctor
shoppers and pill mill participants.68 Concerned not just with the overdosing
of particular prescription drugs, experts are also worried about the dangerous
effects of combining different prescription drugs, such as Methadone, Xanax,
Valium, and Oxycodone. 69 The improper dispensing, misuse, or diversion of
prescription drugs can be deadly, especially when a pharmacist or practition-
er is unaware of a patient's prescription drug medication history.7°
1. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs
Although prescription drug abuse and deaths have become a major
problem in Florida, until recently, Florida lacked a prescription drug moni-
toring program.7 Sergeant Lisa McElhaney of the Broward Sheriff's Office
commented, "We are source-supplying many other states. This is literally
embarrassing. 72 The [Florida] system has enabled this. 73 Before June of
2009, Florida was one of only twelve states that lacked a database to regulate
prescription drugs.74 Many individuals postulate that the reason drug dealers
are making thousands of dollars for each trip to Florida is because Florida
lacks a tracking system.75 Representative Kelly Skidmore of Boca Raton,
Florida, one of the co-sponsors of a proposed drug monitoring bill, com-
mented, "Shame on us for letting it get this far. . . . We don't want every
other state to view Florida as the pharmacy for illegal pain medications. 76
Additionally, prescription drug abuse and "diversion hurts [Florida] signifi-
cantly in terms of lost lives, increased crime, human misery from addiction,
68. See Prescription Drugs Hearing, supra note 7, at 1-2.
69. See generally NIDA, supra note 7 (discussing how certain prescription drugs should
not be mixed).
70. See Act effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-198, 2009 Fla. Laws 1978, 1980-81 (codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. § 893.055 (2009)).
71. See LaMendola, Governor Signs Law, supra note 4.
72. Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills, supra note 9. Without a system to detect and
control prescription drug abuse, regulators and police have insufficient resources to control the
drug problem. See id.
73. Id.
74. LaMendola, Profiting from Pain, supra note 52.
75. Hiaasen, Inside Broward's Pill Mills, supra note 9.
76. Id.
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and ballooning health care costs connected to treatment, medical expenses,
and Medicaid fraud that all Floridians ultimately bear.
77
In the thirty-eight other states that have enacted prescription-drug-
monitoring programs, prescription data is electronically monitored and avail-
able for review and analysis for educational, public health, and investigation-
al purposes.78 While each state's systems enact slightly different rules and
procedures, the drug-monitoring programs' "primary goal[s] [are] to identify
forged prescriptions and to expose so-called doctor shoppers who visit mul-
tiple physicians and pharmacies seeking drugs ... [by requiring] doctors to
submit [prescription] information ... to a centralized database. 79
2. How Florida Measures Up
Chapter 893 of Florida Statutes, the Florida Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, classifies controlled substances "into five
schedules in order to regulate the manufacture, distribution, preparation, and
dispensing of the substances. ''80 Section 893.04, pertaining to pharmacists,
authorizes pharmacists "in good faith and in the course of professional prac-
tice only, [to] dispense controlled substances upon a written or oral prescrip-
tion of a practitioner" under specified conditions." Furthermore, prescrip-
tions for controlled substances must include the date, signature of the pre-
scribing practitioner, and other relevant information about the patient and the
prescription.82 A similar section, section 893.05, pertaining to practitioners,
allows such practitioners "in good faith and in the course of his or her pro-
fessional practice only, [to] prescribe, administer, dispense, mix, or other-
wise prepare a controlled substance. '"83
77. Act Effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-198, 2009 Fla. Laws 1978, 1980 (codified at
FLA. STAT. §893.055 (2009)).
78. See Blum, supra note 27. For example, Kentucky, after a history of prescription drug
abuse, created KASPER-Kentucky All Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting-a sys-
tem that tracks those who are prescribing, dispensing and obtaining the pills. Valarie Honey-
cutt, Virginia Hacker Might Affect Fla. Bill for Prescription Tracking, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, May 22, 2009, http://www.kentucky.comllatest-news/v-print/story/804054.html.
79. Blum, supra note 27.
80. CS for HB 897 Staff Analysis, supra note 15, at 2.
81. FLA. STAT. § 893.04(1) (2009).
82. Id. § 893.04(l)(a)-(b). Such information includes the name and address of the pa-
tient, the name and address of the prescribing practitioner, the name, strength, quantity, and
directions for use of the controlled substance, and the number of the prescription. Id. §
893.04(1)(c)1-6.
83. Id. § 893.05(1).
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Furthermore, Chapter 893 specifically targets doctor shoppers in section
893.13.' 4 For instance, section 893.13(7)(a)8 declares it unlawful for any
person:
[tlo withhold information from a practitioner from whom the per-
son seeks to obtain a controlled substance or a prescription for a
controlled substance that the person making the request has re-
ceived a controlled substance or a prescription for a controlled
substance of like therapeutic use from another practitioner within
the previous 30 days.
85
In Limbaugh v. State,86 a widely recognized talk show host, Rush Lim-
baugh, was put under investigation for violating Florida's "doctor shopping"
statute.7 Police received information that individuals "had sold [Limbaugh]
'large quantities' of Hydrocodone and Oxycontin 'over the course of many
years."' 88 Police investigations then revealed that Limbaugh had received
controlled substance prescriptions "from four different physicians within a
five-month period."89 With this information at hand, police officers acquired
a search warrant and obtained Limbaugh's medical records.9" Objecting to
the seizure of his medical records, Limbaugh claimed that the police violated
his "right of privacy in personal medical affairs."9' However, in response,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that in this situation, "the constitu-
tional right of privacy in medical records is not implicated by the State's
seizure and review of medical records. 92 Such strict enforcement of section
893.13 reveals the State's eagerness to prevent the widespread prescription
drug problem.93
However, although Chapter 893 does impose certain limitations and re-
strictions on controlled substance prescriptions, it has often been viewed as
useless-lacking any type of prescription drug monitoring database. 94 While
84. See id. § 893.13.
85. FLA. STAT. § 893.13(7)(a)8. Section 893.13(7)(a)9 further declares it unlawful for
any person to "acquire or obtain, or attempt to acquire or obtain, possession of a controlled
substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge." Id. § 893.13(7)(a)9.
86. 887 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
87. Id. at 389.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 390.
91. Limbaugh, 887 So. 2d at 390.
92. Id. at 398.
93. See id.
94. See Blum, supra note 27. Dr. Miguel, a University of South Florida professor of pain
medicine, called such legislative inaction, "infuriating and depressing," stating, "You have to
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Bill Janes, director of the Florida Office of Drug Control, discussed that, a
"prescription-tracking system is not a cure-all," he nevertheless stated that it
"could help prevent doctors and pharmacists from unwittingly aiding addicts
and drug dealers. 9 5 Other Florida lawmakers and supporters of stricter regu-
lations have made prescription drug monitoring a top priority.96 Further-
more, non-Florida residents have also expressed their desire for a drug moni-
toring program in Florida in order to control the rampant drug trafficking
link between Florida and their own states.97 Discussing how important a
Florida prescription database is to the State of Kentucky, David Mongiardo,
Kentucky Lieutenant Governor, stated, "This is a major piece of legislation
that we have to have in order to protect our [own] citizens."98
III. SECTION 893.055
A. Legislative History
After rejecting similar prescription drug monitoring bills for years, the
Florida Legislature passed Senate Bill 462-Prescription Drugs Act-in
June of 2009. 9 The new legislation requires the State to create a prescription
drug monitoring database. 1° ° Sponsored by Senator Mike Fasano, among
others, Senate Bill 462 creates section 893.055 and is designed to combat
Florida's problem with pill mills and doctor shopping. °1 One of the bill's
supporters, Representative Marcelo Llorente of Miami, Florida, commented,
"[T]he legislation will eliminate pill mills or pain clinics that are dispensing
drugs in a 'reckless manner and enabling the tragic deaths of countless
people.' 10 2 Included in the text of the bill are several "whereas clauses,"
provide Florida doctors with tools so they can safely prescribe these medications and know
they're in the right hands." Id. However, in Dr. Miguel's opinion, "Right now, doctors are
being made unwilling and unknowing participants in the drug trade." Id.
95. Id. Furthermore, "if criminal activity were suspected, police could get evidence
much faster." Id.
96. See Blum, supra note 27.
97. See Honeycutt, Virginia Hacker, supra note 78.
98. Id. According to Kentucky officials, drug addicts and dealers in Kentucky swarm to
Florida to avoid the Kentucky All Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting System,
KASPER. Id.
99. See LaMendola, Governor Signs Law, supra note 4.
100. See FLA. STAT. § 893.055(2)(a) (2009).
101. See CS for SB 462 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at I; Editorial, A Bill Crist Can Sign
Easily, PALM BEACH POST, June 9, 2009, at A8 (noting that Senate Bill 462 passed unanim-
ously in the Senate and I 10 to 10 in the House).
102. Deborah Circelli, State Targets 'Doctor Shopping', NEWS JOURNAL (Daytona Beach),
June 9, 2009, at Cl.
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explaining the purpose for creating the prescription drug monitoring sys-
tem.
103
WHEREAS, it is the intent of the Legislature to encourage pa-
tient safety, responsible pain management, and proper access to
useful prescription drugs that are prescribed by a knowledgeable,
properly licensed health care practitioner who dispenses prescrip-
tion drugs and that are dispensed by a pharmacist who is made
aware of the patient's prescription drug medication history, thus
preventing, in some cases, an abuse or addiction problem from de-
veloping or worsening, making such a problem possible or easier
to identify, and facilitating the order of appropriate medical treat-
ment or referral.' °4
After passing unanimously in the Senate and 100 to 10 in the House,
Senate Bill 462 was sent to Florida Governor, Charlie Christ, for approval.0 5
Despite the cries of opponents who believed that the proposed measures
would do little to "solve Florida's pill-mill problem," Governor Crist signed
the legislation on June 18, 2009.'06
B. Prescription Drug Validation Program
Subsection 893.055(2)(a) requires the Department of Health, by De-
cember 1, 2010, to
design and establish a comprehensive electronic database system
that has controlled substance prescriptions provided to it and that
provides prescription information to a patient's health care practi-
103. CS for SB 462 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 6.
104. Act Effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-198, 2009 Fla. Laws 1978, 1981 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 893.055 (2009)).
105. See Editorial, A Bill Crist Can Sign Easily, supra note 101.
106. LaMendola, Governor Signs Law, supra note 4. Florida Attorney General, Bill
McCollum, strongly showed his support for Senate Bill 462, sending Governor Charlie Crist a
letter stating, "These crimes are occurring in every comer of our state and they must be
stopped. I urge you to sign Senate Bill 462 into law and put an end to rampant prescription
drug abuse." Letter from Bill McCollum, Fla. Att'y Gen., to Charlie Crist, Fla. Governor
(June 8, 2009), available at http://www.postonpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/106pill-
mill-bill-letter.pdf.
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tioner and pharmacist who inform the department that they wish
the patient advisory report provided to them.'
0 7
As "part of a prescription drug validation program," the monitoring system
will provide prescription information for "controlled substances in order to
prevent the inadvertent, improper, or illegal use of controlled substances. '0 8
More specifically, subsections 893.055(3)(a)-(g) require that each time
a controlled substance is dispensed to a patient, the prescription informa-
tion-such as the name of prescribing practitioner, date, method of payment,
patient's name, patient's address and date of birth, and pharmacy informa-
tion-must be reported through the database system."° This reporting must
be done as soon as possible, "but not more than 15 days after the date the
controlled substance [was] dispensed," unless there is an approved excep-
tion." °
Additionally, the Florida Office of Drug Control, along with the De-
partment of Health, "may establish a direct-support organization to provide
assistance, funding, and promotional support for activities authorized for the
prescription drug validation program."... t Once "the direct support organiza-
tion receives at least $20,000 in nonstate moneys or the state receives at least
$20,000 in federal grants for the prescription drug monitoring program," the
Department of Health will adopt the specific rules for "reporting, accessing
the database, evaluation, management, development, implementation, opera-
tion, security, and storage of information within the system."''I 2 Aside from
107. FLA. STAT. § 893.055(2)(a) (2009). Under subsection 893.055(1)(b), "'[c]ontrolled
substance' means a controlled substance listed in Schedule II, Schedule IIl, or Schedule IV"
from section 893.03. Id. § 893.055(!)(b).
Substances in Schedule I have a high potential for abuse and have no currently accepted medi-
cal use in the United States. Schedule I drugs have a high potential for abuse and a severely
restricted medical use. Cocaine and mdrphine are examples of Schedule II drugs. Schedule III
controlled substances have less potential for abuse than Schedule I or Schedule It substances
and have some accepted medical use. Substances listed in Schedule IIl include anabolic stero-
ids, codeine, and derivatives of barbituric acid.
CS for SB 462 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 3.
108. CS for SB 462 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at I. However, this system must not
interfere with good faith controlled substance prescriptions made by prescribing or dispensing
practitioners or dispensing pharmacists. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 893.055(3)(a)-(g).
110. Id. § 893.055(4).
Ill. CS for SB 462 Staff Analysis, supra note 5, at 8.
112. FLA. STAT. § 893.055(2)(b). "All costs incurred by the department in administering
the prescription drug monitoring program shall be funded through federal grants or private
funding applied for or received by the state .... The prescription drug monitoring program




Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/1
2010] FLORIDA'S PRESCRIPTION DRUG MONITORING PROGRAM 753
providing funding, the direct-support organization will also assist and sup-
port promotions for the prescription drug monitoring system. 1
3
The system must comply with the standards of the American Society for
Automation in Pharmacy-ASAP-and with the Health Insurance Portabili-
ty and Accountability Act-HIPAA-along with any additional state and
federal privacy or security laws."14
Furthermore, subsection 893.055(9) declares it a first degree misdemea-
nor offense for individuals who "willfully and knowingly fail[] to report the
dispensing of a controlled substance as required by" section 893.055.'
15
However, subsection 893.055(5)(a)-(f) provides a list of those who are ex-
empt from the reporting requirements.'
16
Pharmacies, prescribers, or dispensers will have access to the informa-
tion on the database relating to a specific patient of that pharmacy, prescrib-
er, or dispenser.117 However, other access to the database is limited to the
prescription drug program manager or staff in furtherance of managing the
monitoring program.' 18 Upon approval from the program manager, certain
other entities such as the Department of Health, the Attorney General, a "law
enforcement agency during active investigations regarding potential criminal
activity, fraud, or theft [of] prescribed controlled substances," or a patient or
legal guardian may have direct access to the information on the monitoring
database.119
113. ld. § 893.055(11)(d)7.
114. Id. § 893.055(2)(a).
115. Id. § 893.055(9).
116. FLA. STAT. § 893.055(5)(a)-(f).
(a) A health care practitioner when administering a controlled substance directly to a patient if
the amount of the controlled substance is adequate to treat the patient during that particular
treatment session. (b) A pharmacist or health care practitioner when administering a controlled
substance to a patient or resident receiving care as a patient at a hospital ... which is licensed
in this state. (c) A practitioner when administering or dispensing a controlled substance in the
health care system of the Department of Corrections. (d) A practitioner when administering a
controlled substance in the emergency room of a licensed hospital. (e) A health care practi-
tioner when administering or dispensing a controlled substance to a person under the age of 16.
(f) A pharmacist or a dispensing practitioner when dispensing a one-time, 72-hour emergency
resupply of a controlled substance to a patient.
Id.
117. FLA. STAT. § 893.055(7)(b).
118. Id.
119. Id. § 893.055(7)(c)1-4.
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C. Rulemaking Authority
Along with creating section 893.055 of the Florida Statutes, Senate Bill
462 amended sections 458.309 and 459.005.12' The new legislation requires
"[a]ll privately owned pain-management clinics, facilities, or offices" en-
gaged in prescribing or dispensing controlled substances for pain treatment
to register with the Department of Health by January 4, 2010,21 unless the
facility "is accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting agency ap-
proved by the Board of Medicine."'
12
The amendment to section 458.309 subjects pain clinics to annual in-
spections by the Department of Health to ensure proper compliance with the
Board of Medicine. 123 Furthermore, the amendment requires the Board of
Medicine to adopt rules and standards of practice for physicians involved in
pain treatment. 124 Although not limited to these subjects, the rules created by
the Board of Medicine must, at a minimum, address: "(a) Facility opera-
tions; (b) Physical operations; (c) Infection control requirements; (d) Health
and safety requirements; (e) Quality assurance requirements; (f) Patient
records; (g) Training requirements for all facility health care practitioners
who are not regulated by another board; (h) Inspections; and (i) Data collec-
tion and reporting requirements."'
' 25
A very similar amendment to section 459.005 provides for the same
rules and regulations, but it applies to the Board of Osteopathic Medicine,
rather than the Board of Medicine.
126
IV. OPPONENTS OF SECTION 893.055
A. The Critics' Perspectives
Representative Carl Domino of Jupiter, Florida was among the ten Flor-
ida State Representatives who voted against Senate Bill 462.127 Representa-
120. Act effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-198, 2009 Fla. Laws 1978, 1992-93 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 839.055 (2009)). Subsections (4), (5), and (6) were added to section 458.309,
and subsections (3), (4), and (5) were added to section 459.005. Id.
121. Id.; FLA. STAT. §§ 458.309(4)-(6), 459.005(3)-(5) (2009).
122. Ch. 2009-198, 2009 Fla. Laws, at 1992-93.
123. FLA. STAT. § 458.309(4)-(6). Under section 459.005, "Board of Medicine" is re-
ferred to as "Board of Osteopathic Medicine." Id. § 459.005.
124. Id. § 458.309(5).
125. See id. § 458.309(5)(a)-(i).
126. Id. § 459.005.
127. Editorial, A Bill Crist Can Sign Easily, supra note 101.
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tive Domino, the sponsor of a competing bill, House Bill 143,128 feels that
section 893.055 is "designed not to work," and that the legislation "creates a
false sense of security.' ' 129 Joining in the fight against Senate Bill 462 are
many vocal lawmakers, drug experts, and citizens who have expressed simi-
lar concerns.13
0
Chief among the critics' concerns with the new legislation is the poten-
tial for security breaches.' 3' Although section 893.055 gives the Department
of Health until December 1, 2010 to design the specific requirements for the
electronic database system, the legislation does list certain minimum infor-
mation that must be included in the database. 32 It is the personal and medi-
cal information-name, address, date of birth, method of payment, prescrip-
tion quantity and strength, for example-that has people worried about viola-
tions of privacy rights and the potential for abuse. 133 Representative Domino
warned, "Think of the consequences of an out-of-control state employee who
chooses to access this database and make public highly sensitive personal
information. Even more troubling is the potential for hackers to infiltrate."' 34
1. Virginia Hacker
Ironically, amidst a push for Governor Crist to veto section 893.055,
these very same privacy concerns became reality for the citizens of Virgin-
ia. 135 According to reports, "the records of 8 million patients were stolen
from Virginia's prescription-monitoring system when a computer hacker
128. Domino/Aronberg Prescription Drug Validation Plan Saves Lives, Protects Privacy,
Costs Less, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 24, 2009 [hereinafter Prescription Drug Validation Plan].
Senate Bill 614, sponsored by Senator Dave Aronberg of Greenacres, Florida, is the analogous
Senate version of Representative Carl Domino's House Bill 143. Id.
129. Editorial, A Bill Crist Can Sign Easily, supra note 101.
130. See Circelli, supra note 102.
131. See Letter from Ellyn Bogdanoff et al., State Representatives, Fla. House of Repre-
sentatives, to Charlie Crist, Fla. Governor, (May 7, 2009), available at
http://blogs.tampabay.com/files/letter-to-governor-crist.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Ellyn
Bogdanaff et al., to Charlie Crist].
132. See FLA. STAT. § 893.055(3)(a)-(g) (2009).
133. See id.; see also Letter from Ellyn Bogdanoff et al., to Charlie Crist, supra note 131.
134. Carl Domino, Guest Columnist: Correct Method Needed to Curb Doctor Shopping,
TCPALM, Apr. 17, 2009, available at http://www.tcpalm.com/news/2009/apr/l7/correct-
method-needed-to-curb-doctor-shopping/.
135. See Honeycutt, Virginia Hacker, supra note 78. "[O1n April 30, the same day that
the Florida General Assembly passed legislation to create a monitoring system, [a] hacker
posted a message on Virginia's monitoring system saying he had stolen millions of prescrip-
tion records." Id.
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broke into it and demanded a $10 million ransom."' 136 Although it is reported
that the Virginia database contained no patient medical histories, the data-
base "does list names, addresses, and in some cases, Social Security numbers
of patients who received prescriptions for painkillers, such as OxyContin. '137
Prompted by the hacking incident in Virginia, thirteen Florida lawmak-
ers urgently sent Governor Charlie Crist a letter on May 7, 2009, expressing
their concerns. 38
We respectfully request that you veto Senate Bill (SB) 462 entitled
Prescription Drugs/Electronic Monitoring/DOH. This request is
based on a well founded fear that the sensitive personal and medi-
cal information contained in such a database would be susceptible
to cyber terrorists and criminals who would use such information
against the citizens of Florida .... Unfortunately, our fears were
reinforced this past week when hackers broke into a Virginia data-
base, similar to the one proposed by SB 462, used to track pre-
scription drug abuse.... While proponents of SB 462 promise a
secure database, any online security expert will tell you there is no
such thing as a completely secure database .... By allowing Se-
nate Bill (SB) 462 to become law ... you will expand government
further into the private lives of our citizens, and seriously under-
mine the safety and security of Floridians' personal and private
medical records.
139
However, Representative Kelly Skidmore of Boca Raton, Florida, who
co-sponsored Senate Bill 462, addressed these concerns and discussed how
under the proposed system, the names of the buyers, the drugs, and the dates
136. Id. Furthermore, the hacker threatened that if he didn't get the money, "he would sell
the information to the highest bidder." Id.
137. Id. The Virginia database "has not been operational since" the incident. Honeycutt,
Virginia Hacker, supra note 78.
138. See Letter from Ellyn Bogdanoff et al., to Charlie Crist, supra note 131.
139. Id. (emphasis added). Representative Carl Domino, one of the individuals who
signed the letter to Governor Crist, sent a similar e-mail to Bill Janes, Director of Florida
Office of Drug Control, and supporter of Senate Bill 462. See E-mail from Carl Domino,
Florida State Representative, Dist. 83, to Bill Janes, Director, Florida Office of Drug Control
(May 7, 2009, 3:46:21 PM), available at http://www.postonpolitics.com/wp-content/uploads/
2009/05/from-rep-carl-domino-district-83.pdf. In this e-mail, Representative Domino pleas:
I am now asking you to join me in asking the Governor to veto [Senate Bill] 462 as it clearly
poses a significant risk to constitutionally[sic] guarantees of privacy for our citizens. If you
still feel that the bill should go into law please advise me why and what steps you propose to
take to ensure that the Florida data base does not have similar risks.
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would be separate." Representative Skidmore stated, "Even if someone
hacked the system ... they could get only one piece."''
2. Other Potential Loopholes in Section 893.055
Aside from the possibility of invading one's privacy, section 893.055 of
is thought by some to be deficient in other areas as well. 14 2 For instance,
although the bill went into effect July 1, 2009, the Department of Health has
until December 1, 2010 to create the rules and procedures for implementing
the electronic database. 43 Paul Sloan, a Venice pain clinic owner and orga-
nizer of the Florida Society of Pain Management Providers, says, "The bill is
useless as it is now ... [and] will be ineffective in shutting down pill mills.
Pill mills will be completely unaffected."' 44  Additional time-related con-
cerns stem from the fact that "[e]ach time a controlled substance is dispensed
to an individual, the controlled substance shall be reported to the department
...not more than 15 days after the date the controlled substance is dis-
pensed."''45 With this delay, critics warn that "[slellers have 14 days to [log]
a prescription, giving abusers plenty of time to make the rounds obtaining
drugs before anyone can catch on.' 46
Also, critics worry that the legislation does nothing to prevent buyers
from using fake identification to obtain and hide multiple buys. 147 Further-
more, the penalty for a seller who skips entering prescriptions into the data-
base is a mere misdemeanor.'48
Lastly, patients with legitimate medical needs fear the effects this new
legislation will have on the availability and accessibility of treatment. 49
140. Editorial, A Bill Crist Can Sign Easily, supra note 101.
141. Id.
142. See Prescription Drug Validation Plan, supra note 128.
143. See FLA. STAT. § 893.055(2)(a) (2009).
144. LaMendola, Governor Signs Law, supra note 4.
145. See FLA. STAT. § 893.055(4); see also LaMendola, Governor Signs Law, supra note
4.
146. LaMendola, Governor Signs Law, supra note 4.
147. Id.
148. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 893.055(9).
149. See Blum, supra note 27. However, addressing these concerns, a "whereas clause"
from Senate Bill 462 states:
[T]he intent of this act is not to interfere with the legitimate medical use of controlled sub-
stances; however, the people of this state are in need of and will benefit from a secure and pri-
vacy-protected statewide electronic system of specified prescription drug medication informa-
tion created primarily to encourage safer controlled substance prescription decisions that re-
duce the number of prescription drug overdoses and the number of drug overdose deaths ....
Act Effective July 1, 2009, ch. 2009-198, 2009 Fla. Laws 1978, 1980 (codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 893.055 (2009)).
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Because pain treatment is often impossible to measure objectively, critics
worry that the new legislation may inadvertently prevent those who truly
need the drugs from being able to obtain a prescription.' °
B. Alternative Options: Biometric Identification
Although supporters and opponents of the bill share a common goal-
the monitoring and regulation of prescription drug abuse-they disagree
about the best method to achieve this goal. 5 ' Florida House Bill 143, Moni-
toring the Dispensing of Controlled Substances,'52 proposes an alternative to
Senate Bill 462.' Under House Bill 143, the database system would use
biometric identification technology to immediately monitor the dispensing
and purchasing of dangerous drugs. 154 Although House Bill 143, sponsored
by Representative Carl Domino of Jupiter, died in Committee on Health Care
Regulation Policy, its innovative technological approach to the prescription
drug war opens the doors for discussion.'55
The biometric identification system proposed under House Bill 143
would "require dispensers to use . . . biometric scanning devices-
fingerprints or retinal scans, for example-to biologically identify people
attempting to fill prescriptions for . controlled substances.' 56 A Florida
Department of Health database would "assign a unique identification number
to the biometric scan" while simultaneously "convey[ing] this information
back to the prescriber."'5 7 This unique identification number would provide
pharmacists or dispensers with immediate detection of prescription conflicts,
overlaps, and fraud. 5 8 Because the encrypted information in the biometric
database would be assigned a number rather than a name, proponents feel
this measure fights fraud and ensures patient safety more efficiently than
section 893.055.15' Furthermore, supporters of the proposed bill assure that
150. See Blum, supra note 27.
151. See Domino, supra note 134 (discussing an alternative proposal for prescription drug
monitoring).
152. H.R. 143, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2009).
153. See id. Proposed by Senator Dave Aronberg, Senate Bill 614 was the analogous
version of House Bill 143. LaMendola, Profiting from Pain, supra note 52.
154. See Domino, supra note 134.
155. See Fla. H.R. 143.
156. Prescription Drug Validation Plan, supra note 128.
157. Id.; see also Fla. H.R. 143.
158. Prescription Drug Validation Plan, supra note 128.
159. Dara Kam, Lawmaker's Measure Would Drive Drug ID Business to One Firm, PALM
BEACH POST, Feb. 6, 2009, at Al. Calling the alternative legislation, section 893.055 of the
Florida Statutes, "old-fashioned," Representative Domino stated, "Our stronger approach
precludes the filling of multiple prescriptions. The biometric identification would be re-
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even if someone hacked into the database, the advanced technology of the
biometric system would prevent individual identities from being revealed.
16
However, looking beyond the novelty of this proposed method, oppo-
nents such as pharmacists are troubled by the costs to implement the biome-
tric database.' 6' The biometric identification equipment could cost anywhere
"from $300 to $700 per unit," along with the regular "monthly software sub-
scription service" which could cost between $50 and $150.162 But, suppor-
ters believe this is but a small price to pay for the lives that will be saved:
Well-heeled supporters of the old technology have thrown up
roadblocks against the new state-of-the-art system. Some have ar-
gued that the small cost would cripple their profits. It amazes me
that anybody would fight for profits while people are dying. Lives
are on the line. It's critical for Florida to get this right. We can
choose the worn-out approach and, after more people die and pri-
vacy is compromised, come back in a couple of years and fix it.
Or we can take the right path, protect privacy, curb doctor shop-
ping and save lives.
163
According to Senator Aronberg, "Patients shouldn't have to fear the
prescriptions they are taking to make them well. This legislation creates a
21st century safety net to ensure the drugs they are given are just what the
doctor ordered. ' ' "6  Similarly, Representative Carl Domino commented,
"New technology is less costly, protects consumer privacy, and is in real
time and cannot be defeated by a false identification. 165 However, despite
the pleas from advocates urging lawmakers to adopt this alternative biome-
tric identifying database system, section 893.055 of the Florida Statutes went
into effect on July 1, 2009.'66
quested and entered on a real-time basis to an anonymous database, thereby alerting a phar-
macist filling an additional prescription." Domino, supra note 134 (emphasis added).
160. See Prescription Drug Validation Plan, supra note 128.
161. See Kam, supra note 159. Additionally, opponents allege that only one company,
Bio-Tech Medical Software Inc., has the resources to carry out the bill's requirements. Id. If
that is true, and drugstores are required to buy that company's biometric identification equip-
ment and software, then Bio-Tech "has the potential to earn at least $30 million in the first
year." Id.
162. Id.
163. Domino, supra note 134.
164. Press Release, Dave Aronberg, Fla. Senator, Floridians to Gain New Safeguards
Against Prescription Drug Errors Under Aronberg Legislation (Feb. 4, 2009), available at
http://www.flsenate.gov (follow "Senators Members Pages" hyperlink, then "Aronberg,
Dave" hyperlink, then "Press Releases" hyperlink, then "February 4, 2009" hyperlink).
165. Prescription Drug Validation Plan, supra note 128.
166. See LaMendola, Governor Signs Law, supra note 4.
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While some critics remain skeptical about the new legislation, others
are satisfied that at least some measures have finally been taken to combat
the prescription drug war.'67 Daytona Beach Police Chief, Mike Chitwood,
mentioned that he would prefer the fingerprinting system, "but [he will] take
anything [he] can get [his] hands on now.' 68 Similarly, Senator Aronberg
stated, "We need to ensure that Florida's system uses top-of-the-line tech-
nology to eliminate the threat from hackers. The bill I proposed would have
done so, and the bill that ultimately passed, can do so as well."' 69 Former
Govemor of Florida, Jeb Bush, applauded lawmakers for passing the bill and
commented that he had not "seen the details .... but if it is comprehensive
and implemented correctly, it will save lives."'7 °
V. LOOKING FORWARD
With the Department of Health having until December 1, 2010 to design
and establish the comprehensive electronic database system, what will hap-
pen in the meantime to the tourist-friendly pill mills and drug-seeking doctor
shoppers? On July 27, 2009, just weeks after the legislation went into effect,
local Florida newspapers reported that pain clinics already began experienc-
ing a drop in business.17' After P.S. Drugs, a Fort Lauderdale pharmacy,
posted notices that it would "no longer fill certain prescriptions for out-of-
state visitors," Bruce Derby, the manager of the pharmacy, reported that
"[b]usiness has dropped about 20 percent in the past month."'' 72 However,
for vigilant law abiders like Derby, the drop in business is worthwhile if it
prevents prescription pill traffickers from coming to Florida to obtain
drugs.
173
Although many other pharmacies have adopted similar policies barring
out-of-state residents from obtaining prescriptions, 171 this practice may too
have its drawbacks.175 For instance, Florida is home to many winter resi-
dents and extended-stay tourists who may have no other access to prescrip-
167. See Editorial, A Bill Crist Can Sign Easily, supra note 101.
168. Circelli, supra note 102.
169. Posting of Michael C. Bender to Post on Politics, http://www.postonpolitics.com/
2009/05/virgina-prescription-drug-database-hacked/ (May 5, 2009, 12:35 EST).
170. Id.
171. See Sofia Santana, Smaller Drugstores Turn Away Traffickers - Florida Identifica-
tion Required for Pain Pills, SuN-SENTINEL, July 27, 2009, at IA.
172. Id.
173. See id. Derby stated, "It's about having a feeling of comfort about not filling those
prescriptions." Id.
174. See id.
175. See Santana, supra note 171.
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tions. 176 Also, not every out-of-state tourist who visits a Florida pain clinic
has doctor shopping in mind; some tourists have legitimate medical needs.'
Furthermore, without servicing non-Florida residents, the smaller "mom-and-
pop pharmacies" may find it hard to compete with the larger national chain
pharmacies. 7 '
However, not all pain clinics have experienced a drop in business since
the enactment of section 893.055.79 In early March, 2010, agents from a
regional task force raided three South Florida pain clinics that brought in
over fourteen million dollars in cash within the past year. 8 ' While agents
seized truckloads of reports, computers, and pain clinic paraphernalia, con-
fused drug seekers continuously arrived and quickly left throughout the
day. 18
1
Recognizing that it may be years before section 893.055 of the Florida
Statutes takes full effect, some cities, like Dania Beach, are currently in the
process of adopting and implementing city rules to discourage future pill mill
pain clinics from opening. 82 In Dania Beach, the proposed law would pre-
vent future pain clinics from opening in redevelopment areas of the city,
mainly tourist and shopping areas.1 83 Furthermore, the law would prevent
on-site dispensing of pain medication-a service typically geared towards
doctor shoppers.' 84 While awaiting the effects of the proposed law, Dania
Beach already issued a moratorium, or freeze, on pain clinics in April of
2009.185 Other cities, like Coconut Creek and Oakland Park, appear interest-
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. For some struggling, smaller, and independent pharmacies, "the only way they're
surviving is by putting out oxycodone," stated Broward Sheriff's Office Sergeant, Richard
Pisanti. Id.
179. See Santana, supra note 171. After passing unanimously in the Senate and 100 to 10
in the House, Senate Bill 462 was sent to Florida Governor, Charlie Christ, for approval.
Editorial, A Bill Crist Can Sign Easily, supra note 101. Despite the cries of opponents who
believed that the proposed measures would do little to "solve Florida's pill-mill problem,"
Governor Crist signed the legislation on June 18, 2009. LaMendola, Governor Signs Law,
supra note 4.
180. Bob LaMendola, Pain Pills Worth Millions to 3 Clinics, SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 5,
2010, at ID.
181. See id.
182. See lhosvani Rodriguez, Dania Expected to OK Pain Clinic Curbs Today - Measure
Would Prohibit the Dispensing of Pills and Restrict Locations, SUN-SENTINEL, July 28, 2009,
at 1 B. According to the Sun-Sentinel, Dania Beach would "become the first [city] in Broward
[County] to pass a law clamping down on pain clinics, limiting where they may open and
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ed in taking similar measures. 86 Dania Beach Mayor, Anne Castro, believes
that "everyone is going to start adopting these laws soon."'
187
Furthermore, although the Department of Health must wait until suffi-
cient funds have been raised to set up the electronic database system, the
Department has already begun implementing other aspects of the law.188 The
Florida Boards of Medicine and Osteopathic Medicine recently appointed
seven Florida doctors 89 to handle the rule-making procedures, specifically,
designing the state-wide registration requirements for pain practitioners. 90
The new legislation requires all privately owned clinics advertising pain-
management services, or employing physicians that treat pain by prescribing
or dispensing controlled substances, to register with the state and undergo
regular inspections.' 9' Not only will the panel develop the applications for
pain clinics to register with the state, but also "[i]t will decide health and
safety requirements, the kinds of data clinics will have to report, how inspec-
tions will be conducted and what the fees will be."'92 As of January 2010,
about four hundred pain clinics had registered with the Florida Department
of Health, disclosed their owners, and prepared for inspection. 93 Chairman
of the state panel, Fred Bearison, optimistically reported, "[t]hey are going to
get inspected every year, and the inspectors can make sure they are following
the new guidelines we set up---and that's going to help keep them in line."' 94
VI. CONCLUSION
Following the grim statistics from the past decade, Florida lawmakers
and officials had no choice but to take stronger action against prescription
drug abuse. With the enactment of section 893.055 of the Florida Statutes, it
appears that Florida has made progress in its fight against the prescription
186. Rodriguez, supra note 182. In September, officials in Coconut Creek will evaluate a
previously imposed moratorium on similar pain clinics. Id. Meanwhile, Oakland Park, home
to "18 pain clinics within a two-mile radius," considered a moratorium, but decided against it
because of the difficulty in distinguishing between pill mills and legitimate medical clinics.
Id.
187. Id.
188. Carol Gentry, Doctors to Set Limits on Pain Clinics, HEALTH NEWS FLA., July 28,
2009, http://www.healthnewsflorida.orglindex.cfm/go/public.articleView/article/1 3136.
189. Id. The seven doctors include: Fred Bearison, Robert Cline, Onelia Lage, Steven
Rosenberg, John Beebe, Allan R. Escher, and Robert McCann. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Gentry, supra note 188.
193. Bob LaMendola, Pain Clinic Clean-Up Begins-400 Join Registry, but Many Don't
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drug problem. Although the critics of this legislation have expressed legiti-
mate concerns, many nonetheless remain hopeful that section 893.055 is a
step in the right direction. Joined by a common goal-the control of pre-
scription drug diversion-supporters and opponents of the new legislation
agree that something needed to be done to end the prescription drug war in
Florida. Critics and supporters alike recognize that section 893.055 will not
automatically fix prescription drug abuse. Palm Beach County Sheriffs Of-
fice narcotics agent, Robert Banuchi, stated, "It's not a cure-all, and we still
have to get it up and running."' '95 It may take weeks, months, or even years
for section 893.055 to make a substantial impact on Florida's prescription
drug problem. However, section 893.055-if nothing else-provides a step-
ping stone for the proactive measures that Florida must continue to take to
stop prescription drug abuse.
195. Tonya Alanez & Sofia Santana, Law to Combat Black Market 'Pill Mills', SUN-
SENnNEL, May 1, 2009, at I B.
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Every person's body contains an array of complex and unique informa-
tion, known as DNA.' These segments of proteins and molecules instruct the
body how to develop and function, and are the most basic ingredients of
every person's individuality and distinct life experience.2 Genetic discove-
ries and identification of specific mutations have even contributed to the aca-
demic, corporate, and health communities in uncovering secrets and insight
into the human body, health, and disease.3 An example of a recent genetic
breakthrough was the identification of the human genes associated with he-
reditary breast and ovarian cancer, known as BRCA1 and BRCA2, which
can help patients gain insight as to whether they are at risk of developing
these diseases. 4 In maximizing the benefits and possibilities of genetic dis-
coveries for public health, ease of access "is crucial if basic research is to be
expeditiously translated into clinical laboratory tests that benefit patients in
the emerging era of personalized and predictive medicine." 5
In an effort to reward and protect this new wealth of information and
scientific advancements, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has
granted thousands of patents on human genes, including BRCA1 and
BRCA2, 6 which give patent holders "the right to prevent anyone from study-
ing, testing or even examining a gene."7 While the public can in fact benefit
1. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN GENE PATENTS
2 (May 27, 2009), available at http://aclu.org/pdfs/freespeechl/brca-qanda.pdf [hereinafter
LEGAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN GENE PATENTS].
2. Complaint at 1, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,
669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 4515).
3. See Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: Free Riders, Hold Ups, and the
Future of Medical Breakthroughs, II TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221, 222 (2003) ("In order to
understand health and battle disease, scientists seek an understanding of [human] genes, hop-
ing to improve our lives and cure the diseases that plague us. The complete sequencing of the
human [genes] offers unprecedented opportunities for scientific advancement and medical
breakthroughs.").
4. News Release, Pub. Patent Found., ACLU and PUBPAT Challenge Patents on Breast
Cancer Genes: Gene Patents Stifle Patient Access to Medical Care and Critical Research
(May 12, 2009), http://www.pubpat.org/brcafiled.htm.
5. Complaint, supra note 2, at 2; see also Hill, supra note 3, at 228 (Proliferation of
diagnostic genetic testing "will undoubtedly aid physicians in diagnosing patients and in prac-
ticing more effective preventative medicine.").
6. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996) (issued May 19, 1998).
7. LEGAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN GENE PATENTS, supra note i, at I. Because patent
holders have exclusive rights over the genes themselves, they essentially have "a monopoly
over the patented genes and all of the information contained within them." Id.
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from an efficient patent system, unsound patents or "government sanctioned
restraints on freedom and competition" can also "harm the public by making
products and services more expensive, if not completely unavailable, by pre-
venting scientists from advancing technology, by unfairly prejudicing small
businesses, and by restraining civil liberties and individual freedoms." 8
Association for Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent & Trade-
mark Office9 was originally filed on May 12, 2009 by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Public Patent Foundation, on behalf of nu-
merous patients and researchers; and it is a new demonstration of concern for
the non-patent holding public, whose interests and voices have been absent
in the decision-making about the current patent system.' ° One of the plain-
tiffs, Genae Girard, was diagnosed with breast cancer at the age of thirty-
six," and in an effort to gain information about treatments and medical deci-
sions, she stated:
I... decided to be diligent about getting second opinions along the
treatment path ... [but] one company has a monopoly on genetic
testing of the BRCA genes. After I was diagnosed with cancer, I
was tested for hereditary risk for breast and ovarian cancers. Mu-
tations on [those] genes can show if you are at higher risk for these
cancers. I tested positive .... [O1nly one company . . . has the
ability to sequence them. I can't get a second sequencing done at a
different company to validate my results. I am thinking about hav-
ing my ovaries removed .... It is uncomfortable making such an
important decision based on only one test .... Having . . . your
ovaries removed [is a] serious procedure[] that cannot be undone.
Patents on human genes should not block patients' ability to get
second opinions. 12
8. American Innovation at Risk: The Case for Patent Reform: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
I 10th Cong. 1 (2007) [hereinafter American Innovation at Risk] (statement of Daniel B. Ra-
vicher, Executive Director, Public Patent Foundation).
9. 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
10. Id. at 369-72; see American Innovation at Risk, supra note 8, at 2 ("[T]he patent
community culture tends to dismiss and exclude the opinions of those it sees as unsophisti-
cated outsiders, but it is mostly because the general public does not yet realize how much the
patent system actually affects them.").
11. American Civil Liberties Union: BRCA-Plaintiff Statements (May 12, 2009),
http://www.aclu.org/print/free-speech womens-rights/brca-plaintiff-statements [hereinafter
Plaintiff Statements].
12. Id. (statement of Genae Girard). Genetic studies "will likely continue to identify
many ... genetic risk factors for common diseases. To continue translating these genetic
discoveries into improved health and quality of life, it is critical to ensure that affordable,
2010]
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The federal case of Association for Molecular Pathology, filed in the
Southern District of New York, attempts to attack genetic patenting through
theories and policies behind patent law, medicine, science, breast cancer ac-
tivism, and "unusual civil liberties argument[s] in ways that could make it a
landmark case."'
' 3
With the advent of technology, patent law addresses many things which
the Framers of the Constitution surely did not anticipate. Nevertheless,
"[p]atent law should not trump [c]onstitutional rights nor be used to impede
its own goal of advancing technology."'' 4 This article will analyze the validi-
ty of DNA patents, specifically the patent on the genes associated with breast
cancer, by applying the novel legal arguments raised in the pending case of
Association for Molecular Pathology, as well as suggest the need for an ex-
emption from infringement liability for exercising constitutional rights such
as freedom of speech, expression, privacy, and bodily integrity. Section I of
this article will begin with background information and history behind patent
law, its constitutional purpose, and how it has been applied to DNA. It will
also discuss the formation and opposition to the BRCA gene patents by ex-
plaining the causes of action in the Association for Molecular Pathology
complaint. Furthermore, Section I will address the need for a new interpre-
tation of gene patents by addressing the problems with the current laws and
precedents, as well as the controversy and debate of patenting something
which is naturally part of the human body. Section I will look to theories
and interpretations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments as new grounds
for attacking patents on human genes. Finally, Section IV will conclude by
discussing the recent cases and how they have changed the analysis of patent
claims in the Federal Circuit courts. It will also anticipate the defenses the
patent holder of the BRCA may raise, as well as the implications of the As-
sociation for Molecular Pathology lawsuit and how patent law might be af-
fected in the future.
interpretable clinical genetic tests will be available to all Americans." Stifling or Stimulat-
ing-The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 2 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing: Stifling or Stimulating] (statement of Wendy
Chung) (submitted in connection with statement of Marc Grodman, CEO, Bio-Reference
Labs, Inc.).
13. John Schwartz, A Cancer Patient Near Austin, in a Landmark Lawsuit, Challenges a
Company's Monopoly on Two Genes Associated with the Disease: Should a Gene be Pa-
tented? HOUSTON CHRON., May 17, 2009, at 8.
14. American Innovation at Risk, supra note 8, at 16.
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II. HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW, DNA,
AND THE BRCA GENES
A. Defining and Interpreting Genes and Patentable Subject Matter
Under section 101 of the Patent Act, there is no specific subject matter
proscription on what is patentable. 5 "[L]aws of nature, physical phenomena,
and abstract ideas" are not patentable subject matter.' 6 While a mathematical
formula is not a patentable invention, a patent may exist where there is a new
function produced with the aid of knowledge of such a mathematical formu-
la. 7 Consequently, patents may be obtained for any new or useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.'8 However, it is not always
clear how to distinguish an unpatentable principle from a patentable
process. 19 Because of the lack of legislative guidance, courts have extreme
difficulty in determining "what a patent does and does not cover," and the
discretionary "'broadest reasonable construction' standard" is often used to
evaluate the validity of a patent claim. 20 As a result, quality of patent law has
suffered, and private patent holders have the potential ability to deny the
American people of significant advances that may benefit and address the
needs of the public.
2
'
Underlying the constitutional tests and congressional conditions
for patentability is the balancing of two interests-the interest of
the public in being protected against monopolies and in having
ready access to and use of new items versus the interest of the
country, as a whole, in encouraging invention by rewarding crea-
tive persons for their innovations. By declaring a constitutional
15. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
16. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). "A principle, in the abstract, is a
fundamental truth." Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (quoting Gottschalk v. Ben-
son, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)) (internal quotations marks omitted); accord Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). Such discoveries "are manifestations of...
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." Id.
17. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981).
18. See Flook, 437 U.S. at 588-89.
19. Id. at 589; see also Lab Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 134 (2006) (per curiam) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[M]any a patentable invention rests
upon its inventor's knowledge of natural phenomena; many 'process' patents seek to make
abstract intellectual concepts workably concrete; and all conscious human action involves a
mental process.").
20. American Innovation at Risk, supra note 8, at 6, 14.
21. Id. at 15. "That fundamental limitation on the scope of what can be patented is
needed to protect the public domain of science and nature from being appropriated through
private property rights." Id. at 17.
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standard of patentability, however, the Court, rather than Con-
gress, will be doing the ultimate weighing.
22
Currently, the USPTO awards patents on human genes, 23 usually mean-
ing that the patent holder prevents laboratories from analyzing "the gene for
mutations in order to diagnose the presence of a disease or condition, such as
breast cancer," without permission and a high priced licensing fee.24 Ap-
proximately twenty percent of all human genes are patented, including those
associated with Alzheimer's disease, asthma, and some forms of colon can-
cer.25 Ever since the Supreme Court held that a genetically altered bacterium
could be patented in the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,26 courts have in-
terpreted patent law to "'include anything under the sun that is made by
m a n .
,27
The Supreme Court has recognized the danger of granting patents that
cover broad subject matter through application-especially in areas that are
vast and unknown.28 Defining the term "gene patent" and what it encom-
passes is not an easy task, and is open to interpretation. 9 With the increase
in knowledge regarding genes, the term "gene" does not only cover the ge-
netic material that encodes a protein in the human body, but also would in-
clude that broad sense of genetic sequencing of the entire segment of the
relevant DNA.3 ° Some argue that gene patents cover molecular constructions
that do not exist in nature and are corresponding structures that are derived
from naturally occurring genes. 3' The debate over patenting genes derives
from the fact that "naturally occurring genes as they exist in their native
state-as they exist in the human body-are unpatentable . . . raw genetic
sequence information;" but the irony of precedent is that the isolation and
"purification of a natural product from its native environment can confer
patentability on the purified [gene]. 32
22. S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 315 (2004).
23. LEGAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN GENE PATENTS, supra note 1, at 3.
24. Hearing: Stifling or Stimulating, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Marc Grodman).
"[E]xcept when blocked by exclusive licenses, clinical laboratories compete. We compete on
service.... We compete on quality.... We compete on price .. " Id.
25. LEGAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN GENE PATENTS, supra note 1, at 3.
26. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
27. Id. at 309 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. Rep. No. 1923, at 6 (1952)).
28. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966).
29. See Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and
Access: A Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 307 (2007).
30. Id.
31. See id. at 313 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 311. Compare Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., No.
04cvl200 JAH (RBB), 2008 WL 878910, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev'd, 581 F.3d
[Vol. 34
205
: Nova Law Review 34, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2010
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PATENTING BRCA GENES
When patent claims are drafted so that they cover any "recombinant or
isolated form of naturally occurring gene sequence.... they would appear to
cover any biotechnological product or process making or using the claimed
sequence," thereby having a patent over the gene per se.33 In this way, courts
are treating genes "as products in and of themselves, instead of guides to
future product discovery." 34 Accordingly, many argue that granting private
property rights over "such a fundamental aspect of our common human her-
itage strikes some as an affront to human dignity.
35
B. Myriad Problems
[A] "useful" invention is one "which may be applied to a benefi-
cial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention injurious to
the morals, health, or good order of society, or frivolous and insig-
nificant"-and upon the assertion that to do so would encourage
inventors .. .to publicize the event for the benefit of the entire
scientific community, thus widening the search for uses and in-
creasing the fund of scientific knowledge.
36
The patent over the BRCA genes held by Myriad Genetics, a private
biotechnology company in Utah, is an example of a detrimental broad patent
claim. 37 As researchers around the world were getting closer to isolating the
first gene to be associated with hereditary breast cancer, researchers from
Myriad applied for the patent, claiming they were the first to discover the
genetic sequencing.38 The patent relates "generally to the field of human
genetics," covers "methods and materials used to isolate and detect a human
breast and ovarian cancer predisposing gene," and "also relates to the therapy
of human cancers which have a mutation in the [patented] gene, including
1336 (Fed. Cit. 2009) (recently noting that "claims do not gain patentability simply by includ-
ing man-made compositions"-such as gene isolation or purification), and Funk Bros. Seed
Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (if there is to be a patent for an invention
from a discovery of unknown natural phenomenon, "it must come from the application of the
law of nature to a new and useful end"), with Holman, supra note 29, at 311.
33. Holman, supra note 29, at 313.
34. Melissa E. Horn, DNA Patenting and Access to Healthcare: Achieving the Balance
Among Competing Interests, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 253, 264 (2003); see also News Release,
Pub. Patent Found., supra note 4 ("'Genes isolated from the human body are no more patenta-
ble than gold extracted from a mountain."').
35. Holman, supra note 29, at 297.
36. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) (citing Justice Story's decisions on
circuit in Lowell v. Lewis, 15 Fed. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568)).
37. See Horn, supra note 34, at 269.
38. Id. at 269 & n.162.
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gene therapy [and] protein replacement therapy. 39 Unfortunately, Myriad's
broad patent claim also covers the ownership over the rights to screening for
drugs relating to cancer therapy, as well as screening for gene mutations,
which are essential to understand a person's predisposition to breast and ova-
rian cancer.' °
The suit filed against the USPTO and Myriad asserts that the patent
over the naturally occurring genes should not be patented simply because
they are "'isolated from their natural state and purified."' 41 A gene that is
isolated and removed from a human body functions the same exact way as
does a non-isolated gene inside the body.42 Therefore, removing the gene-a
product of nature--does not change the fact that it still remains and functions
as a product or law of nature.43 Furthermore, by patenting a correlation of
certain mutations with a high risk of breast or ovarian cancer, Myriad has an
unlawful patent over an abstract idea or principle, which allows them to gain
a monopoly over a scientific fact.44
Because the patent is over the actual genes, rather than a genetic test,
scientists and laboratories are prevented from performing alternative testing
on the genes. 45 Breast cancer is not a rare disease, but instead is one of the
leading causes of death among women.46 Right now, there are about two
thousand different mutations along the BRCA genes, 47 but because of My-
riad's broad patent claim and its incomplete genetic testing, little is known
39. U.S. Patent No. 5,753,441 (filed Jan. 5, 1996) (issued May 19, 1998).
40. See id.
41. Complaint, supra note 2, at 19.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See LEGAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN GENE PATENTS, supra note 1, at 4. Laboratory
Corp. of America Holdings involved the natural relationship between elevated hormone defi-
ciencies in B vitamins in human blood, but Justice Breyer and the dissent would have held that
such a correlation is merely an observable aspect of biology and the human body. See Lab.
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 135 (2006) (per curiam)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). The patent merely covered instructions for reading and understanding
the significance of numbers in light of already acquired medical knowledge. Id. at 137.
45. LEGAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN GENE PATENTS, supra note I, at 3.
46. See National Cancer Institute, BRCAI AND BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Test-
ing 2 (2009), available at http://www.cancer.gov/images/documents/abcb7812-al32-4e78-
a532- f002c92fa9b9/fs3_62.pdf.
47. National Cancer Institute, Genetics of Breast and Ovarian Cancer (PDQ): Major
Genes, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/pdq/geneticsbreast-and-ovarian/HealthProfessin
al/page3#Section_ I10 (last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
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about this vast array of information which may be vital to a woman deciding
to undergo preventative surgery4 8
Researchers and clinicians cannot develop or implement new tests
for breast/ovarian cancer linked to BRCA1 or BRCA2 if develop-
ment or implementation involves looking at [the genes]. Women
cannot give their blood or DNA to a researcher or clinician and ob-
tain a second opinion. The effect is to infringe on quality medical
practice and to compromise quality assurance and improvement of
testing.49
C. Impeding the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the broad power
"[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries." 50  Patent law, therefore, is aimed at fostering productive
efforts by providing inventors exclusive rights as an incentive for their re-
search and intellect.5' The rationale behind the purpose and efficiency of
patents is that competitors will be encouraged "to 'invent around' the pa-
tented invention, avoiding wasteful duplication of efforts, and insuring the
eventual dedication of invention to the public with the expiration of the pa-
tent. '52 Particularly in the field of diagnostic testing, competition is "critical
to protection of the public health. ' 3 The Framers of the Constitution, there-
fore, were concerned with "promoting certainty" in addition to the federal
policy objectives.54
48. See Timothy J. Ohara, Note, Patenting the Diagnosis of a Disease: The Scope of
Patentable Subject Matter Based on Labcorp v. Metabolite Labs, 38 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
139, 169-73 (2007); Horn, supra note 34, at 269.
With the breast cancer test,.., more reliable laboratory tests will enable better treatments or at
least enable more rational decisions about electing experimental treatments .... There is a
large number of diseases that could be potentially diagnosed and treated more effectively
through improved diagnostic testing .... However, researchers [cannot improve a genetic test]
if broad diagnostic claims are allowed to remain valid, even when there is a[n] . . . unmet need
for such an improvement.
Id. at 172-73.
49. Complaint, supra note 2, at 18-19.
50. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
51. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980).
52. Hill, supra note 3, at 236.
53. Hearing: Stifling or Stimulating, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Marc Grodman).
54. Chris J. Katopis, Patients v. Patents?: Policy Implications of Recent Patent Legisla-
tion, 71 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329, 346 (1997).
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The underlying policy behind patent law is that discoveries and inven-
tions should be used fully and freely. 55 Genes are at the forefront of public
interest, considering that many of them may hold the keys to life-saving
medical and scientific discovery and innovation.56 Unlike other patents on
more tangible and concrete inventions, genetic discoveries have been public-
ly funded through initial research, but private biotechnology companies, such
as Myriad, and the pharmaceutical industry are those that perform private
research under a patent in order to strive towards a commercially viable
use.57 However, some argue-such as those parties opposed to Myriad's
exclusive rights-that these privately funded patent holders are usually not
interested in making any further end product, or do not have the capability of
doing so.58 When this happens, further development is prevented because
intellectual property rights in genes and diagnostic testing are being pro-
tected too early in the research process.59
In a survey of clinical laboratory directors that perform DNA-based ge-
netic tests-including members of the Association for Molecular Patholo-
gy-a study analyzing the effects of patents on genetic testing revealed that
laboratories were being prevented from continuing already developed genetic
tests because of gene patents. 6° Because genetic laboratories have the ability
and knowledge to perform and translate clinical tests without the publication
of data supplied by gene patents, there is the argument that these gene pa-
tents are not necessary to provide the incentive for others to develop new
innovations in genetic discoveries. 1 On the contrary, when a genetic variant
is discovered and sequenced, such as the BRCA genes, patents are not cru-
cial for the development of the initial invention.62
The patent held by Myriad makes ease of access to genomic discoveries
restricted, and the BRCA genes have been underused in medical and scientif-
ic breakthrough as a result of the over-exclusive use of the patent holder.63 If
the potential uses and benefits of these genetic discoveries are not made
available to the public, access to personalized and predictive medicine is
55. See id. at 338.
56. Horn, supra note 34, at 262.
57. See id. at 263.
58. See id. at 265.
59. See id.
60. See generally Mildred K. Cho et al., Effects of Patents and Licenses on the Provision
of Clinical Genetic Testing Services, 5 J. MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICs 3,3 (2003).
61. See id. at 8.
62. See id.
63. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 2; see also American Innovation at Risk, supra note
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restricted.' Because the BRCA genes are not the only genes or factors asso-
ciated with breast cancer, there is still a lot to be uncovered about the disease
in order to maximize the benefits of genetic testing and technology. 65 How-
ever, because Myriad can decide how many tests will be done, and who is
entitled to receive and perform the tests, only a limited number of individuals
are using and testing the new information.66 In a statement regarding the
danger of patents on patients' rights by prohibiting medical innovation, the
American Society for Clinical Pathology reported:
[Myriad's] [g]ene patents limit the broad availability of diagnostic
tests due to the simple fact that laboratory scientists are prohibited
from performing genetic tests because of patent enforcement and
the threat of litigation. As a result, the market is dominated by a
single provider, eliminating competition and scientific diversity,
which ultimately drives up costs .... Such patents stifle the inno-
vative process, negating further refinement in test methodology,
improvements in quality, and access to testing .... 67
Perhaps the most disturbing effect of the Myriad patent over the BRCA
genes is that because there is little incentive for competition due to fear of
litigation, there is little incentive to improve the quality of testing performed
by Myriad.68 As a consequence, the company continues to deliver confusing
and ambiguous results.69 Because of the limited avenues of testing provided
by Myriad, women and their families are left without knowing whether they
should make a life-altering decision affecting their bodies, health, and value
of life.
70
64. Complaint, supra note 2, at 2.
65. See Horn, supra note 34, at 272-73 ("Science has moved away from thinking that
one gene is responsible for each disease .... [M]ultiple genes work in coordination; therefore,
in order to treat or cure a disease, research and experimentation upon many genes and their
functions is necessary.").
66. Id. at 269,275.
67. Plaintiff Statements, supra note 11. "In breast cancer genetic testing . .. we have
seen no innovation in the past five years-since Myriad Genetics introduced its most recent
test." Id. (statement of Dr. Harry Ostrer).
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I. The Need for Dynamic Constitutional Interpretation
As those in the medical profession continue to be cooperative and open
about their intellect and ideas within their studies, the case against Myriad
demonstrates the need to interpret gene patent claims through a new alterna-
tive means of constitutional purpose.71 When the Framers of the Constitution
drafted the provision regarding congressional authority over patents, the
science of genetic sequencing was surely not in their field of thought or im-
agination.72 Therefore, like the Constitution itself, patent claims are drafted
broadly to adapt to current social and legal issues in light of precedents that
are already understood and well known.73 Patent holders should not be able
to construct their own claims and laws in order to fulfill their own private
interests; rather, only Congress holds the broad power to grant patents to
fulfill the constitutional intent of "promoting the sciences and useful arts.
74
When patents no longer function as the Framers intended, patents are
unconstitutional. As the plaintiffs in Association for Molecular Pathology
contend, patent law affects many fundamental rights.75 Awarding a patent
for a human gene, such as those associated with breast cancer, prevents
scientific advancement and intellectual freedom by obstructing the free ex-
change of information that is vital to the workings of democracy.
III. NOVEL LEGAL CHALLENGES:
GENE PATENTS AS A CIVIL LIBERTIES ISSUE
In order to uphold the validity of the plaintiffs' unprecedented constitu-
tional challenges against patenting genes in Association for Molecular Pa-
thology, one must understand the inner workings of the relationship between
patent law and constitutional fights in order to appreciate these novel argu-
ments, keeping in mind that the Constitution, as a political invention, and
patents, as a physical invention, are both, in some sense, a source of intellec-
tual, social, and human development.76 Because Congress' power over pa-
tents derives from the Constitution itself, "constitutional interpretation must
be freed from the [past] circumstance[s] of the Framers," in order to allow
71. See Katopis, supra note 54, at 387.
72. See Thomas K. Landry, Constitutional Invention: A Patent Perspective, 25 RUTGERS
L.J. 67, 92-94 (1993) ("It has been necessary to adapt the Constitution to our advancing tech-
nologies .... The case for accommodation of progress without originalist objections ... is
supported by the interpretative accommodation of progress in patent law.").
73. See id. at 90-91.
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
75. See generally Plaintiff Statements, supra note 11.
76. See Landry, supra note 72, at 97 (emphasis added).
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modem interpreters and judges to accommodate the changes caused by the
new unknown realm of intellectual property that is engraved in genetic
sciences."' The power granted to a patent holder is created by constitutional
power.78 Thus, constitutional law demands the flexibility and endurance of
protections of fundamental liberties and core principles of a democratic so-
ciety. To achieve the constitutional requisites of patent law, one must devel-
op new conceptions of constitutional rights as exemptions from governmen-
tal power.79 Patents exist only for a limited lifetime.80 The Constitution lives
forever. The enumerated power granted to Congress in Article I "is not an
end in itself for the typical citizen in whose name the Constitution was rati-
fied as supreme law."
81
A. Granting Exclusive Licenses Infringe on First Amendment Rights
Although the First Amendment states, "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, 82 the text also applies to
other forms of conduct and communication, such as expression of ideas and
knowledge, self-expression, and the dissemination of information. 83 Patent
law serves the same purpose as does the First Amendment-to place know-
ledge and innovation on an equal playing field in order to develop new ideas
based on actual merit and effort, and not based on what is dictated by more
powerful organizations and the government. 84 Therefore, if a gene patent
prevents the progress of scientific and medical breakthroughs and innova-
tions, the First Amendment is inevitably implicated because the federal gov-
ernment has awarded the patent holder with the exclusive rights to deny oth-
ers from researching the genetic sequences, which results in the silencing of
future knowledge, ideas, and expression. 85 After all, "[tihe first amendment
is there so as to enrich the gene pool of ideas. 86
77. Id.
78. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
79. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 146-47 (1984).
80. See Hill, supra note 3, at 233.
81. BARBER, supra note 79, at 106.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
83. See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1998) ("[Tlhe bare text of the First
Amendment provides only a hint of the ultimate contours of legal protection.").
84. Paul Heckel, Patents, Ecology and the First Amendment, PANDAB, July 6, 1998,
http://www.pandab.org/patents-ecology-first-amendment.html. ("The role of patent laws
plays in encouraging innovation is the same role as the first amendment plays in encouraging
open political discussion and thus change: they make it possible to challenge entrenched and
powerful established interests.").
85. See generally FARBER, supra note 83. It is important to "preserve a predominantly
free enterprise economy, [and] the allocation of our resources ... will be made through nu-
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In the case of Association of Molecular Pathology, the patent for the
BRCA genes is drafted in such a way that it gives Myriad not only exclusive
rights but also exclusive license, which makes it more difficult for others to
express opinions and share ideas regarding the breast cancer enigma.87 If
patents such as the one held by Myriad are an unconstitutional private own-
ership of a basic idea or human knowledge, then the gene patent therefore
infringes on the First Amendment rights of researchers, doctors, patients, and
the American public, who have a fundamental right to access known, benefi-
cial public information.88 There are thousands of physicians, researchers,
pathologists and scientists who are able and willing to look at and sequence a
person's BRCA genes and determine whether a mutation exists that would
increase that person's risk of breast or ovarian cancer.8 9 Genes contain the
necessary information towards developing cures and therapies for diseases;
however, "[t]he only thing that prevents those doctors and scientists from
looking at the human BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes is Myriad's patents. 90
1. Self-Realization Values and the Attainment of Truth in the Marketplace
of Ideas
Intrinsic in the First Amendment is the importance of attaining truth
through the exchange of facts and personal fulfillment. 9' "If people lack
merous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the
aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial informa-
tion is indispensable." Id. at 152 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Con-
sumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 765 (1976)) (emphasis added).
86. Heckel, supra note 84 (emphasis added).
87. See Plaintiff Statements, supra note 11.
When we have only one laboratory that we can use, we have no way of saying to our patients,
"let's do this a different way" or "let's ask someone else." Sometimes our patients say, "Let's
try another laboratory. Maybe this laboratory made a mistake or maybe there is another me-
thod to look at genes." Together we make an effort to exhaust all of the possibilities. Having
only one laboratory to perform a test because the genes are patented restricts our ability to ask
for another opinion. A second opinion is frequently a must in medicine when there are impor-
tant decisions to be made. We should also have the opportunity to have a second or even a
third opinion when it comes to genetic testing.
Id. (statement of Elsa Reich, Dep't of Pediatrics at N.Y. Univ. School of Med.); see also Hill,
supra note 3, at 233. Since Myriad holds a patent on the molecule itself, this "confers the
broadest protection to the patentee because the claimed molecule will fall within the scope of
the patent regardless of what process is used to make the product." Id.
88. See LEGAL CHALLENGE TO HUMAN GENE PATENTS, supra note 1, at 7 (The public has
a "right to benefit from scientific breakthroughs that advance medical research.").
89. Complaint, supra note 2, at 25.
90. Id. The BRCA genes are pure information-not inventions-and in order to invent
around them, the actual sequences must be freely available to utilize. Id. (emphasis added).
91. FARBER, supra note 83, at 4.
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access to a wide range of ideas, they are prevented from imagining the full
range of possibilities in their lives."92 From the viewpoint of those wishing
to study and research BRCA genes, and other genetic disorders and treat-
ments related to them, the repressive nature of the patent system can confine
their ability to express their perspectives, thereby taking a sense of self-
ownership away from them.93
The Supreme Court once said that "[o]ur [n]ation is deeply committed
to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us
and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a spe-
cial concern of the First Amendment . . . 94 For those who have devoted
their lives and studies to uncovering the endless possibilities in the field of
genetic science, the patent law system seems to work against their devotion
for their work and desire to acquire knowledge.95 Patents are economically
driven, but in the world of science and research, personal wealth often takes
a back seat to recognition among peers and self-gratification. 96 Therefore, in
the case of the plaintiffs opposing the BRCA gene patent, the patents are
unnecessarily restrictive in that they deny the personal quest for scientific
truth and progress in answering a usually narrow question with a specific
answer.97 By patenting the BRCA genes, the government is sanctioning the
patenting of useful scientific information and the abstract idea that mutations
occur outside of the body.98 In fact, little is known to certainty regarding
92. Id.
93. See id.; see also Brian C. Murchison, Speech and the Self-Realization Value, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443, 446 (1998) (explaining that the freedom to participate in deci-
sions is a necessary ingredient to a democratically-governed society).
94. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
95. See generally Plaintiff Statements, supra note 11. There is a "strong disincentive to
perform translational research, [which] applies to many other academically based genetics
testing laboratories, thus depriving patient populations from the active research involvement
of some of the best scientists and institutions in the world." Id. (statement of David H. Led-
better, Ph.D.).
96. See Hill, supra note 3, at 243. Although there might be some underlying economic
incentive behind genetic sciences, the foremost goal of scientists is defining individual
achievement. Id. (citing John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentabili-
ty: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 147-49
(2001)).
97. See id. at 244. The validation of scientific findings, which are confirmed by others in
the field, are vital in searching for scientific truth among different techniques and ways of
approaching the scientific enigma in question. Id. (citing Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and
the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017,
1048-53 (1989)).
98. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 23 (What is patented is that the two forms of the
BRCAI and BRCA2 genes have been made different because of nature-an abstract idea not
known to be true.).
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breast cancer genetics, and if these ideas are treated as any other traditionally
patented products, the public "marketplace of ideas" will be burdened by
patent regulations.99
Because the significance of the test results of BRCA genetic tests are
often unclear and meaningless, the results lack an objective quality-even
though other physicians who actually interpret these results have the ability
to perform further testing." When a patient or a physician receives a test
result of "variants of unknown significance," it can be confusing because
there is no way to acquire a definite answer whether the patient can surely be
at a higher risk of developing cancer.' °' Especially in the realm of medicine
and health, the providers of beneficial services should act with the patients'
best interests in mind.
Progress in the natural sciences is not remotely confined to find-
ings made in the laboratory. Insights into the mysteries of nature
are born of hypothesis and speculation. The more so is this true in
the pursuit of understanding in the groping endeavors . . . the con-
cern of which is man and society .... [I]f understanding be an es-
sential need of society-inquiries into these problems [by those in
their respective occupations], speculations about them, stimulation
in others of reflection upon them, must be left as unfettered as
possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into this ac-
tivity of freedom [that is a special concern of the First Amend-
ment]. 102
By allowing Myriad Genetics to hold the power and wealth of vital in-
formation to sick patients, the quality of health care inevitably suffers. The
complaint of Association for Molecular Pathology points to the fact that
"[f]or at least some portions of the life of the [BRCA genes], Myriad did not
perform certain tests that were known to reveal additional mutations that
99. See FARBER, supra note 83, at 5 (noting that society can benefit from a wide array of
ideas in order to conceptualize and confirm true ideas by disproving false, or bad, ones).
100. See generally Cho et al., supra note 60 (finding that genetic laboratory directors felt
that gene patents delayed or inhibited research, especially regarding genetic testing they had
already been performing before the issuance of a gene patent). While there exists an experi-
mental use exemption for infringement liability, it has been interpreted to have no significant
effect on the patent system and researchers' rights. See American Innovation at Risk, supra
note 8, at 16 (noting that "it seems perverse to subject scientific research to the risk of in-
fringement liability .... [but] legislative action is now [needed] to restore the proper balance
between the private rights of patent holders and the public interest in advancing technology.").
101. Plaintiff Statements, supra note 11 (statement of Harry Ostrer, M.D.).
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increased the risk of breast and/or ovarian cancer." 10 3 Myriad's patent over
the BRCA genes, therefore, does not coincide with the constitutional purpos-
es behind the Patent Act and merely has the effect of prohibiting others in the
medical and scientific fields from disseminating useful knowledge and
ideas. °4 Contrary to what proponents of patents on genes may argue about
negative impacts of duplicative research, multiple teams of researchers can
actually scrutinize the same problems in order to efficiently reach and vali-
date a particular result.'05 In fact, it is likely that when multiple individuals
research the same subject matter-BRCA genes and the significance of their
mutations-the "marketplace of ideas" can be filled with new implications
and conclusions arising from the initial discovery.'06
2. Chilling Effects Doctrine and the Public's Right to Know
Today, doctors are viewed as individuals who are part of a prestigious
team and work together by sharing insights and intellectual honesty, in order
to inform each other and their patients. 10 7 However, because Myriad does
not share the information that is personally held in its large database of
BRCA1 and BRCA2 data, researchers are "chilled from engaging in research
on other genes," despite the fact that it is well-known that the BRCA genes
"interact with other genes in ways that are not yet fully understood."'0 8 Up
until this point in time, there have only been two lawsuits involving Myriad
and its BRCA patents, but neither proceeded far enough to reach a substan-
tive ruling.1°9 Consequently, "none of the fears" and potential harm caused
by gene patents have materialized, despite the fact that many would agree
that declaring private ownership of a human gene is morally inappropriate. °"0
One lawsuit for infringement involved the University of Pennsylvania, which
had been providing commercial genetic testing for the BRCA1 gene, but
decided to cease testing in order to avoid litigation."' This demonstrates the
103. Complaint, supra note 2, at 26.
104. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966) (Congress did not intend for a
patent to be "a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its
successful conclusion.") (emphasis added).
105. Katopis, supra note 54, at 390.
106. See id. ("'The benefits of the parallel research strategy include, increased returns
corresponding to the number of alternatives; [as well as] a higher rate of 'learning'.
(citing Eisenberg, supra note 97, at 1065).
107. Id. at 388.
108. Complaint, supra note 2, at 28.
109. Holman, supra note 29, at 346-47.
110. Id. at 352.
111. Id. at 347.
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"chilling effect of gene patents" and the negative impact on access to health-
care and genetic testing."
12
The chilling effect doctrine, as a basis for protecting First Amendment
rights, understands that when the expression of viewpoints and freedom to
engage in certain activities is limited because of indirect government regula-
tion, a chilling effect occurs because of the abridgment of First Amendment
freedoms.1 3 Myriad, as the exclusive holder of the rights to the BRCA
genes, charges approximately $3000 for a genetic test, and charges high
amounts for licensing fees." 4 However, even if these licensing practices are
available, the high prices and fees have led researchers to shut down labs and
halt research efforts."5 Lab shut-downs result in the chilling effect of not
being able "to gain access to the latest information [and] can result in a dis-
covery... not being made at all." '1 6 Plaintiff Arupa Ganguly is an Associate
Professor in the Department of Genetics at the Hospital of the University of
Pennsylvania whose field of study involved clinical practice relating to
breast cancer, but she was forced to discontinue her research because of a
cease-and-desist letter from defendant Myriad." 7 "If [Myriad's patents] are
invalidated now, she would seriously consider resuming clinical practice that
is now prohibited.""' 8 First Amendment rights, and the chilling effect doc-
trine, are implicated through the exercise of patent rights held by Myriad
because it affects those who have put time and effort and devoted their lives
to studying breast cancer and related genetic disorders.
When there is a lack of competition in diagnostic testing, such as the
current situation of BRCA genetic testing, different viewpoints and avenues
for testing are chilled, as many providers have been prevented from provid-
ing genetic testing for breast cancer." 9 Because Myriad has the ability to
refuse to offer certain diagnostic testing, there is a reduction in possible ac-
cumulated knowledge. The chilling effects do not only harm certain individ-
uals wishing to assemble together in order to acquire, share, and reap the
benefits of their knowledge and viewpoints, but also harms society and the
general public--especially in the world of health care-because "[t]he great-
112. Id.
113. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 178 (2008).
114. Complaint, supra note 2, at 27; Horn, supra note 34, at 275.
115. Horn, supra note 34, at 275.
116. Id.
117. Complaint, supra note 2, at 6.
118. Id.
119. See Plaintiff Statements, supra note II (statement of Stephen T. Warren, Ph.D.)
("Even if an improvement in testing methodology is available, another laboratory is prohibited
by the exclusive license from implementing the testing refinement.").
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est benefit DNA patents bring is the promise and potential of curing, treating,
diagnosing, and eliminating medical conditions that afflict all.'
' 20
When patents on DNA have the effect of privatizing biomedical re-
search, they chill upstream and downstream research. 121 Where clinical la-
boratory directors and genetic physicians would otherwise have the right to
freely practice their own trade, patents on DNA force them to deal and li-
cense with the private patent holders. 22  Therefore, the monopoly of the
BRCA genes held by Myriad preempts any alternative avenues for commu-
nicating related expression and viewpoints regarding breast cancer and ge-
netic disorders, effectually chilling, undermining, and blocking the public's
right to benefit from better medical care for hereditary forms of breast can-
cer. 23 "As it currently stands, because of exclusive gene testing patents, no
single laboratory in the United States could offer full genome sequencing for
clinical purposes."' 24 Therefore, by raising First Amendment challenges to
the patents held by Myriad, the plaintiffs in Association for Molecular Pa-
thology have the ability to prove that the BRCA gene patents hamper the
progress of useful arts and sciences on new legal bases that voice concern for
the chilling effects of restricting the bounds of practicing medicine and si-
lencing new research. 121 "'What they have really patented . . . is know-
ledge.""
126
120. Brian Gargano, The Quagmire of DNA Patents: Are DNA Sequences More Than
Chemical Composition of Matter?, 2005 SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 3, 36 (2005) (empha-
sis added).
121. See Horn, supra note 34, at 264 ("[P]atents limit the availability and raise the cost of
the therapeutic and diagnostic end products because the patents are owned too far upstream in
the research and development process.").
122. See Cho et al., supra note 60, at 3 (finding a significant number of respondents re-
ported that they had decided to stop performing genetic tests for clinical purposes because of
patents or licenses).
123. See Hearing: Stifling or Stimulating, supra note 12, at 6 (statement of Marc Grod-
man) ("[W]hen an exclusive license is granted, research on finding new genes that will en-
hance the clinical significance of the original discovery is brought to a halt.... In the area of
genetic testing, exclusivity is a formula for mediocrity.").
124. Plaintiff Statements, supra note 1 I (statement of Stephen T. Warren) (emphasis omit-
ted). Allowing a broad patent claim "amounts to granting a patent on the practice of medi-
cine." Ohara, supra note 48, at 147.
125. Broad medical diagnostic patents "could have a chilling effect on free speech in terms
of communicating good medical advice or the practice of medicine." Ohara, supra note 48, at
165 & n.248.
126. Schwartz, supra note 13 (quoting statement of Christopher Hansen, Senior National
Staff Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union). "Gene patents implicate the First Amend-
ment because the very thought that there is a relationship between specific genetic mutations
and diseases has been patented and because scientific inquiry is limited." LEGAL CHALLENGE
TO HUMAN GENE PATENTS, supra note 1, at 5. The monopoly that is created by granting ex-
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B. Fourteenth Amendment, Fundamental Rights, Privacy, and
Informed Consent
"'Imagine if one of your family members was making a decision about
surgery to remove her breasts [or ovaries] after a gene test result placed her
at high risk for breast [or ovarian] cancer and there was no place to get an
independent test done to confirm the results .. ,, ."" This is the disturbing
situation of many patients looking for some insight into their own personal
diseases or those of family members. The rapid pace at which scientific and
genetic technology are advancing foreshadows the continuing concerns over
"genetic privacy, informed consent, and the ownership and custodianship of
patient data. ... ,,128 When a person is denied the information that might be
readily available concerning his or her own health, the exclusion has an ef-
fect of taking away a person's constitutional right to control over his or her
own life and liberty.
The Fourteenth Amendment states that a person shall not be deprived of
"life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' 29  The Supreme
Court has recognized that individual rights and liberty interests encompass-
ing individual sovereignty, bodily integrity, and informed consent are vital in
order to protect and guarantee the most important decisions a person will
make in her lifetime.1 30 The freedom over one's own body and health has
been characterized as being pivotal to the liberties encompassed in the Four-
teenth Amendment. 131 Modern constitutional analysis, in addition, encom-
passes certain "zones of privacy, which were evident and sustained under
law since before the nation's founding."'1
32
In the world of therapeutic and non-therapeutic medical experimenta-
tion, a patient has the fundamental right to be informed through disclosure of
the benefits and risks of medical procedures-including complete and accu-
rate information containing a full description of a patient's condition-to
clusive rights over "fundamental pieces of knowledge infringes on First Amendment rights,
which protect the freedom of scientific inquiry and the free exchange of knowledge and
ideas." Id.
127. Press Release, Am. College of Med. Genetics, ACMG Joins Lawsuit Challenging
Patents on Breast Cancer Genes (May 12, 2009) (on file with author) (quoting statement of
Michael S. Watson, Exec. Director of the Am. College of Med. Genetics).
128. David Korn, Privacy and the Research Use of Human Tissue, in GENETIC TESTING
AND THE USE OF INFORMATION 73 (Clarisa Long ed. 1999).
129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
130. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-46 (1992).
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maintain autonomy over his or her body.1 33 In the case of Myriad Genetics
and its patents to the BRCA genes, breast cancer victims and those whose
family members have succumbed to the disease have been excluded from
information regarding personal information and the use of personal data.
13 4
When people are excluded from participating in how their personal data con-
tained in their genes can be used, there is an effectual feeling of uncertain-
ty.1"5 The lack of ability to maintain knowledge of one's own bodily and
genetic information can make a person powerless. 13 6 In the realm of possibil-
ities genetic information can reveal, the patent on the BRCA genes prevents
the discovery of new personal facts about a person that result from the ag-
gregation of information taken from the original, isolated gene.1 37 Informa-
tion contained in a person's genes is vital to understanding how the body
functions and reacts. 138 Therefore, in order to make intelligent and informed
decisions about one's body, one must have the most accessible and accurate
information. The women who are denied testing because they are unable to
afford Myriad's exorbitant diagnostic fees are therefore denied their funda-
mental rights to make informed decisions regarding choices over their body
and health. 1
39
1. Reproductive Liberty and Gender Discrimination
Reproductive liberty is a certain autonomy encompassed in privacy over
certain intimate decisions. 140 By focusing on the general realm of reproduc-
tive health and freedom, discrimination and subordination of women can be
found because the patents restrict a woman's freedom to choose to reproduce
at her will.14' Because reproductive liberty is a non-express fundamental
constitutional right, some scholars believe it falls under a penumbra of rights
under a right of privacy. 142 However, "even if privacy is taken to mean [re-
productive] autonomy, that kind of freedom of decision making presupposes
that the one exercising it has control over the ... act or its effects."' 143 Breast
cancer and ovarian cancer are diseases that mainly affect women, who as a
133. See GEORGE P. SMITH II, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 40-41 (1981).
134. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 2, 18.
135. SOLOVE, supra note 113, at 134-35.
136. Id.
137. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 2, 18.
138. See id. at 2, 16.
139. Id. at 2-3.
140. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
141. See MARCIA MOBILIA BOUMIL ET AL., LAW AND GENDER BIAS 20 (1994).
142. Id.; see, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.
143. BOUMIL ET AL., supra note 141, at 19-20.
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class, are unequally burdened by Myriad's patents. 44 "Because of this, re-
productive liberty must be found in the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."'
45
Because of the patent over the BRCA genes, the collaboration of some
of the nation's most experienced people in the world of cancer and genetics
are missing, and these women are suffering as a result. 46 Therefore, a wom-
an who is denied the completely informed decisional authority to remove her
ovaries is inevitably denied her fundamental right to choose freely whether
or not to have a child. 147 One of the plaintiffs in Association for Molecular
Pathology, Lisbeth Ceriani, submitted a blood sample, as recommended by
her oncologist, in order to determine if she should undergo surgery in order
to reduce her risk for ovarian cancer.
48
However, she was notified that Myriad would not process the
sample. Even though her insurance has informed her that it would
cover the BRCA genetic test, Myriad will not accept [her] cover-
age. Ms. Ceriani is unable to pay the full cost out-of-pocket and,
to date, has not been tested. Without the genetic test results, she
cannot determine the best medical course for herself. If the patents
are invalidated, Ceriani is ready, willing, and able to utilize [other]
additional resources for testing and research. 149
For a woman who is deciding to remove her ovaries, it is essentially a
decision to terminate her ability to give birth to a child. Something that the
Supreme Court has also recognized as part of substantive due process is a
fundamental right to be free from governmental interference affecting a per-
son's decision whether or not to terminate-or in this case, prevent-a preg-
nancy.150 The possibility of unnecessarily preventing someone from having
children brings back thoughts of Social Darwinism and the theory of eugen-
ics, which has been held to be morally unacceptable and inhumane.' 5' When
a woman is not informed to a sufficient degree to make a completely volun-
tary decision to make herself infertile, but a more knowledgeable physician
and genetic counselor is able to make such a recommendation for her, the
144. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 26, 29; BOuMIL ET AL., supra note 141, at 20.
145. BOUMILETAL., supra note 141, at 20.
146. Complaint, supra note 2, at 2, 18-19.
147. See id. at 2.
148. Id. at 10.
149. Id.
150. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
151. See BOuMIL ET AL., supra note 141, at 57.
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right to procreate is no longer a fundamental choice to uphold the existence
and survival of one's familial line.
52
2. Family Rights
In the doctor-patient relationship, there are many issues regarding dis-
closure to family members regarding knowledge of a certain genetic condi-
tion.'53 The genetic information of patients wishing to access BRCA testing
may not only reveal information regarding their own personal risks of devel-
oping cancer, but also may answer questions about relatives who have died
of breast or ovarian cancer.154 Currently, Myriad only offers genetic testing
on blood samples and has not developed any other methods of testing
through human tissue.1 5 If the family members have passed away due to
breast or ovarian cancer, the only available specimen available for testing is
human tissue from a previously removed cancerous tumor because the blood
is no longer available. 156 Therefore, family members wishing to have Myriad
perform genetic testing are denied from doing so, despite the fact that other
laboratories in the country are able to do so. 157 The family, as a collective
unit, has a common public interest and private right to claiming the informa-
tion in question.
158
3. Equal Protection as a Basis for Discriminatory Genetic Testing Quality
In 2005, approximately 1,433 BRCA1/BRCA2 genetic tests resulted in
genetic variations of unknown significance. 159 Unfortunately, the problemat-
ic test results provided by Myriad disproportionately affect African Ameri-
cans, Hispanics, and Asian women, who have been less likely to volunteer in
research studies to add information to genetic databases.1'6 "[T]here are mul-
l 52. See id. at 20.
153. See Dean Bell & Belinda Bennett, Genetic Secrets and the Family, in GENETICS AND
GENE THERAPY 209, 209 (Shiela A.M. McLean ed., 2005).
154. See id. at 210. "[E]ven if family members are not actually tested, in order to verify a
diagnosis clinical practice normally entails obtaining information about family members in
successive generations leading to the creation of a family pedigree." Id.




158. See Lawrence 0. Gostin, Genetic Privacy, in GENETICS AND GENE THERAPY 241, 304
(Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 2005).
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tiple links among race, gender, and genetics, . . . [but] [g]enetic differences,
too, are typically regarded as biological and 'real,' justifying differences in
treatment, with too little attention to the social choices involved.' 6' Under
Susan M. Wolf s approach to an antidiscrimination approach, the lack of
knowledge of genetic information of minority populations results because "a
norm exists . . . that all should be treated in conformance.' '162 The Myriad
genetic testing:
counsels that people of color should be treated like whites .... It
bifurcates the world into those who nonproblematically fit the
norm . . . and those who are problematically different .... In ge-
netic terms, this means bifurcating the world into those with non-
problematically "normal" genotypes and those with problematical-
ly "abnormal" ones. 163
Because no person has the same exact genetic makeup, it is important to
have a genetic database containing variants in a wide range of ethnicities, in
order to analyze and conserve the information to compare and correlate these
variants. ' 64 The Myriad gene patents, however, result in disproportionate
medical exclusion of minorities.' 65 Because Myriad faces no competition in
the market, "there is no incentive for them to improve the quality of data
interpretation ... 166
IV. CONCLUSION: CASE IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
APPROACHES
The outcome of Association for Molecular Pathology is still indefi-
nite. 167 "The rock was tossed into the biotech pond on March 29, 2010, when
161. Susan M. Wolf, Beyond "Genetic Discrimination": Toward the Broader Harm of
Geneticism, in GENETICS AND GENE THERAPY 159, 159 (Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 2005) (cit-
ing Rochelle Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Jurisprudence of Genetics, VAND. L. REV. 313,
315-17 (1992)).
162. Id. at 161.
163. Id. at 161-62.
164. See Hearing: See Stifling or Stimulating, supra note 12, at 3-4 (statement of Dr.
Wendy Chung).
165. See id. at 3.
166. Id. at4.
167. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 669 F. Supp.
2d 365, 369-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Since completion of this paper in the summer of 2009,
Defendants moved to dismiss, and Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on August 26,
2009. Id. at 370. "Defendants' motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs' motion for jurisdictional
discovery were heard and marked fully submitted on September 30, 2009, and Plaintiffs'
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Judge Robert W. Sweet issued a 156-page opinion holding that the purifica-
tion of a natural product (in this case, human BRCAI and BRCA 2 genes),
without more, could not transform it into patentable subject matter."'68 In
reaching the conclusion, Judge Sweet relied on Supreme Court precedent,
and determined that the proper test to analyze the patents was "whether the
invention had 'markedly different characteristics' from the natural prod-
uct.' ' 16 9 The court ultimately invalidated the human gene claims by looking
"at the isolated DNA for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes as claimed in the
patents, and held that it was unpatentable as it was not markedly different
from native DNA as it exists in the human body."'7 ° With regards to My-
riad's method claims, Judge Sweet sided with the plaintiffs and ruled that the
patents were indefinite and "were directed to an unpatentable abstract mental
process.''
The case is surely to have an effect in the world of policy and law as it
relates to the world of intellectual property and medicine. 72 Because of the
future wealth that awaits in the pharmaceutical and health care industries as a
result of genetic discoveries, it is unlikely that a court would completely ban
motion for summary judgment was stayed pending resolution of Defendants' motion to dis-
miss." Id. at 369. In their motions to dismiss, Defendants USPTO and Myriad directors ar-
gued that Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for constitutional violations and to challenge the
validity of the patents. See generally id. at 383-92 (explaining why Plaintiffs have established
standing); see also Defendant U.S. Patent & Trademark Office's Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion to Dismiss at 4-9, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trade-
mark Office, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09 Civ. 4515). However, the court
denied the motions. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
While the USPTO is correct that Myriad's refusal to license its patent broadly contributes to
Plaintiffs' alleged injuries, the patents were issued by the USPTO, in accordance with its poli-
cies and practices. It is those policies and practices that the Plaintiffs allege are unconstitu-
tional. The injury alleged is therefore "fairly traceable" to the USPTO.
... Granting Plaintiffs' request for relief would serve to render the claims-at-issue defini-
tionally invalid. As a result, the Plaintiffs would be allowed to engage in conduct currently
prohibited by Myriad's patents, and the alleged injuries would be redressed.
Id. at 385 (quotations omitted).





172. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology, 669 F. Supp. 2d at 370. The challenges to the BRCA
patents "raise questions of difficult legal dimensions concerning constitutional protections," as
well as "the need to adopt policies that promote scientific innovation in biomedical research."
Id. The outcome of the case against the USPTO and Myriad, and the resolution of the novel
legal issues "will have far-reaching implications, not only for gene-based health care .... but
also for the future course of biomedical research." Id.
2010]
224
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss3/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
the patenting of genes, in general. 113 However, in order to maximize the
benefits to the public, it is necessary that genetic testing is widely available
with the greatest possible quality. The case against the USPTO and Myriad
is rather a way to demonstrate the actual harms of broad patenting and licens-
ing schemes in such an unknown yet valuable realm of information and
sciences.
A recent case, Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative
Services,174 held that a correlation between metabolite levels and toxic results
from metabolic activity in the human body were natural, unpatentable, phe-
nomena, that would have existed without human intervention. 175  Certain
natural metabolites were not patentable on their own because the correlation
was a result from a natural body process. 176 However, with Judge Sweet's
new opinion, there might be hope that an appeals court may still hold that the
mutations on the BRCA genes-while believed to be environmentally caused
in an isolated, purified gene-are naturally correlated with a higher risk of
breast cancer, and are therefore not patentable. It will likely take years of
litigation to see whether Myriad's patents will meet whatever standard the
Supreme Court devises in the future.177
Perhaps the answer to gene patents might be to develop a patenting
scheme where there would still be incentive for intellectual efforts by ensur-
ing financial merit; but, instead of granting exclusive rights and licenses, the
patent would allow certain health-care providers access without infringe-
ment, or perhaps setting limits on licensing fees so that there would be de-
creased insurance barriers to patient access to quality healthcare. 178 Further-
173. Because only some of Myriad's claims were invalidated, while some remained un-
challenged. Ramage, supra note 168.
174. No. 04cvl200JAH(RBB), 2008 WL 878910, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2008), rev'd,
581 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
175. Id. at *6-9.
176. Id. at *7.
177. Susan Decker & Thom Weidlich, Myriad Loses Ruling over Breast Cancer-Gene
Patents (Update3), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2010, http://www.businessweek.
com/news/2010-03-29/myriad-loses-ruling-over-breast-cancer-gene-patents-update l-.html.
178. After completion of author's own research, conclusions, and recommendations-as
stated in Part IV of this article-the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Genetics, Health and
Society (SACGHS) for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a revised
draft report, entitled Gene Patents and Licensing Practices and Their Impact on Patient
Access to Genetic Tests, which includes six recommendations that stress equal and uninhibited
access to the benefits of genetic testing and research for Plaintiffs like those affected by the
broad BRCA patents. See SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND
SOCIETY, REVISED DRAFr REPORT ON GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING PRACTICES AND THEIR
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more, if the same genetic test could be performed with better quality and
knowledge by someone who has greater skills than that of Myriad, the gov-
ernment should not allow the public to suffer as a result. The personal right
of those wishing to exercise their constitutional rights to access and share
information and make informed decisions over their body should not be ab-
ridged simply because a court has read a patent too broadly.
pdf. The most controversial recommendation is "Recommendation 1: Support the Creation of
Exemptions from Infringement Liability," which suggests carving out statutory "exemption[s]
from liability for infringement of patent claims on genes for anyone making, using, ordering,
offering for sale, or selling a test developed under the patent for patient care purposes," and
"for those who use patent-protected genes in the pursuit of research." Id. at 90. The other
recommendations are as follows: "Recommendation 2: Promote Adherence to Norms De-
signed to Ensure Access"; "Recommendation 3: Enhance Transparency in Licensing"; "Rec-
ommendation 4: Establish an Advisory Body on the Health Impact of Gene Patenting and
Licensing Practices"; "Recommendation 5: Provide Needed Expertise to USPTO"; and "Rec-
ommendation 6: Ensure Equal Access to Clinically Useful Genetic Tests." Id. at 91-93.
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